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NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 
COMMANDER C. G. GILL, U. S. NAVY 



[-60' 



NAVAL POWER 
IN THE WAR 

(1914-1918) 



BY 

ci'C. GILL 

COMMANDER, U. S. NAVY 



MAPS AND DIAGRAMS 




NEW XSJr YORK 
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 




THE WORLD AT WAR, DECEMBER, 1917 



NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 



NATIONS AT WAR WITH (iKKMANV (.ir lini iMn, Aiinlilii, 
Turkey and IliilKfirlii): — 

SorMa (v«. Aiiiilrln July jfl, iol.|). Kumilu (Auuiint i, lan), rramc 
(AuKUnt ], IUI.I), llnllduin (AiiKUOl 4, lgl,|), (Irrut llrllnlii (Auiiual ,|, 
1014), Mdiilonrttni (vii. Atiultlit AitKtitit H, iui.|), .liil>iiii (Ailiillitt J.t, 
lyi,j), Itdly (Vfi. Aiinliiii Mny J4, luis), Siui Miiiltio IvK Au.ililii Miiy 
J4, loij), I'wlumil (Mnnli u. luif'), Uuiiiiiiiln (vii. Aiinlilu Aii|iu«l >7. 
I0i«), Hulled SInl™ (April (i. igljl, Culm (A|ull V, niiy), l'(UUVUm 
(April 7. 101/), (Imw (I'H.v, (liivl, Niiv. ill, mid, lic.vl, ..I Alm.July 
1, lui;). Slum (July ri. 1U17), I.lhrrlii (Annum .|, lui;). Cliinn (Auguat 

14, lull), llrni'.ll ((Vl.^lior j(i, lul'/l, llllii \M (April ij, luiH), Cunlil 

Klcn (Miiy l^, luil", Nlnuiiipm (klnv ji. imH). Ilnlll llulv is, uiiH), 
Ilimdurnll (Julv lu, i«iH). 



NAIIDNS THAT ilAVH 
SHVUKI'.I) KICI.ATION.S 
WITH (IUKMANV:- 

IMIvIn (Ajirll 14. loi;) 
UruHiuy ((H'l.;, iod) 
I'lTU jdcliiliiT (1, mil) 
ICilliulor (l)rc. 17, mi;) 



NATIONS NiaiTKAI, lUIT 
rAVdUUADLK TO TTIH 
AU.IliS:— 

ArKcntiuii, PnrnKUtiy, 
1 Chill, Sulviidor 



CHIEF NEUTRAL 
NATIONS:— 



Norway. Sweden, Dcnmorlc, 
Hulliind, Spain, SwiUerland, 
Mexico,^ Vcncxucla, Colombia. 
Note :— Aliilinnistan. 

llaluchistnn, 

Persia. 

Abyssinia 

nUo Dculrul, 



NOTE:-*Central and South America ore more or less 
involved, but in a diplomatic rather than a military 
sense. As Africa has been practically annexed by 
Kuropcan powers the whole continent is involved 
except the ai]cient empire o( Abyssinia and unap* 
propriuted portions of the Libyan Desert. Prac- 
tically all Asia is involved. Although Persia h.AS 
not declared war there has been considerable fipht- 
in^' there. fThe South Arabian revolt has aligned 
:tluit country la^ainst Turkey. 



^lity has become ditljcult and dangci 



The experience o[ this 



:me seventeen nntionalitic 



^tiiiiilJted the theory of na 

Allied sea power has permitted the 
scattered thr( 
of this force against me enemy. 

On the other hand, lack of naval control has isolated the Central Po 
Jul unscrupulous use of the submarine. Germany's submarine campaigr 
recard to neutral rights, and hasc.ist discredit on her national honolu I 
^ XUg ^ar has emphasised the importance of free pathways upon the sea. * the need of free out 
to the sea for land-locked nations, and the strategic value of narrow waters in which ocean highways c 
verge such as Panama. Suez. Gibraltar, and the Dardanelles. 

• President Wilson. 






COPYRIGHT, 1918, 1919, 
BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 



PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

JAN 27 1919 

©CI.A5 12169 \^' 



PREFACE 

The purpose of this study is to show the de- 
cisive role of naval power in the war. The scope 
of the narrative is limited to the more important 
naval events. These are discussed not so much 
with a view to completeness in detail as with the 
view of making clear points of policy, strategy, 
and tactics necessary to an understanding of the 
general principles governing the size, composi- 
tion, training, and uses of modern fleets. 

In the year that has passed since the original 
manuscript went to press the only major naval 
operation which has taken place is the overseas 
transportation of United States troops. This is 
covered in an additional chapter under the head- 
ing, "The United States in the War." Extensive 
notes have also been appended to this chapter de- 
scribing other war activities of the United States 
Navy. 

Since the battle of Jutland, war on the sea has 
not been marked by any major contact of fight- 
ing forces. Occasional raiding expeditions with 
attending light cruiser and destroyer engage- 



vi PREFACE 

ments, together with submarine encounters, com- 
prise about all that has been heard from the silent, 
though busy, navies. A noteworthy instance of 
recent sea fighting is the brilliant attack by the 
British against Zeebrugge. Another example is 
the exploit of the Italian Navy in torpedoing 
Austrian battleships at anchor in the harbour of 
Trieste. These are interesting enough in them- 
selves and by no means inconsequential, but do 
not find a place in this work, which is limited to 
the major operations of the war. 

Since the publication of this book, moreover, 
there have not been any disclosures or develop- 
ments of such a nature as to demand revision of 
the original text. Advantage has been taken, 
however, of the opportunity kindly afforded by 
the publishers to bring statistical data up to date, 
to perfect diagrams, and to make a few minor 
changes in arrangement and wording. With the 
exception of the additional chapter, the main 
body of the book remains substantially the same 
as when first published. 

The twelve chapters, with one exception, were 
contributed to The New York Times Current His- 
tory Magazine. The exception is the sixth chap- 
ter — The Dardanelles Operations — which was 
written to complete the series covering the major 
naval operations of the war. 



PREFACE vii 

The author takes occasion to extend his ac- 
knowledgments and thanks to the editors of The 
New York Times Current History Magazine for 
permission to republish, which they have kindly 
given. 

Acknowledgment is also made to Allan West- 
cott, Ph.D., Instructor in the United States Naval 
Academy, for maps and diagrams contributed and 
for help given in editing the text. Sincere thanks 
are expressed to Mr. T. G. Frothingham, to the 
Staff of the English Department of the United 
States Naval Academy, and to the Officers of the 
Oklahoma and the Seattle for many helpful sug- 
gestions cordially given throughout the progress 
of these studies. C. C. Gill. 



INTRODUCTION 

The present volume had its origin in lectures 
delivered by Lieutenant Commander Gill at the 
United States Naval Academy in the winter of 
1915-16 to midshipmen who have since been grad- 
uated and are now in active service. For this 
audience, the facts and lessons of recent naval his- 
tory had a special significance, as a very practical 
preparation for the responsibilities they were soon 
to undertake. To quote the words of Napoleon, 
"The happiest inspiration in battle is often a rec- 
ollection of the past." 

The discussion was afterward continued in The 
Nezv York Times Current History Magazine^ and, 
with the sanction of the Navy Department, is now 
published in book form. In selecting and prepar- 
ing the material, the author had in mind not only 
the special needs of young naval officers, whether 
midshipmen or volunteers now entering the naval 
service, but also the general popular interest in 
naval affairs. The book is to be used this year 
by the Department of English at the Naval Acad- 
emy in the teaching of naval history. 



INTRODUCTION ix 

Undertaking these studies before the entry of 
the United States into the war, the author has 
maintained throughout the standpoint of the tech- 
nical student of naval warfare, rather than that 
of the philosophical historian. Needless to say, 
he is not without strong sympathies and convic- 
tions ; but these, from the nature of the investiga- 
tion, are subordinated to the search for truth. In 
other words, the book is not partisan and is not 
propaganda; it has no special thesis to maintain 
— except an underlying belief in the importance 
of naval power to a nation whose boundaries are 
the two oceans, and whose interests extend 
throughout the Seven Seas. 

The wisdom of attempting to write naval his- 
tory at such close range may be questioned. The 
question may be answered by pointing out that 
the book aims to draw the significant naval les- 
sons, rather than to chronicle events in minute de- 
tail. Whatever the paucity of the data, it is im- 
portant that these lessons should be drawn im- 
mediately. Frank discussion clears the air. 

There is an advantage also in the contemporary 
point of' view, with its appreciation of concurrent 
events and the feeling of the hour. If distant 
perspective gives proper proportion, it also throws 
a haze over the scene. And in naval history par- 
ticularly, the facts are not always clearer with the 



X INTRODUCTION 

lapse of time. Historians a century ago could 
have determined, more easily than it can be deter- 
mined to-day, the exact manner in which Nelson 
brought his fleet into action at Trafalgar; and a 
century ago there was a recognition — more in- 
stinctive and less reasoned, perhaps, but not less 
genuine than to-day — of the greatness of that vic- 
tory and its meaning in the Napoleonic War. 

Students of naval history, therefore, may feel 
indebted to the writer for this book — written un- 
der pressure of duties afloat which since our par- 
ticipation in the war have left slight leisure for 
outside work. 

Allan Westcott, 
Department of English, 
U. S. Naval Academy. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 1 

II DEFINITIONS AND ESTIMATE OF 

THE SITUATION 9 

Sea Power 9 

•Sea Control 11 

Plans of Warring Navies .... 14 

III OPENING ACTIVITIES 19 

Strength and Disposition of Fleets 19 
"Goeben" and "Breslau" Episode . 24 
Attacks on Cable and Wireless Sta- 
tions 28 

IV NAVAL ACTION IN HELIGOLAND 

BIGHT 33 

V CORONEL AND FALKLAND EN- 
GAGEMENTS 44 

Battle off Coronel 44 

Falkland Islands Engagement . . 51 

VI DARDANELLES OPERATIONS . . 59 

VII NORTH SEA BATTLES 83 

Dogger Bank Encounter .... 83 

Battle of Jutland (Part 1) ... 88 

VIII NORTH SEA BATTLES (Cont.) ... 101 

Battle of Jutland (Part 2) . . . 101 

xi 



xii CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

IX SUBMARINE WARFARE .... 120 
X ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS ... 132 

XI UNITED STATES IN THE WAR . . 156 

Overseas Transportation of United 
States Troops 156 

Other War Activities of the United 
States Navy 163 

XII NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR . . 223 
APPENDIX 

(1) Comparative Strength of Navies . . . . 161 

Excerpts from a compilation by T. G. 
Frothingham, reprinted by courtesy of 
Current History 161 

Table prepared and arranged by C. H. Fos- 
ter, U. S. N. A 192 

Table published by oflSce of U. S. Naval 
Intelligence 192 

{£) "Emden" Exploits 195 

Excerpts from articles by Comdr. L. A. 
Cotton, U. S. N., and Lt. H. von Miicke 
(executive officer of Emden), the latter 
translated byLt. Comdr. J. H. Klein, Jr., 
U. S. N., reprinted by courtesy of 
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings . . 195 

(3) America's Part in the Development of Naval 

Weapons and Tactics 206 

By T. G. Frothingham, reprinted by 
courtesy of the U. S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings , . . 206 



MAPS AND DIAGRAMS 

Map of the World Indicating Barred Zones 
AND Location of Chief Naval Events . 

Frontispiece 

PAGE 

North Sea and Baltic 21 

Map of Eastern Mediterranean .... 25 

Map of German North Sea Coast .... 35 

Diagram of Battle off Coronel .... 47 

Diagram of Falkland Islands Engagement . 55 

Map of Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora and 
Bosporus (The Approaches to Constanti- 
nople) 65 

Diagram of Dogger Bank Encounter ... 85 

Diagram of Battle of Jutland 93 

British Fleet Formation 103 

Diagram Indicating Fleet Movements after 
Battle of Jutland 113 

Mine Fields Laid by British and American 

Navies in the North Sea 148 

xiii 



ILLUSTRATIONS 

PAGE 

U. S. S. Constitution 207 

American Letter of Marque Brig Grand 

Turk of Salem 211 

American Armed Brig Tenedos 213 

U. S. S. Niagara- 214 

American Armed Barque Stamboul . . . » . 215 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, 1837 216 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, 1916 217 

A Convoy Showing Escort and an Example of 

"Dazzle" Painting 152 

U. S. Naval Gun in Action near Soissons . . 184 



NAVAL POWER IN 
THE WAR 

CHAPTER I . 

Naval Power in the War 

NAVAL activities comprise : — constructing, 
arming, and fitting out men-of-war; the 
supply and training of the commissioned and 
enlisted personnel; the operation and upkeep of 
the fleets; and the maintenance of the necessary- 
navy yards and stations at home and abroad. 
Merchant marine activities, placed largely under 
control of naval strategists by war measures, 
include : — The ship-building plants ; the facilities 
for fitting out, docking and repairing merchant 
ships; depots for handling merchandise and 
passengers in home ports and foreign ports 
of call; the merchant fleets; their personnel; 
and the agents and machinery used in the 
management of ocean traffic. The material used 
in tjiese activities involves the industries of mine, 



2 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

field, forest and work shop. Exports and im- 
ports, emigrants, and immigrants, when carried 
in ships, are also factors of Sea Power. 

In the war just ended the transportation and 
supply of the Allied armies depended on naval 
power. Naval strategy was the grand strategy 
of the war. 

Allied naval strategy aimed at the gradual 
exhaustion of the enemy. The ultimate success 
of this strategy was foretold by two striking ex- 
amples from History — the Napoleonic Wars 
and our own Civil War. In the Napoleonic Wars 
the pressure of British Sea Power prostrated the 
industry of France, broke her spirit of aggression, 
and prepared decisive tactical victories in the field. 
In like manner during our Civil War the pressure 
of the Union blockade cut off the Southern armies 
from their source of supply, destroyed the hopes 
of the Confederacy, and paved the way to Grant's 
victory and the ensuing peace. 

The two most conspicuous naval actions in this 
war, the Battle of Jutland and the attempt to 
force the Dardanelles, were disappointing in re- 
sults. At Jutland the German High Sea Fleet, 
although damaged, escaped the clutches of the 
British Grand Fleet, and at the Dardanelles the 
Allied offensive to gain control of the approaches 
to Constantinople and Russia's Black Sea ports 



NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 3 

was a failure. As a consequence, in some quarters 
dissatisfaction led to criticism of Allied naval 
strategy as a whole. To be sure, complete suc- 
cesses at Jutland and the Dardanelles would have 
greatly promoted the aim of Allied strategy; but 
care should be taken to assign the proper causes 
to tactical failures. 

Due weight should be given Allied naval 
achievements: — Restriction of German and Aus- 
trian battle fleets; destruction of enemy cruisers 
abroad; annihilation of enemy merchant ma- 
rine activities; stoppage of enemy supplies from 
oversea sources; defeat of the enemy submarine 
policy; transportation and supply of the west- 
ern armies: — In short, the vitalisation of Allied 
forces and the devitalisation of .enemy forces. 
These were the decisive factors in obtaining vic- 
tory. 

Even with the event so near it may be safely 
stated that the surrender of the German Fleet 
without firing a shot was the spectacular culmina- 
tion of the greatest naval achievement in history. 

Naval power in the war was exerted for the 
most part behind the scenes. It is hard to realise 
that the achievements of the Allied fleets, ac- 
complished with so little fighting, proved, in their 
influence upon the war, more important than the 
much heralded land battles involving enormous 



4) NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

loss of life and property. The German Govern- 
ment admitted this potency of sea power, when, 
in April, 1917, Hindenburg announced that it 
was only necessary for the German armies to hold 
their own on land while on the sea the U-boats 
hemmed in Great Britain 'and so crippled the 
ocean trade supplying men, food and munitions 
to Allied armies as to compel the acceptance of 
peace terms pleasing to the Prussian leaders. 

It is strange that Germany's first soldier should 
have made the point, that the submarine, the only 
naval weapon able to evade the Allied blockade, 
promised a respite and a hope that the German 
armies could not give, even though the latter had 
been successful on all fronts and had conquered 
entire countries. Thus Germany recognised the 
principle well taught by the distinguished Ameri- 
can naval officer, Admiral Mahan, that in all great 
wars between commercial nations land power is 
ancillary to sea power. 

In this war, as in past wars, the force of sea 
power slowly but surely shaped the issues. As 
the arteries of sea-borne commerce to the Teutonic 
Powers were more and more effectually blocked, 
and as the U-boat terror subsided while new 
strength from America, Africa and Asia was trans- 
ported more and more easily to France, England 
and Italy — the realisation was slowly but surely 



NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 5 

forced home, that Pan-Germanism could not be 
realised. 

In following the developments of the great 
war it is of interest to note that in the main noth- 
ing startling happened to upset expert predic- 
tions, either as to the part sea power would take, 
or as to which of the belligerent navies would 
dominate. In the course of the fighting there 
were no great surprises. Generally speaking, re- 
sults corresponded with the degree and kind of 
peace time naval preparation made by the war- 
ring nations. 

The statement that there were no great sur- 
prises should be modified by one exception, sub- 
marine warfare against merchant ships. Before 
the British blockade forced Germany to plan her 
unscrupulous submarine campaign against com- 
merce it is doubtful if any country, not except- 
ing Germany, ever thought seriously of such a 
campaign as a contingency of modern civilised 
war. It came therefore as a surprise, and its 
temporary success was due to the fact that in the 
years of pre-war time development of the sub- 
marine there had been no contemporaneous de- 
velopment of naval weapons to combat it as a 
commerce destroyer. The submarine had always 
been looked upon as a lawful weapon for use 
against enemy fighting ships, and its meagre sue- 



6 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

cess in this capacity shows that the preparations 
made against it were adequate ; but the submarine 
as an unscrupulous commerce raider had thirty 
years' start of the weapons designed for use against 
it in this new and unexpected role. If it had been 
foreseen that submarines would be used in this 
way, step by step with the development of under- 
water craft, there would have been a correspond- 
ing improvement in scientific contrivances for safe- 
guarding commerce; and had this been the case it 
is reasonable to suppose that the U-boat would 
never have reaped its grim harvest of peaceful 
shipping. 

So this exception goes to prove the rule that 
naval weapons both for offence and defence are 
highly scientific products resulting from long years 
of development. There is always the chance, of 
course, that one side or the other will hit upon 
some revolutionising invention. Nor does it nec- 
essarily follow because none appeared in this war 
that none will appear in the future; but there is, 
nevertheless, evidence that in shaping a policy of 
defence it is safer to heed the lessons of experience 
than to rely on a mere theory of inventive abilities 
adequate to meet any situation. 

Neither an army nor a navy can be improvised, 
but it is an important difference between them 
that an army can be prepared more quickly and 



NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR ,7 

easily than can a navy. At the outbreak of this 
war Great Britain's army was small, but her pow- 
erful fleet was ready. Under the protection of 
this first line of defence a great army was recruit- 
ed from British possessions all over the world, 
and equipped, and trained. Navies cannot so 
readily be built up; it takes years to construct a 
battleship fleet and train the personnel to fight it. 
When the war began Germany's army was ten 
times as strong as Great Britain's army, but four 
years later this difference had disappeared. On 
the other hand, in 1914 Germany's sea power 
was about two-thirds the strength of England's 
sea power, and when the armistice was signed 
England had increased this lead. It takes so long 
to build fighting ships, and the demands on a na- 
tion's resources are such that Germany was unable 
to construct during the war a fleet to rival that of 
her enemy. But it is different in the case of land 
forces. Great Britain rapidly overcame an initial 
discrepancy in armies much greater than was the 
naval discrepancy facing Germany in July, 1914. 
Careful analysis of the battles fought in pre- 
vious wars has contributed much to naval science, 
and the general theories previously deduced have 
been verified by the events of this war. There is, 
however, by reason of improvements in ships and 
weapons, continuous change in the conditions af- 



8 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

fecting the application of strategic and tactical 
principles. This makes it advisable to alter rules 
of practice in the light of lessons learned from 
day to day. In attempting this concurrent study 
of naval operations of the great war, the handi- 
cap of insufficient and unreliable data is admitted, 
but even if some of the premises are slightly in 
error, still, the inferences drawn will have value 
so long as they are logical and square with accepted 
naval opinion. 

Secrecy forms an important part of naval strat- 
egy and is favoured by nature. The sea isolates 
and frequently swallows up all testimony of the 
fighting done. Hence the Admiralty announce- 
ments of both sides have been laconic. There is, 
however, plenty of evidence that the silent navies 
were not idle. This is indicated by a summary of 
the losses sustained. 

It is reported that in first line ships Great Brit- 
ain and her allies lost ten dreadnoughts and six- 
teen pre-dreadnoughts, while Germany and her 
allies lost three dreadnoughts and seven pre- 
dreadnoughts. The Allies lost twenty-two ar- 
moured cruisers and twenty-four light cruisers, 
against seven armoured cruisers and twenty-tour 
light cruisers lost by the Central Powers. In other 
types the figures are less reliable, but the Allies 
lost about seventy-three destroyers, twenty torpedo 



NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 9 

boats, forty submarines, and ninety converted 
cruisers and auxiliaries, while the Central Powers 
lost about thirty-nine destroyers, twenty-six tor- 
pedo boats, between one hundred twenty-five and 
one hundred fifty submarines, and forty-five con- 
verted cruisers and auxiliaries. In addition to 
these, both sides lost numerous small craft, includ- 
ing air scouts, patrol boats, yachts and mine 
sweepers. 

This list of losses, however, indicates only a 
part of the naval work accomplished. Difficult 
and important operations are frequently unat- 
tended by losses. A complete narrative of the 
war would include not only the engagements 
fought, but in addition all the activities incident 
to mobilising, blockading, commerce destroying, 
transporting, convoying, patrolling, scouting, raid- 
ing, and mine laying. It will be many years 
before the data for such a work will be available. 

The scope of this brief study is limited to the 
more important naval events. These are dis- 
cussed not so much with a view to completeness 
in detail as with the aim of bringing out the points 
of policy, strategy, and tactics necessary to an 
understanding of the general principles govern- 
ing the size, composition, training, and uses of 
battle fleets. These principles are important as 
the starting point from which more difficult scien- 



10 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

tific deductions proceed. To determine the latter 
is the function of naval experts who have devoted 
years to the exhaustive study of technical naval 
problems. The former comprise a portion of gen- 
eral knowledge which even a casual student of 
world politics can ill afford to neglect. 



CHAPTER II 

Definitions and Estimate of the Situation 

Sea Power — Sea Control — Plans of Warring Navies 

SEA POWER 

THE sea power of a nation may be said to 
comprise all its means for contesting the 
control of the sea. It includes the battle fleets 
and their auxiliaries, cruisers, destroyers, subma- 
rines, aircraft, also naval bases and stations, for- 
tified or naturally protected harbours, coast de- 
fences, the merchant marine (embracing armed 
and unarmed vessels engaged in commerce and' 
passenger traffic), in short, everything the country 
possesses that may be useful, directly or indirectly, 
for the purposes of naval warfare. 

Big-gun ships comprise the main reliance in 
battle and are known as "dreadnoughts." These 
are divided into dreadnought battleships and 
dreadnought battle cruisers, the difference between 
the two being that a certain amount of the gun 
power and armour of the battleship is sacrificed 

II 



12 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

in the battle cruiser in order to get speed. Pre- 
dreadnought battleships differ from dreadnought 
battleships in that, instead of carrying all big 
guns and torpedo defence guns, they carry some 
big guns and some smaller or intermediate bat- 
tery guns, thus tapering down to the torpedo de- 
fence guns. The armoured cruiser carries a mixed 
calibre battery like her running mate, the pre- 
dreadnought battleship, but is faster by reason of 
having less armour and less powerful guns. 

Both pre-dreadnought battleships and armoured 
cruisers are discredited as shown by the fact that 
no more are being built, but they are by no means 
useless and still form an important part of the 
strength of the more powerful navies. The light 
cruiser, used for commerce destroying and scout- 
ing, is a fast vessel without armour and carries 
torpedoes as well as a light battery of intermedi- 
ate calibre guns. The light cruiser type, which 
has shown considerable usefulness in the recent 
war, may be regarded as a development of the 
torpedo boat destroyer, as it is larger, more sea- 
worthy, more habitable and better armed. The 
torpedo boat is a smaller edition of the destroyer, 
and the submarine requires no definition. An aux- 
iliary cruiser or a converted cruiser is a merchant 
ship or private vessel requisitioned by the Govern- 
ment for naval purposes. Such a vessel is usually 



NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 13 

armed for both offence and defence. She loses her 
character of a merchant ship engaged in peaceful 
pursuits and becomes a part of the fighting navy 
with the status of a regular man-of-war. 

On the other hand, an armed merchantman is 
armed simply for defence. She is not a part of 
the fighting navy, and her character is determined 
by her employment. If she is still engaged in the 
peaceful pursuits of trade the fact that a ship car- 
ries one or two guns for defence only does not 
change her character into that of a man-of-war. 

Strategy and tactics comprise the science and 
art of using sea power. The word strategy con- 
veys the idea of preparation for the fighting and 
tactics that of execution of the fighting. But 
before discussing the points of naval strategy and 
tactics exemplified in the present war, it is well to 
explain the uses of naval power and to outline the 
maritime situation in July, 1914. 

SEA CONTROL 

When nations of maritime importance are at 
war, relative control of the sea, or certain parts 
of the sea, belongs to the belligerent whose sea 
power dominates the areas in question. For ex- 
ample, it is generally considered that from the 
beginning of the war the Allies had control 



14 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

of the Atlantic. This does not mean that the 
maritime operations of the Central Powers in these 
waters were literally extinguished. It would 
appear impossible, in the face of an enterprising 
and resourceful enemy, to prevent completely the 
operations of submarines and occasional commerce 
destroyers. But since these did not materially 
affect the maritime operations of the Allies it 
is proper to say that the latter controlled the 
Atlantic. There are varying degrees of sea con- 
trol, and the more extensive the submarine and 
commerce destroying activities of the weaker bel- 
ligerent, the less completely does the stronger 
enemy control the sea areas in question. 

Theoretically, in times of peace at least, the 
seas are free to all, but even then certain areas are 
said to be potentially controlled by certain nations 
by virtue of their relatively superior sea power in 
these respective waters. The superior sea power 
of Japan in Asiatic waters gives her in peace 
times what might be called potential control of 
those seas, and it may be assumed that this poten- 
tial control increases the weight of her voice in 
international affairs of the Far East. 

In times of war also the potential sea power of 
neutrals may easily prove an important factor. 
At the beginning of the present war had the 
United States possessed a navy superior to the 



NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 15 

navies of the Allies, although, relatively speak- 
ing between the belligerent powers, the Allies 
would still have controlled the Atlantic Ocean, 
the superior sea power of the United States would 
have given this country a potential control of this 
ocean, which might have affected the conduct of 
the maritime operations of all the belligerents, 
particularly in matters concerning the lawful in- 
terests of the United States. 

International law is not very clearly codified, 
and it is natural that different nations should look 
at things from different angles. This means that 
when great wars are going on potential sea power 
may prove especially valuable in securing respect 
for neutral rights. 

At the beginning of the war the Allies had su- 
perior sea power and consequent potential control 
in the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian Ocean, Mediterra- 
nean Sea, Black Sea, North Sea — in short, in all 
sea areas excepting those adjacent to the ports 
and naval bases of the Central Powers, namely, 
the Adriatic near Austria's ports, the North Sea 
and the Baltic adjacent to Germany's ports, and 
the Sea of Marmora, the Dardanelles, and the 
Bosporus, under the control of Turkey. 

Another estimate of the situation at the time 
of the armistice shows no material alteration other 



16 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

than the extension of enemy naval control in the 
Baltic and Black Seas incident to the collapse of 
Russia. The fighting, which changed the potential 
control into active control, followed a course quite 
to be expected, and with the exception of the 
lawless destruction of commerce by submarines, 
maritime operations were singularly free of 
surprises. The Allies made a notable attempt to 
wrest control of the Dardanelles, Sea of Mar- 
mora, and Bosporus from Turkey and her allies, 
but it failed, and, with the exception of the 
battle off the Jutland Peninsula, there has 
been no other active struggle to alter the areas 
of sea control as determined by the pre-wartime 
disposition of sea power. Manifestly, from the 
beginning the naval situation was disadvan- 
tageous to the Teutonic Powers. Notwithstand- 
ing this, the sea power of Germany, the part 
taken in the war by enemy fleets, and the waters 
they controlled were far from negligible. Be- 
sides keeping the Allied fleets at a distance 
and hampering commerce by the use of sub- 
marines, enemy naval command of the Baltic 
and the entrances to the Black Sea by blockading 
the principal ports of B-ussia contributed in large 
measure to the downfall of that country.^ 

^ The German advance in the Baltic Sea against the Russian de- 
fences guarding the Gulf of Riga would properly be classed as a major 
operation, except that, by reason of Russian disaffection, this advance 
took the form of a strategical manoeuvre without noteworthy fighting. 



ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 17 

PLANS OF WARRING NAVIES 

Broadly speaking, Great Britain's plan of naval 
campaign at the outbreak of hostilities aimed: — 
first, to destroy the enemy fleets with superior 
forces, or, failing in this, to conjfine the enemy 
fleets and restrict his trade by a system of distant 
blockades; second, to convert potential control 
of the high seas into active control by destroy- 
ing, capturing, or bottling up enemy men-of-war 
operating on foreign stations. 

On the other hand, the weaker German and 
Austrian navies instituted a different kind of cam- 
paign. The Teutonic powers planned: — first, to 
operate the home fleets so as to protect their coast 
lines and control as wide as possible sea areas be- 
yond, thereby preventing a close blockade and 
permitting commercial intercourse with neighbour- 
ing neutral countries; second, to use their naval 
vessels abroad to inflict the greatest possible 
damage on their enemies before being cornered 
and destroyed by superior Allied sea power or es- 
caping to the shelter of home or friendly ports, 

While the German expedition was carefully planned and well executed, 
Russia does not appear to have offered any organized resistance. The 
Germans made the voyage to the scene of operations without molesta- 
tion. Although fighting occurred during the occupation of the Rus- 
sian coast and outlying islands, the defence was haphazard and in- 
effectual. Under the circumstances no tactical conclusions can be 
drawn. Strategically the position of Germany in the Baltic was 
greatly improved. With the fall of Reval, the Allies lost their Baltic 
submarine base, and Germany gained practically undisputed control 
of all these waters. 



18 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

as was the case when the Goeben and Breslau 
eluded numerous enemy ships in the Mediterra- 
nean and steamed safely through the Dardanelles 
to Constantinople; third, to interfere with and 
damage enemy commerce by means of submarines 
and commerce destroyers, such as the Moewe; and 
fourth, the Teutonic powers planned to lessen the 
disparity of force between their navies and the 
superior navies of their enemies by so-called attri- 
tion warfare, harassing and menacing the enemy 
in all possible ways, instituting raids with fast air 
and sea squadrons, attacking with mines and tor- 
pedoes, and watchfully seeking opportunity to 
fall upon a detached portion of the enemy fleet 
with a superior force. 

How did these plans work out^ What did 
Teutonic sea power accomplish'? What did Al- 
lied sea power accomplish? 

Early in the war German commerce destroyers, 
of which the 'Emden is a historic example, did 
considerable damage to Allied shipping. Turkey, 
aided by Germany, defeated the Allies at the Dar- 
danelles, where a costly attempt was made to 
wrest from Turkey waterways over which she had 
exercised authority practically since the beginning 
of modern history. The potential defensive pow- 
er proved adequate when put to the test of 
active resistance. The exploits of submarines as- 



ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 19 

tonished the world. The British shores were 
raided both by air and by sea attacks. Control of 
the Baltic and the entrances to the Black Sea ef- 
fectually blockaded the principal ports of Russia, 
and made possible the temporary German domina- 
tion of that country. 

But to what purposed The superior naval 
power of the Allies slowly but surely swept the 
German flag from the seas. In the first month 
of the war, the German cruisers in American and 
Far Eastern waters were skillfully drawn away 
from enemy-infested areas and concentrated un- 
der the command of Vice Admiral von Spee off 
the west coast of South America. Here they 
gained a brief respite by defeating an inferior 
British squadron. But they were doomed ships, 
and it was only a question of time before the more 
powerful enemy navies would find and destroy 
them. This happened in the Falkland Islands en- 
gagement, which took place a month after the 
German victory off Coronel. With no navy to 
protect them, the German colonies were captured 
one by one. On the other hand, the colonies of 
the Allies were secure, and a source of aid and 
comfort to their mother countries. German sub- 
marines inflicted enormous losses but did not 
succeed in closing the sea highways to the Al- 
lies. Supplies and munitions of war constantly 



20 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

streamed into their ports. Transports brought 
their troops from all parts of the world. 

It was the pressure of naval power which com- 
pelled Germany as a last hope to undertake her 
lawless submarine campaign against commerce. 
This precipitated the United States into the war. 
Again it was the ability of the naval power of the 
United States to check the submarine menace in 
the Atlantic which made the money, food, and 
man power of America transported over-seas to 
the support of hard-pressed England, France, and 
Italy the decisive factor of the war. 

Naval events in this war, therefore, supplied 
corroborative evidence to inductions grounded in 
the experience of past wars, thus clarifying rather 
than confusing the principles already more or less 
firmly established. Naval power dominated the 
military situation. The armies of the belligerent 
denied the sea were overcome by the armies fed 
and equipped and supported by means of ocean 
traffic. 



CHAPTER III 

Opening Activities 

Strength and Disposition of Fleets — Goeben and Breslau 
Episode — Attacks on Cable and Wireless Stations. 

STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF FLEETS 
(JULY, 1914) 

WHEN hostilities opened, the naval fleets of 
the countries involved were concentrated 
in well-defined theatres of operations. Disregard- 
ing the small detachments on independent or for- 
eign service, the bulk of Great Britain's fleet faced 
the German high sea fleet in North Europe, while 
the French navy was opposed to the Austrian navy 
in the Mediterranean and Adriatic. Russia's navy 
had not been rehabilitated since the Russo-Japa- 
nese war, but the few ships she had guarded Rus- 
sian Baltic and Black Sea coasts. The relative 
strengths of these belligerent navies at the begin- 
ning of the great war may be approximately in- 
dicated by the following figures. 

Great Britain's navy consisted of sixty-three 
battleships, ten battle cruisers, thirty-four ar- 

21 



22 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

moured cruisers, seventy-four cruisers, two hun- 
dred destroyers, eighty-five torpedo boats and 
seventy-eight submarines. Of these, two of the 
older battleships, thfee battle cruisers, sixteen 
cruisers, and a few destroyers were on foreign sta- 
tions. 

Germany's navy consisted of thirty-five battle- 
ships, five battle cruisers, nine armoured cruisers, 
forty-five light cruisers, one hundred and forty- 
three destroyers, and about thirty-five submarines. 
This fighting strength was concentrated in home 
waters except for one battle cruiser, two armoured 
cruisers, eight light cruisers, and one destroyer on 
duty abroad. 

The French navy comprised twenty-two battle- 
ships, nineteen armoured cruisers, twelve light 
cruisers, eighty-four destroyers, one hundred and 
thirty-five torpedo boats, and seventy-eight sub- 
marines. As early as 1912, the Entente Cordiale 
between Great Britain and France resulted in the 
general scheme that France would look out for 
British naval interests in southern Europe, while 
Great Britain would protect French naval inter- 
ests in northern Europe. France had only four 
cruisers engaged in distant service. 

Austria's navy numbered twelve battleships, ten 
cruisers, eighteen destroyers, sixty-three torpedo 
boats, and ten submarines, AH of these, with the 



OPENING ACTIVITIES 



23 



exception of one armoured cruiser on the China 
station, were in home waters. 



Table (approximate) of Belligerent Fleets 
July, 1914^ 





Battle- 






Ar- 
moured 














ships, 
dread- 


Battle- 
ships 


Battle 
cruis- 


Cruis- 


De- 
stroy- 


Tor- 
pedo 


Sub-- 
ma- 


Coast 
defense 




nought 
type 


ers 


era 




ers 


boats 


rines 


vessels ' 


England 


231 


40 


10 


34 


74 


200 


85 


78 





Germany. .. 


152 


20 


5 


9 


45 


143 





30 


2 


France 


4 


18 





19 


12 


84 


135 


78 


1 


Russia 





7 





6 


9 


91 


14 


30 


2 


Austria- 




















Hungary. . 


4 


6 








10 


18 


63 


10 


6 



* Assuming 2 Queen Elizabeth class practically completed. 
2 Assuming 2 Koenig class practically completed. 

Just before the outbreak of war the British fleet 
had been mobilised at Spithead, and early on Au- 
gust 4th, the day of Great Britain's war declara- 
tion against Germany, this fleet put to sea under 
sealed orders. Less is known about the exact dis- 
position of the German forces, but probably they 
were equally ready and concentrated in the vi- 
cinity of the fortified bases at either end of the 
Kiel canal connecting the North and Baltic seas. 

On August 5th the British ship Drake cut two 
cables off the Azores, thus severing this means of 
communication between the German ships abroad 
and their Admiralty at home. On the same day, 

^ For further details of all the navies finally engaged in the 
war, see Appendix. 



M NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

the crew of a fishing boat reported that they had 
seen a large merchant ship in the North Sea throw- 
ing things overboard. A British destroyer flotilla 
of four ships was sent to investigate and soon gave 
chase to the steamer Koenigen Luise. A shot 
across the bow was unheeded, thus confirming the 
suspicions that the fleeing steamer had been con- 
verted by Germany into a mine layer. An en- 
gagement lasting about six minutes followed, dur- 
ing which the mine layer was repeatedly hit and 
finally sunk by gun fire. Fifty of her crew of one 
hundred and thirty were saved and made prison- 
ers. The next day the British light cruiser Am- 
phion struck a mine, probably one of those laid 
by the Koenigin Luise, and was destroyed. On 
August 9th a flotilla of German submarines made 
an unsuccessful attack against the light cruiser 
Birmingham^ which escaped unharmed after sink- 
ing by gim fire the German U-15. 

These early happenings give an idea of how 
the struggle on the seas began. As fast as the 
war news spread throughout the world the fight- 
ing ships and merchant ships of the nations in- 
volved proceeded, in accordance v/ith instructions, 
to modify their conduct and movements to meet 
the change from peace to war conditions. The 
German warships at large did what they could 
to safeguard their own commerce, destroy enemy 




5 s 



OPENING ACTIVITIES 25 

commerce, and evade destruction themselves. The 
Allied navies set to work blockading enemy coasts, 
protecting Allied commerce, clearing the seas of 
enemy flags, rendering assistance to the expedi- 
tions Sent to reduce German colonies, and trans- 
porting troops with their impedimenta from all 
parts of the world to the fighting front. 

Although the primary purpose of fighting ships 
is to fight, it is readily seen that naval war- 
time work covers a wide and varied field. Some- 
times there are important naval happenings with- 
out attendant losses or even without fighting. 
The escape of the Goeben and Breslau may be 
cited as of conspicuous political significance. 

"goeben" and "breslau" episode 

It was reported that during the first few days 
of the war the German battle cruiser Goeben and 
light cruiser Breslau bombarded the Algerian 
coast, sank a few ships in Bona harbour, and then 
proceeded t3 Messina, arriving there on August 
5th, 1914. It was also rumoured that while off 
the northern coast of Africa the two German 
cruisers, when hard beset by enemy forces, escaped 
during misty weather by the aid of the ruse of 
placing some musicians on a raft to attract the 
attention of enemy patrols by pla)ang German 



26 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

airs, while the warships laid their course for Mes- 
sina. 

From the pre-wartime disposition of forces it 
may be assumed that the Allies had in the Medi- 
terranean at this time numerous men-of-war, in- 
cluding very likely two or three British battle 
cruisers, several fast light cruisers, and many de- 
stroyers. International law required that the Ger- 
man warships leave the neutral port of Messina 
within twenty-four hours. The chances for es- 
cape appeared dubious to say the least, and the 
following version of the manoeuvre, purporting to 
be based on the log of the Goeben, is of interest: 

On Aug. 6, 1914, just before sailing from Messina the 
German commander issued these orders : "News about 
the enemy is uncertain. I presume his strength lies in 
the Adriatic and that he is watching both exits to the 
Messina Strait. Our object is to break through to the 
east and reach the Dardanelles. I want to create the 
impression that we intend to go to the Adriatic. In case 
I so succeed I will veer round in the night and make 
for Cape Matapan, if possible throwing the enemy off 
our track." 

As the ships — flags flying and music playing — were 
reaching the open sea the following wireless message 
from the Kaiser reached the Admiral: "His Majesty 
expects the Goeben and the Breslau to succeed in break- 
ing through." 

Shortly after leaving the harbour the English cruiser 



OPENING ACTIVITIES 27 

Gloucester appeared on the horizon. The English 
cruiser was emitting signals in three groups. The word 
"Mumfu" frequently occurred and it was clear that it 
referred to the Goeben. The wireless receivers inter- 
preted the signal of the British cruiser as follows : "Goe- 
ben making for the Adriatic." 

The German wireless officer argued thus: "I can jam 
him. If I break my waves against his perhaps I can 
confuse, hold up, destroy his messages. Shall I jam his 
wireless?" he asked the Admiral. 

"Shall we fire"?" asked the Commander. 

"No," was the answer to both questions. No one 
apart from the staff understood the Admiral. This is 
how he argued, however: "This boat is evidently a 
patrol, intending to wireless our movements to the main 
British fleet. He shallsave us, not ruin us. He shall 
do his work. We will neither fire at nor jam him. Let 
him wireless that the Germans are making for the Adri- 
atic, whereas the Dardanelles is our object." 

It was dark. The Breslau closed in. It was 10 o'clock 
in the evening; then came the order from the bridge: 
"Starboard ; make for Cape Matapan." 

The watching British cruiser saw the manoeuvre, but 
before she could wireless the news that the Germans were 
making for the east the following order flashed out from 
the Admiral: "Jam the wireless; jam it like the devil." 

For hours the Germans were travelling eastward with- 
out obstacle, while the patrol boat tried' to make itself 
understood in vain. Where did the error of our enemy 
lie ? In England the excuse was advanced that the Ger- 
mans had acquired knowledge of the British secret wire- 
less code and so deceived the latter into waiting. Is it 
worth while contradicting such stuff? The English 



28 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

should have waited before the Strait of Messina, and 
nowhere else. But so confident were they that the Goe- 
ben and Breslau must try and break through to the Adri- 
atic in order to reach an Austrian port, that they thought 
it safe to wait in the Strait of Otranto, which is forty 
sea miles wide. So positive were they on this point that 
the thought of our making for the Dardanelles never 
seems to have occurred to them. 

When the wireless messages of the Gloucester finally 
reached the British fleet it was too late. The German 
ships were en route for Constantinople. 

That this episode caused the Allies considerable 
chagrin may well be imagined. The British com- 
mander was afterwards relieved. A little later, 
apparently as an alternative to disarming and 
being interned, the Go eh en and Breslau were sold 
by Germany to Turkey, a transaction without pre- 
cedent and involving a question of international 
law. Sharp representations were made by the Al- 
lies to Turkey, claiming that the latter had vio- 
lated her neutrality and demanding immediate 
repatriation of the officers and crews. Turkey 
failed to comply with this demand and it is rea- 
sonable to suppose that the presence of the two 
warships in Constantinople had considerable in- 
fluence in persuading the Turkish Government to 
join Germany and Austria in the war. 

At this initial period in near Eastern affairs 
determined action on the part of the Allies to- 



OPENING ACTIVITIES 29 

ward Turkey might possibly have had important 
effects. 

Suppose, for example, that a powerful com- 
bined British and French naval force had steamed 
through the Dardanelles up to Constantinople and 
demanded the surrender of the Goeben and Bres- 
lau because of Turkey's alleged violation of neu- 
trality laws. Suppose, also, if Turkey had for- 
bidden this passage and refused these demands, 
that the Allied force had fought its way through 
the Dardanelles and either captured or destroyed 
the Goeben and Breslau in spite of any armed 
resistance which might have been offered. ■ It is, 
of course, problematical how much strength Tur- 
key could have shown at this time, but it is not 
an unreasonable supposition that a resolute naval 
demonstration in the Dardanelles might have been 
successful and might have had a decisive influence 
on the wavering Turks, with consequently far- 
reaching effects upon the general course of the 
war. 

ATTACKS ON CABLE AND WIRELESS STATIONS 

As another example of the kind of naval activ- 
ity frequently overlooked because unmarked by 
fighting, the work of destroying the enemy's cable 
and wireless service and safeguarding one's own, 
may be mentioned. 



30 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

Means of transmitting information are most 
important factors in modern strategy. These are 
now so efBcient that it is extremely difficult for 
commerce destroyers of the nation of weaker sea 
power to escape the net drawn about them by 
the stronger navies dominating the seas. That 
the German ships on foreign stations well realised 
the part wireless and cable would play in their 
final downfall is evidenced by some interesting 
attempts made by them to destroy wireless sta- 
tions and cable stations. 

An instance of this was the visit of the Nilrn- 
berg and a German collier to the British cable 
station at Fanning Island, situated about four 
hundred miles south of the Hawaiian group in 
the mid-Pacific. It was in the morning of Sep- 
tember 7, 1914, that the German cruiser rudely 
intruded upon the usually quiet and uneventful 
life of Fanning. 

The cable employes were hard at work, when 
they were paralysed to see a German officer at 
the door of the operating room with a revolver. 
"Take your hands off those keys, all of you I" he 
commanded. The men were made to line up 
against the wall, while the sailors with axes 
smashed the delicate and costly instruments. 
Heavy charges of dynamite were planted and the 
cable was blown to atoms. In the meanwhile the 



OPENING ACTIVITIES 31 

collier grappled for the cable further out to sea, 
with the intention of doing additional damage. 
A search was then made by the officers, and a num- 
ber of papers were found which revealed that sev- 
eral valuable instruments were buried in reserve 
for just such contingencies, and that a quantity of 
hidden arms and ammunition existed, all of which 
were quickly uncovered and confiscated/ 

Later on the Niirnherg formed a part of Ad- 
miral von Spec's squadron, which after the vic- 
tory off Coronel attempted to raid the Falkland 
Islands, just as Fanning had been raided. But 
this time the British Navy did the surprising, and 
instead of a defenceless wireless station the Ger- 
mans found Vice Admiral Sturdee on guard with 
a battle cruiser division. 

Another instance of cable attack, also unhappy 
in its results for the raiders, occurred in the Far 
East at the Cocos Islands. The valiant Captain 
Miiller of the Emden attempted one of his bogus- 
funnel ruses as a means of taking by storm the 
cable and wireless station on Keeling-Cocos Isl- 
and. But the ruse was detected — and well ahead 
— by those in charge on shore, who promptly ad- 
vised by wireless several British men-of-war with- 
in call. This led to the Emden's ultimate doom. 
Moreover, a rush cable message was sent out to 

* Chas. Bright, 19th Century Magazine, April, 1915. 



82 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

the Navy Office at Melbourne, and the alertness 
and intelligence of the cable and wireless Super- 
intendents showed that they had well learned the 
lesson taught by the raid on Fanning Island. The 
Emden landing parties did, indeed, succeed in cut- 
ting two cables, but were too late. The intelli- 
gence which proved fatal had already passed over 
the wires. 

The story of the operator's part in the sinking 
of the Emden is one of those records of ready wit 
and efficiency which make the best of romance. 
The guns of the Sydney sent the Emden on the 
rocks, but those guns would not have come into 
play had not the operator at Cocos Island quickly 
recognised the enemy in all her disguise and dis- 
patched the warning message throughout the 
world which brought the Sydney up in time. It 
is almost disturbing to think that before the boat's 
crew had landed from the Eniden the warships 
were moving to the rescue and London was mak- 
ing arrangements for repairing the cable and wire- 
less station. 

The superior sea power of the Allies, however, 
made German attempts on Allied wireless and 
cable stations difficult, and, when successful, of 
only temporary embarrassment, while the over- 
seas German stations, without ships to defend 
them, passed permanently into the hands of the 
Allies. 



CHAPTER IV 

Naval Action in Heligoland Bight 

THE first noteworthy naval engagement of 
the war occurred off Heligoland in August, 
1914. In connection with this action which at 
once and so dramatically brought this strategi- 
cally commanding naval fortress to the world's 
attention, it is interesting to keep in mind the 
events that gave to Germany this island outpost 
and the double base of the Kiel canal. 

It was a strange fatality that Great Brit- 
ain's foreign policy throughout the 19th Century 
strengthened the sea power of her enemies 
both off her own shores and at the Dardanelles, 
while at the same time her contemporary naval 
policy carefully maintained a navy strong 
enough to dominate all rivals. This illustrates 
the necessity in any country for mutual under- 
standing and co-operation between the Foreign 
Office and the Navy department in shaping for- 
eign policies. 

The island of Heligoland had been a British 
possession from 1807, but in the late eighties was 

33 



34 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

ceded to Germany in exchange for concessions in 
Africa. In times of peace the African explorer 
Stanley is said to have called this transfer of 
Heligoland for concessions in Africa, "The ex- 
change of a trouser button for a whole suit" A 
German interviewer in 1914 reported that the Kai- 
ser, "with joy and pride," spoke of a recent visit to 
Heligoland, and adapted the above figure to pre- 
sent conditions by saying, "Today this trouser but- 
ton holds our whole suit together." 

Heligoland is situated 35 miles northwest of 
Cuxhaven and 43 miles north of Wilhelmshaven, 
and it guards the naval bases and the North Sea 
entrance of the Kiel canal. As a part of the Ger- 
man program of naval expansion prior to the war 
it had been converted into an impregnable forti- 
fication, and the Bight of Heligoland has become 
an outwork of the German bases which has greatly 
increased their tactical value. The Bight forms a 
channel eighteen miles wide leading to the ports 
of the Elbe and it is a nest of mines and lurking 
submarines. 

The chief point of interest in the action of Au- 
gust 28, 1914, is the spirited dash against the out- 
skirts of these dangers by Admiral Beatty's squad- 
ron, and his escape without serious damage after 
inflicting losses upon the Germans. 

The action of August 28th took place about 



36 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

seven miles north of Heligoland. Reconnoitring 
British submarines had reported German light 
cruisers and smaller craft in the vicinity of Heli- 
goland. The British plan was to draw these enemy 
ships away from the protecting guns of the fortress 
island and then to destroy them. Detailed official 
reports have not been published, but various ver- 
sions appearing in the press indicate a British 
scheme carried out in some such way as is de- 
scribed in the following paragraphs. 

Three submarines were to steam ahead on the 
surface of the water to act as decoys, and to re- 
treat before the German ships which were ex- 
pected to give chase. The light cruisers Arethusa 
and Fearless were assigned the mission to cut the 
enemy off from their home bases. A squadron of 
light cruisers was detailed to support these two 
ships, while other light cruisers and battle cruis- 
ers were held in reserve farther away in the north- 
west. British destroyers accompanied each of 
these three cruiser detachments. Vice Admiral 
Beatty was in chief command of the British forces. 

All ships being in their allotted positions at 
daybreak of the 28th, the three decoy submarines 
showing their hulls advanced at half speed to- 
ward Heligoland. They were accompanied by 
five sister ships steaming submerged and followed 
by two destroyers. This detachment was soon 



ACTION IN HELIGOLAND BIGHT 37 

sighted, and German destroyers gave chase, fol- 
lowed by the light cruisers Ariadne and S trass- 
burg. 

At about 7 a. m. this chase was being con- 
ducted toward the British reserve force in the 
northwest, while the supporting detachment, con- 
sisting of the Are thus a and the Fearless with ac- 
companying destroyers, was steaming toward the 
eastward to cut off the German retreat. At 8.10 
a. m. these two cruisers were engaged by enemy 
cruisers, and a stubborn action ensued in which 
the Arethusa was damaged. At 8.25 a six-inch 
projectile from the Fearless wrecked the forward 
bridge of the Ariadne^ killing her captain, and the 
German ships then withdrew. At about 9 o'clock 
the Fearless towed the Arethusa to the westward, 
where she was able to make temporary repairs 
which permitted her to return to the engagement 
about an hour later. 

Meanwhile lively destroyer actions were in 
progress. The German V-187 boldly attacked a 
superior number of enemy destroyers, but was 
overpowered by gun fire and sank with her crew 
cheering and firing their guns as long as the muz- 
zles were above water. 

During a lull in the fighting the British de- 
stroyers Goshawk and Defender lowered boats to 
rescue survivors of the V-187, t)ut the German 



38 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

light cruiser Mainz interrupted this operation and 
forced the destroyers to abandon two of their 
small boats. The commander of the submerged 
British submarine E-4 happened to be nearby 
watching this episode through his periscope. Tak- 
ing in the situation he manoeuvred his submarine 
for a rescue, and surprised the two small boats by 
suddenly coming to the surface midway between 
them. The Britishers and their rescued prisoners 
were quickly taken aboard, and the E-4 again sub- 
merged. 

At about 10 o'clock the British destroyers 
Lurcher and Firedrake^ which were in company 
with the decoy submarines, reported that they 
were being chased by two fast enemy cruisers. 
The Arethusa^ Fearless^ and two more light cruis- 
ers armed with 4-inch guns went to the rescue and 
engaged the Strassburg, which vessel was soon 
supported by the Koln and Mainz. The larger 
guns carried by the German cruisers proved too 
strong for the lighter armed British cruisers, and 
calls for assistance were sent to the reserve force 
of battle cruisers and light cruisers previously sta- 
tioned in the northwest. 

In the meantime (at 11 a.m.) this reserve 
force had been attacked by three German subma- 
rines. This attack was frustrated by rapid ma- 



ACTION IN HELIGOLAND BIGHT 39 

noeuvring, and four British destroyers made a 
counter-attack. Shortly after eleven Vice Admiral 
Beatty, flying his flag in the battle cruiser Lion^ 
received word that the British light cruisers were 
being hard pressed, and he ordered the Falmouth^ 
carrying eight 8-inch guns, and the Nottingham, 
carrying nine 6-inch guns, to go to their support. 
A little later further calls for assistance were re- 
ceived, and the battle cruisers, having worked up 
to full speed, proceeded to the scene of the action. 
When the Lion and Queen Mary appeared out of 
the mist their heavy guns quickly decided the 
battle. 

The noonday sun cleared away the mist which 
had masked the large guns of Heligoland during 
the engagement, and by evening both British and 
German forces had retired to their respective home 
ports. The Germans lost three light cruisers, 
Koln, Mainz and Ariadne, and one destroyer, 
V-i8y, sunk. The light cruiser Strassburg suf- 
fered severe damage as did also other of the Ger- 
man destroyers and small craft. The British lost 
no ships sunk, but the light cruiser Arethusa 
and some of the destroyers were hard hit and 
compelled to limp back to home navy yards for 
extensive repairs before returning again to active 
service. 



40 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

The following is Admiral Beatty's report of the 
engagement : 

H. M. S. Lion, September i, 1914. 

Sir. — I have the honor to report that on Thursday, 
August 27, at 5 a. m., I proceeded with the First Battle 
Cruiser Squadron and First Light Cruiser Squadron in 
company, to rendezvous with the Rear Admiral, Invinci- 
ble. 

At 4 a. m., August 28, the movements of the flotillas 
commenced, as previously arranged, the Battle Cruiser 
Squadron and Light Cruiser Squadron supporting. The 
Rear Admiral, Invincible, with New Zealand and four 
destroyers, having joined my flag, the squadron passed 
through the prearranged rendezvous. 

At 8.10 a. m. I received a signal from the Commodore 
(T), informing me that the flotilla was in action with the 
enemy. This was presumably in the vicinity of their pre- 
arranged rendezvous. From this time until 11 a. m. I 
remained about the vicinity ready to support as neces- 
sary, intercepting various signals, which contained no in- 
formation on which I could act. 

At 11 a. m. the squadron was attacked by three sub- 
marines. The attack was frustrated by rapid maneuver- 
ing, and the four destroyers were ordered to attack them. 
Shortly after 1 1 a. m. various signals having been re- 
ceived indicating that the Commodore (T), and Com- 
modore (S) were both in need of assistance, I ordered the 
Light Cruiser Squadron to support the torpedo flotillas. 

Later I received a signal from the Commodore (T), 
stating that he was being attacked by a large cruiser, and 
a further signal informing me that he was being hard 
pressed, and asking for assistance. The Captain (D), 



ACTION IN HELIGOLAND BIGHT 41 

First Flotilla, also signalled that he was in need of help. 

From the foregoing the situation appeared to me crit- 
ical. The flotillas had advanced only two miles since 8 
a. m., and were only about 25 miles from two enemy 
bases on their flank and rear respectively. Commodore 
Goodenough had detached two of his light cruisers to 
assist some destroyers earlier in the day, and these had 
not yet rejoined. (They rejoined at 2.30 p. m.) As the 
reports indicated the presence of many enemy ships — one 
a large cruiser — I considered that his force might not be 
strong enough to deal with the situation sufficiently rap- 
idly, so at 11.30 a. m. the battle cruisers turned to ESE. 
and worked up to full speed. It was evident that to be 
of any value the support must be overwhelming, and car- 
ried out at the highest speed possible. 

I had not lost sight of the risk of submarines, and pos- 
sible sortie in force from the enemy's base, especially in 
view of the mist to the southeast. 

Our high speed, however, made submarine attack diffi- 
cult, and the smoothness of the sea made their detection 
comparatively easy. I considered that we were powerful 
enough to deal with any sorties except by a battle squad- 
ron, which was unlikely to come out in time, provided our 
stroke was sufficiently rapid. 

At 12.15 p. ^- Fearless and First Flotilla were sighted 
retiring west. At the same time the Light Cruiser Squad- 
ron was observed to be engaging an enemy ship ahead. 
They appeared to have her beat. 

I then steered NE. to sounds of firing ahead, and at 
12.30 p. m. sighted Arethusa and Third Flotilla retiring 
to the westward engaging a cruiser of the Kolberg class 
on our port bow. I steered to cut her off from Heligo- 



42 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

land, and at 12.37 p. m. opened fire. At 12.42 the enemy 
turned to NE., and we chased at 27 knots. 

At 12.56 p. m. sighted and engaged a two-funnelled 
cruiser ahead. Lion fired two salvos at her, which took 
effect, and she disappeared into the mist, binning furi- 
ously and in a sinking condition. In view of the mist 
and that she was steering at high speed at right angles 
to Lion, who was herself steamiirg at 28 knots, the Lions 
firing was very creditable. 

Our destroyers had reported the presence of floating 
mines to the eastward, and I considered it inadvisable to 
pursue her. It was also essential that the squadrons 
should remain concentrated, and I accordingly ordered a 
withdrawal. The battle cruisers turned north and circled 
to port to complete the destruction of the vessel first en- 
gaged. She was sighted again at 1.25 p. m. steaming 
SE., with colors still flying. Lion opened fire with two 
turrets, and at 1.35 p. m., after receiving two salvos, she 
sank. 

The four attached destroyers were sent to pick up sur- 
vivors, but I deeply regret that they subsequently re- 
ported that they searched the area but found none. 

At 1.40 p. m. the battle cruisers turned to the north- 
ward, and Queen Mary was again attacked by a sub- 
marine. The attack was avoided by the use of the helm. 
Lowestoft was also unsuccessfully attacked. The battle 
cruisers covered the retirement until nightfall. By 6 
p. m., the retirement having been well executed and all 
destroyers accounted for, I altered course, spread the 
light cruisers, and swept northwards in accordance with 
the Commander-in-Chief's orders. At 7.45 p. m. I de- 
tached Liverpool to Rosyth with German prisoners, seven 



ACTION IN HELIGOLAND BIGHT 43 

officers and 79 men, survivors from Mainz. No further 
incident occurred. I have the honor to be, sir, your 
obedient servant, 

(Signed) David Beatty, Vice Admiral. 
The Secretary of the Admiralty. 



CHAPTER V 

CORONEL AND FALKLAND ENGAGEMENTS 
BATTLE OFF CORONEL 

AT the beginning of the war the British ar- 
moured cruisers Good Hope and Mon- 
mouth^ together with the light cruiser Glasgow 
and the transport Otranto, were in Atlantic wa- 
ters off the coast of the Americas. These ships 
rendezvoused off Brazil under the command of 
Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock and proceeded 
south around Cape Horn, evidently with the mis- 
sion to find and destroy German vessels. The 
old battleship Canopus was also under his com- 
mand, but apparently did not cruise in company 
with the other ships because of her inferior speed. 
At this time German ships in the Pacific in- 
cluded the armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and 
Gneisenau, the light cruiser Niirnberg^ and the 
light cruiser Leipzig. These ships in the Pacific, 
together with the light cruiser Dresden., then in 
South Atlantic waters, proceeded at the outbreak 
of the war, apparently in accordance with a pre- 
arranged plan, to rendezvous off the coast of South 
America. 

44 



CORONEL— FALia^AND ENGAGEMENTS 45 

A comparison of the strategic dispositions of the 
belligerents in this rather remote theatre of war, in 
the latter part of October, 1914, shows that the 
British Admiral had under his command two ar- 
moured cruisers, one light cruiser, and one battle- 
ship, while the German Admiral, Count von Spee, 
had two armoured cruisers and three light cruisers, 
thus giving the British a superiority of about 
8,000 tons in displacement and about 2,200 
pounds in weight of broadside. These figures, 
however, are misleading, because they do not truly 
measure the fighting values of the two groups. 
The German ships were newer and their squadron 
more homogeneous in both guns and speed. The 
British ships were a heterogeneous collection of 
less modern vessels, with the principal fighting 
strength in an old battleship of only sixteen knots 
speed, which did not get into the engagement at 
all. With the Canopus out of the battle line, the 
Germans had considerable advantage in tonnage 
and in weight of broadside.^ 

*The following figures indicate the strength of the British 
ships actually engaged. For the strength of the German squad- 
ron, see table for Falkland Islands engagement, p. 53 



Name 


Type 


Date 


Dis- 
place- 
ment 
(Tons) 


Belt 
ar- 
mour 


Guns 


Speed 


Good Hope .... 

Monmouth 

Glasgow 


Armoured Cruiser . . . 
Armoured Cruiser . . . 
Light (scout) Cruiser 


1903 
1903 
1911 


14,100 
9,800 
4,800 


6-inch 
4-inch 
none 


2-9.2', 16-6', 14-3' 
14-6', 8-3' 
2-6', 10-4' 


24 
24 
26.5 



46 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

The information now available seems to afford 
evidence of superior strategy on the part of Ger- 
many. All the more credit is due on account of 
Germany's marked inferiority in total of sea pow- 
er, with consequently greater difficulties confront- 
ing Admiral von Spec, beset as he was by Japa- 
nese squadrons as well as by British squadrons, 
and without any naval bases in which to seek ref- 
uge and comfort. 

The movements of these squadrons up to the 
day of the battle have been considered as strateg- 
ical because they were in preparation for fighting. 
We now turn to the tactical phases which have to 
do with the execution of the fighting. 

On the afternoon of November i, 1914, the 
British squadron was spread out in scouting for- 
mation, steaming along the coast of Chile, look- 
ing for enemy ships. The light cruiser Glasgow 
had been dispatched to Coronel to send cables. 
She left there at 9 a. m., November 1, and while 
steaming to the northward sighted the German 
squadron about 4 p. m. At about 5 p. m. the 
British ships formed in line ahead, the Good Hope 
leading, followed by the Monmouth, Glasgow, 
and Otranto. The battleship Canopus was about 
250 miles to the southward. Admiral von Spee 
formed his ships in line ahead, the Scharnhorst 
leading, followed by the Gneisenau, with the 



i*-- OTRANTOJ 

"^•D . GLASGOW i 
"■ "-g MONMOUTH i 
a< 5 
Z of; GOOD HOPE 



10 C 0) 
•H E «> 

CD^ US 



6iP7_ 

14,600 yds," 



t NURNBERG ("far In rear") 

I DRESDEN ("l mile behind") 
i GNEISENAU 
i SCHARNHORST 



' 6:20 _ 

1 13;^400yds. 



1 _6l34 

V""1 1,260 yds. 

GOOD HOPE t)\t.\ 6i39_ 



German ships close 1 point. 



/ Open fire 

Tumbes Pt. 
Resume southerly course. 



OTRANTOg 

escapes S.Wj,^ 



6:53 



MONMOUTH 

ceases fire, 7:20jY \ 
sunk by NURNBERG, 8:56, '^ 



GLASGOW /| 

escapes S,W.r 



GOOD HOPE 

ceases fire, 7:23; 
sunk, 8:20i-v_^ 



bjpo^ One point off. 
B,500 yds.N 
\ 5,300 ^7:26, Cease fire 

'" yds. V^ 

•- x"^ Increase 

\ ■*='^^^\ distance." 

^\ Light cruisers 
M In pursuit. 




>«-J 



Wind S. 2 points E. 
Heavy head/ 
sea." 



STA.MARIA I 



P.Lavapie, 




Coticepcion 



DIAGRAM OF BATTLE OFF CORONEL 



47 



48 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

Dresden about one mile in the rear and the Niirn- 
berg far behind. At 6.07 p. m. the two squad- 
rons were on nearly parallel southerly courses, 
about 15,000 yards apart, with the German line 
inshore. 

There was a heavy sea and strong wind from 
one to two points to the eastward of south, and 
the German ships were able to make their course 
a little to the westward of south, bringing this 
heavy sea on their unengaged bow. On the other 
hand, the British carried wind and sea a little on 
the engaged bow, a marked disadvantage, making 
their six-inch guns, especially the lower tier, prac- 
tically useless. It is to be noted that the German 
8.2-inch guns were mounted higher and were bet- 
ter for fighting in a seaway. Practically all that 
the British had to oppose the twelve 8.2-inch guns 
of the Germans were two old 9.2-inch turret guns 
on board the Good Hope. An additional disad- 
vantage was that the British ships were outlined 
against the western sky, supplying an excellent 
point of aim for the Germans. 

At this time Admiral Cradock was no doubt 
doing some hard thinking. Should he engage 
with such big odds against him? There was the 
Canopus., his main fighting strength, 250 miles 
to the southward. By bearing off sharply to the 
westward, even at this late hour, the speeds of the 



CORONEL— FALKLAND ENGAGEMENTS 49 

two squadrons were so nearly equal that he could 
have avoided engaging that night, and by morn- 
ing he might have joined the Canopus and fought 
the battle on a more equal footing. It would be 
interesting to know what thoughts flashed through 
the Admiral's mind and what counsels prevailed 
upon him to make the courageous but fateful de- 
cision embodied in his signal to the Canopus at 
6.18 p.m., "I am going to attack the enemy 
now." 

The two squadrons gradually neared one an- 
other on converging courses, and Vice Admiral 
von Spee describes the resulting battle as follows : 

Wind and swell were head on and the vessels had 
heavy going, especially the small cruisers on both sides. 
Observation and distance estimation were under a severe 
handicap because of the seas which washed over the 
bridges. The swell was so great that it obscured the 
aim of the gunners at the six-inch guns on the middle 
deck, who could not see the sterns of the enemy ships at 
all and the bows but seldom. At 6.20 p. m., at a dis- 
tance of 13,400 yards, I turned one point toward the 
enemy, and at 6.34 opened fire at a distance of 11,260 
yards. The guns of both our armoured cruisers were 
effective, and by 6.39 already we could note the first 
hit on the Good Hope. I at once resumed a parallel 
course instead of bearing slightly toward the enemy. 

The English opened their fire at this time. I assume 
that the heavy sea made more trouble for them than it 



50 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

did for us. Their two armoured cruisers remained cov- 
ered by our fire, while they, so far as could be deter- 
mined, hit the Scharnhorst but twice and the Gneisenau 
only four times. 

At 6.53, when 6,500 yards apart, I ordered a course 
one point away from the enemy. They were firing more 
slowly at this time, while we were able to count numer- 
ous hits. We could see, among other things, that the 
top of the Monmouth's forward turret had been shot 
away and that a violent fire was burning in the turret. 
The Scharnhorst, it is thought, hit the Good Hope about 
thirty-five times. 

In spite of our altered course the English changedr 
theirs sufficiently so that the distance between us shrunk 
to 5,300 yards. There was reason to suspect that the 
enemy despaired of using his artillery effectively and 
was manoeuvring for a torpedo attack. The position of 
the moon, which had risen at 6 o'clock, was favourable 
to this move. Accordingly I gradually opened up 
further distances between the squadrons by another de- 
flection of the leading ship at 7.45. In the meantime it 
had grown dark. The range finders on the Scharnhorst 
used the fire on the Monmouth as a guide for a time, 
though eventually all range finding, aiming, and obser- 
vations became so inexact that firing was stopped at 
7.26. 

At 7.23 a column of fire from an explosion was no- 
ticed between the stacks of the Good Hope. The Mon- 
mouth apparently stopped firing at 7.20. The small 
cruisers, including the Niirnberg, received by wireless at 
7.30 the order to follow the enemy and to attack his 
ships with torpedoes. Vision was somewhat obscured at 



CORONEL— FALKLAND ENGAGEMENTS 51 

this time by a rain squall. The light cruisers were not 
able to find the Good Hope, but the Number g encoun- 
tered the Monmouth, and at 8.58 was able by shots at 
closest range to capsize her without a single shot being 
fired in return. Rescue work in the heavy sea was not 
to be thought of, especially as the Nurnherg immedi- 
ately afterward believed she had sighted the smoke of 
another ship and had to prepare for a new attack. 

The small cruisers had neither losses nor damage in 
the battle. On the Gneisenau there were two men slightly 
wounded. The crews of the ships went into the fight 
with enthusiasm, every one did his duty and played his 
part in the victory. 

In concluding the account of this battle it is 
difficult to find any fault in the tactics used by 
Vice Admiral von Spee. He appears to have 
manoeuvred so as to secure the advantage of light, 
wind, and sea. He also suited himself as regards 
the range. The Good Hope and Monmouth were 
destroyed, the Glasgoiv had a narrow and lucky 
escape, while the German losses were two slightly 
wounded. 



FALKLAND ISLANDS ENGAGEMENT 

After the battle off Coronel, while the German 
squadron coaled at Valparaiso and made its way 
in no great hurry around Cape Horn, the British 
were not idle. Within ten days of the receipt of 



52 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

the news of the British disaster in the South Pa- 
cific the dreadnought battle cruisers Invincible 
and Inflexible, under command of Vice Admiral 
Sturdee, were on their way to the Falkland Isl- 
ands, a wireless and coaling station off the south- 
east coast of South America. It would appear 
that Admiral von Spee contemplated an attack on 
the Falklands, and it would also appear that he 
did not anticipate the vigorous and alert strategy 
of his enemy. Had he done so he surely would 
have either tried to time his visit earlier or else 
have abandoned it entirely. 

As a matter of ordinary precaution it seems 
strange that he did not send a scout ship ahead 
to reconnoitre. At least he might have planned 
to arrive in the late afternoon, which would have 
given his ships a good chance to escape from a 
superior force under cover of darkness. On the 
other hand, little criticism can be made of Eng- 
land's strategy. On the morning of December 8, 
when the German squadron hove in sight of the 
lookout ship off the Falkland harbour entrance, an 
opposing fighting force had been provided, and 
lay at anchor within, consisting of two battle 
cruisers, the Invincible and Inflexible; three ar- 
moured cruisers, the Carnarvon, Cornzvall, and 
Kent; the light cruisers Bristol and Glasgow; and 
the predreadnought battleship Canopus. 



CORONEL— FALKLAND ENGAGEMENTS 53 

The German squadron was the same as off Cor- 
onel — two armoured cruisers, the Scharnhorst and 
Gneisenau, and three light cruisers, the Leipzig, 
Niirnberg, and Dresden. 

The total tonnage of the British ships was 
87,000 — nearly three times that of the German 
tonnage, 35,500. The total weight of the Brit- 
ish broadside was 9,566 kilograms, nearly five 
times that of the German broadside, which was 
2,032 kilograms. 

The following table gives the details of the 
opposing squadrons : 



BRITISH SQUADRON 



Name 


Type 


Date 


Dis- 
place- 
ment 
(Tons) 


Belt 
ar- 
mour 


Guns 


Speed 


Invincible 

Inflexible 

Carnarvon 

Cornwall 

Kent.. 


Battle Cruiser 

Battle Cruiser 

Armoured Cruiser . . . 
Armoured Cruiser . . . 
Armoured Cruiser . . . 

Scout Cruiser 

Scout Cruiser 

Coast Defense Ship . . 


1908 
1908 
1904 
1901 
1903 
1911 
1911 
1897 


17,250 
17,250 
10,850 
9,800 
9,800 
4,800 
4,800 
12,950 


7-inoh 

7-inch 

6-inch 

4-inch 

4-inch 

none 

none 

6-inch 


8-12", 16-4" 

8-12", 16-4" 

4-7.5", 6-6" 

14-6" 

14-6" 

2-6", 10-4" 

2-6", 10-4" 

4-35 cal. 12', 12-6" 


26.5 
26.5 
23.0 
23.5 
23 


Bristol 

Glasgow 

Canopus 


26.5 
26.5 
16.5 



GERMAN SQUADRON 



Scharnhorst . . 
Gneisenau. . . 

Leipzig 

Nurnberg... . 
Dresden 



Armoured Cruiser . 
Armoured Cruiser . 
Protected Cruiser. 

Scout Cruiser 

Scout Cruiser 



1907 


11,600 


6-inch 


1907 


11,600 


6-inch 


1906 


3,250 


none 


1908 


3,450 


none 


1908 


3,600 


none 



8-8.2", 6-6" 
8-8.2", 6-6" 
10-4" 
10-4" 
10-4" 



23.5 
23.5 
23.0 
24.0 
24.0 



In addition to the fighting ships just mentioned, 
the converted cruiser Macedonia was acting as a 



54 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

lookout ship for the British, and the steamships 
Baden and Santa Isabel were in the train of the 
German squadron. The British ships had arrived 
at 10.30 a. m. the day before and had begun 
coaling at once. At the time of the engagement 
the battle cruisers, though not filled up, had suf- 
ficient fuel on board, and the fact that they were 
a little light in draft favoured their speed. 

At 8 a. m. the German ships were sighted, and 
orders were given to raise steam for full speed. 
The high land hid the main British force, and at 
9.20 the Gneisenau and the Nilrnberg, with guns 
trained on the wireless station, had closed to with- 
in 1 1,000 yards of the Canopus^ which latter ves- 
sel opened fire at them across the low land with 
her twelve-inch guns. The Germans hoisted their 
colours and turned away from their hidden foe, 
but a few minutes later turned to port, as though 
to close on the Kent, at the entrance of the har- 
bour. Then the British battle cruisers were sight- 
ed, and the two German ships altered course and 
increased their speed to join their consorts. 

At 9.45 a. m. the British squadron got under 
way and headed for the German ships, which were 
clearly in sight, hull down. The sea was calm, 
with a light breeze from the northwest. The visi- 
bility was at a maximum, under a bright sun in 
a clear sky. At 10.20 signal for a general chase 



56 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

was made, but the battle cruisers eased speed to 
twenty knots, to allow the other cruisers to get in 
station. 

Three enemy ships, probably transports or col- 
liers, were sighted off Port Pleasant, and the Bris- 
tol was ordered to take the Macedonia in com- 
pany and destroy the transports. 

The British squadron, as a whole, was not able 
to close on the German squadron, and at 11.20 
Vice Admiral Sturdee decided to attack with his 
faster ships, the Invincible^ Inflexible^ and Glas- 
gow. These three all had a speed of twenty-six 
and one-half knots, and were able to close quickly 
on the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau^ which had a 
speed of only twenty-three and one-half knots. 
At 12.55 ^^ battle cruisers opened fire on the 
German light cruiser Leipzig at a range of 16,500 
to 15,000 yards. Soon after opening fire, the 
German light cruisers turned to the southwest and 
spread, in an effort to escape. The armoured 
cruisers Cornwall and Kent and the light cruiser 
Glasgow gave chase, while the battle cruisers and 
the Carnarvon kept on after the Scharnhorst and 
Gneisenau: Admiral Sturdee maintained, for the 
most part, a range of between 16,000 and 12,000 
yards, destroying the enemy with his twelve-inch 
guns in rather leisurely fashion, without getting 
within the effective range of the German 8.2-inch 



CORONEL— FALKLAND ENGAGEMENTS 57 

guns. At 4.17 p.m. the Scharnhorst sank, with 
her flag flying. The Gneisenau kept up the une- 
qual fight, but at 6 p. m. she also sank with her 
flag flying. 

In the chase after the light cruisers the Glasgow 
was the only ship with superior speed, but she was 
able to engage the Niirnberg and Leipzig, delay- 
ing them enough to give the Cornwall and Kent a 
chance to get into action. The Leipzig sank at 
9 p. m. and the Niirnberg was sunk by the Kent 
at 7.27 p.m. 

The Dresden escaped, and made a precarious 
commerce destroying cruise, which lasted until 
March 14, 1915, when she was discovered near 
Juan Fernandez island and destroyed by the Kent, 
Glasgow, and auxiliary cruiser Orama. 

Hindsight is always better than foresight, and 
we should be slow to criticise without knowing 
full particulars, but one cannot help wondering 
at the tactical disposition of the Bristol and ques- 
tioning if the Dresden would have escaped had 
the Bristol been on hand to help the Glasgow. It 
is to be noted that the Bristol, a sister ship to the 
Glasgow, was faster and better armed than any 
of the German light cruisers, and was also three 
and one-half knots faster than the British ar- 
moured cruisers Carnarvon, Cornwall and Kent. 
The reasons for sending a twenty-six-and-one- 



58 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

half -knot ship instead of a twenty- three-knot ship 
after the transports are not very clear, especially 
as the Bristol and the Glasgow were the only two 
ships besides the battle cruisers fast enough to 
catch the Nurnberg and the Dresden. The Bris- 
tol, to be sure, accomplished her assigned mission 
in destroying the German steamships. But could 
not the three-knot slower armoured cruiser Car- 
narvon have done this equally well"? As it was, 
the Carnarvon served no useful purpose, and no 
avail was made of the valuable speed asset of 
the Bristol. 

The British lost nine killed and about the same 
number wounded. All the German ships except 
the Dresden were sunk, and only about 200 men 
were saved from the total complements. This 
decisive naval action gave the Allies practically 
undisputed control of the high seas. 



CHAPTER VI 

Dardanelles Operations 

TURKEY entered the war on October 31, 
1914, and four days later the outer forts 
of the Dardanelles were bombarded for about ten 
minutes by Allied men-of-war. What useful pur- 
pose this bombardment served the Allied cause is 
not clear. There seems to have been no intention 
of pushing the attack home, and simply as a di- 
version it would appear calculated to put the en- 
emy on guard without gaining any commensurate 
military advantage. 

As early as November 25, 1914, the idea of 
making a serious attack on the Dardanelles was 
discussed at a meeting of the British War Coun- 
cil. In addition to political benefits expected to 
result from a military success in this war theatre 
and the obvious value of opening a way to Rus- 
sia's Black Sea ports, the argument was advanced 
that the best way to protect India and Egypt was 
to threaten Turkish communications, or better yet 
to cut them by capturing Constantinople. The 

59 



60 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

Council admitted the points in favour of the pro- 
ject, but because of the critical situation on the 
Western front and the shortage of tonnage fgr 
transport service the question for the time being 
was dismissed. 

On January 2, 1915, a telegram from Petro- 
grad stating that Russia was hard pressed in the 
Caucasus and expressing the hope that a demon- 
stration would be made against the Turks from 
some other quarter, spurred the British War Coun- 
cil to a reconsideration of the Dardanelles pro- 
ject. In the ensuing deliberations the need of 
Russia seems to have introduced a question of 
expediency which hampered the development of 
plans strictly in accord with sound military prin- 
ciples. 

At this time naval and military opinion seems 
to have agreed that if a serious attack was to be 
made against the Dardanelles fortifications it was 
highly desirable to make it a joint naval and mili- 
tary operation. 

The original estimate of the British War Office 
was that an army of 150,000 men would be re- 
quired for a combined naval and military attack. 
The difficulty of supplying this force and the 
urgency of doing something for Russia led to a 
discussion of the advisability of making a purely 
naval demonstration with a view either to with- 



DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 61 

drawing if the opening bombardment were not 
successful, or continuing the attack with such mil- 
itary support as could be provided on the spot, 
if the results of the preliminary demonstration 
warranted further operations aiming at the ulti- 
mate capture of Constantinople. 

In these discussions a strong opinion developed 
that the Dardanelles might be forced by the fleet 
alone, and in consequence, while the War Office 
made certain military preparations in the Eastern 
war theatre, important transactions took place be- 
tween the Admiralty office and Vice Admiral Car- 
den, then commanding the British forces in the 
Mediterranean. 

On January 3, 1915, the following telegram 
was dispatched from the Admiralty to Vice Ad- 
miral Carden: — 

"Do you think that it is a practical operation to force 
the Dardanelles by the use of ships alone ? It is assumed 
that older battleships would be employed, that they 
would be furnished with mane sweepers, and that they 
would be preceded by colliers or other merchant vessels 
as sweepers and bumpers. The importance of the result 
would justify severe loss. Let us know what your views 
are." 

On January 5th, Vice Admiral Carden replied 
to the Admiralty telegram of the third, in the fol- 
lowing terms: — • 



62 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

"I do not think that the Dardanelles can be rushed, 
but they might be forced by extended operations with a 
large number of ships." 

On January 6th, the telegram following was 
sent from the First Lord to Vice Admiral Car- 
den: — 

"High authorities here concur in your opinion. For- 
ward detailed particulars showing what force would be 
required for extended operations. How do you think it 
should be employed, and what results could be gained?" 

On January nth, Vice Admiral Garden replied 
to the telegram sent to him from the Admiralty 
on the 6th. Four operations he said were possi- 
ble. These were : — 

(a) The destruction of the defences at the en- 
trance to the Dardanelles. 

(b) Action inside the straits, so as to clear the 
defences up to and including Cephez Point Bat- 
tery N8. 

(c) Destruction of defences of the narrows. 

(d) Sweeping of a clear channel through the 
mine field and advance through the narrows, fol- 
lowed by a reduction of the forts further up, and 
advance into the Sea of Marmora. 

He estimated that it would take a month to 
carry out all these operations. 



DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 63 

At a meeting of the war council on January 
13, 1915, a decision was made and this decision 
as noted by Premier Asquith reads : — 

"The Admiralty should prepare for a naval ex- 
pedition in February to bombard and take the 
Gallipoli peninsula, with Constantinople as its 
objective." 

On January 15th, the Chief of the Naval War 
Staff reported his opinion on Admiral Carden's 
proposal. His memorandum began with the fol- 
lowing remark: "Concur generally in his plans." 
After dealing at some length with the detailed 
proposals this memorandum concluded by saying: 
'T would suggest (a) might be approved at once, 
as the experience gained would be useful." Un- 
less the experience gained from (a) and (b) jus- 
tified it, the undertaking of (c) and (d) was not 
recommended. 

On February 16th, a very important informal 
meeting of ministers was held. Owing to events 
in Egypt and to changes in plans in the West, it 
was decided to mass a considerable military force 
in the Mediterranean to be used as occasion might 
require. The decisions, which were eventually in- 
corporated with those of the war council, were as 
follows : — 

"1. The 29th division, hitherto intended to 
form part of Sir John French's army, to be des- 



64 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

patched to Lemnos at the earliest possible date. 
It is hoped it may be able to sail within nine or 
ten days. 

"2. Arrangements to be made for a force to 
be dispatched from Egypt, if required. 

"3. The whole of the above forces, in conjunc- 
tion with the battalions of Royal Marines already 
despatched, to be available in case of necessity to 
support the naval attack on the Dardanelles. 

"4. Horse boats to be taken out with the 
29th division, and the Admiralty to make arrange- 
ments to collect small craft, tugs, and lighters in 
the Levant. 

''5. The Admiralty to build special transports 
and lighters suitable for the conveyance and land- 
ing of a force of 50,000 men at any point where 
they may be required." 

It had been intended that the 29th division 
should be ready to sail for the Mediterranean by 
the 22nd of February, but on the 20th the War 
Office decided that the general situation was such 
that this division could not be despatched as 
planned. On March 10th the situation on other 
fronts had changed and the War Office announced 
that the decision to send the 29th division was 
again operative. This change of mind entailed 
a delay of three weeks in despatching these troops. 

In the meantime during January and February 




65 



66 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

British and French forces in the Mediterranean 
were preparing for extensive operations against 
the Dardanelles. The island of Tenedos was 
seized. Under an agreement with Venizelos, the 
Greek Premier, the island of Lemnos was occu- 
pied, and Mudros with its large harbour converted 
into an advanced naval and military base. Lem- 
nos was less than fifty miles from Gallipoli, while 
Tenedos was only twenty-two miles distant from 
the Turkish coast. It has been said that there 
was also an arrangement with Venizelos to supply 
a Greek military expeditionary force, but, as the 
event proved, this aid could not be relied on. 

By the middle of February a large British fleet 
had been assembled, including the new superdread- 
nought Queen 'Elizabeth^ carrying 15-inch guns, 
the battle cruiser Inflexible, the predreadnought 
battleships Agamemnon, Irresistible, Vengeance, 
Triumph, Albion, Lord Nelson, Ocean, Majestic, 
and a number of light cruisers, destroyers, subma- 
rines, mine sweepers, and other small craft. In 
addition to these the French contributed a fleet 
including the predreadnought battleships Charle- 
magne, Gaulois, Suffren, and Bouvet, with attend- 
ing destroyers and submarines. 

Naval operations began on the morning of Feb- 
ruary 19, 1915, at 8.00 a. m., when the combined 
fleet, with Vice Admiral Garden in supreme com- 



DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 67 

mand and Rear Admiral Guepratte in command 
of the French division, arrived off Gallipoli, and 
began a long range bombardment of the outer 
forts. In the middle of the afternoon three Brit- 
ish and three French battleships closed the forts 
and by darkness apparently all the outer shore 
batteries had been silenced. 

The demolition, however, did not prove perma- 
nent and bad weather prevented further opera- 
tions until February 25th, when another bombard- 
ment took place and by 5 o'clock in the afternoon 
the forts had again been silenced. 

Mine sweepers then cleared the way for the 
larger ships and on the next day a division of 
battleships steamed four miles up the straits and 
bombarded Fort Dardanos, a battery mounting 
* 5.g-inch guns. This fort together with a number 
of concealed batteries was silenced and marines 
were then landed to complete the demolition. 
This work was successfully accomplished, except 
at Kum Kale, where a strong force of Turks drove 
the landing party back to their boats. 

Bad weather again intervened, permitting the 
Turks to rehabilitate Fort Dardanos and the hid- 
den shore batteries. On March 1st the operations 
were resumed and mine sweepers cleared the chan- 
nel to within one and one-half miles of the Nar- 
rows. During the next four days the bombard- 



68 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

ment and demolition by landing parties went on. 
A French squadron bombarded the Turkish line 
of communications at Bulair, with the hope of 
embarrassing the enemy's food and munition sup- 
ply, but without success. Also, as a diversion, a 
combined Allied fleet bombarded Smyrna, but this 
does not appear to have had much military sig- 
nificance. 

On March 6th and 7th violent naval attacks 
were made both by battleships well within the 
straits at close range and by the Queen 'Elizabeth^ 
Agamemnon and Ocean at long range from the 
Gulf of Saros. The indirect lire of these battle- 
ships was controlled by airmen, who watched the 
fall of shell striking beyond the heights of the 
Peninsula and signalled spot corrections to the 
ships. As the angle of fall was such that the Eu- 
ropean forts could not be reached, the indirect fire 
was concentrated on the forts near Chanak on the 
Asiatic side. It was thought that this bombard- 
ment caused the Turks much discomfiture, and 
that the 15-inch shrapnel from the Queen Eliza- 
beth inflicted heavy losses. But the forts were 
not permanently silenced and although the heavy 
shrapnel fire was temporarily effective against en- 
emy personnel there was not a sufficient number 
of high explosive shells dropped in the fortifica- 



DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 69 

tions to damage them beyond repair. The result 
of these bombardments appears to have been ex- 
aggerated both in the minds of the naval com- 
manders on the spot and in the hopes of the Al- 
lied people at large. 

From March 7th to March 18th, there was a 
lull in the operations at the straits. It was realised 
that there would be need to land troops, and by 
March 15th the British forces gathered at Mudros 
together with the French force assembled at Biz- 
erta totalled somewhat over 100,000 fighting men, 
while the naval forces had been increased to the 
strength indicated in the following table.-^ 

Allied Fleet at Dardanelles 
british battleships 

Weight in Pounds of a 

Broadside Salvo 
Heavy Secondary- 
Name Guns Guns Guns 

Queen Elizabeth . Eight 15-inch, twelve 6-inch 15,600 600 

Inflexible Eight 12-inch, sixteen 4-in. 6,800 372 

Lord Nelson Four 12-inch, ten 9.2-inch. . 5,300 

Agamemnon " " " " .. 5,300 ... 

Swiftsure " lo-inch, fourteen 7.5- 
inch 3,312 

Triumph Four lo-inch, fourteen 7.5- 
inch 3.312 

ComwaUis Four 12-inch, twelve 6-inch 3,400 600 

Queen " " " " 3,400 600 

Implacable " " " " 3,400 600 

London " " " " 3,400 600 

Irresistible " " " " 3,400 600 

^ Naval Inst. Proc, pp. 1735 and 1736, 1915. 



70 



NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 



Name 



Guns 



Four 12-inch, twelve 6-inch. 



Goliath 

Ocean 

Vengeance " 

Albion « « « « 

Canopus « " " " 

Prince George. ..." " " " 

Majestic " " " " 

BRITISH CRUISERS, ETC. 

Euryalus Two 9.2-inch, twelve 6-inch 

Dublin Eight 6-inch 

Minerva Eleven 6-inch 

Doris " " 

Talbot " _ " _ _. 

Phaeton Two 6-inch, eight 4-inch . . . 

Amethyst Twelve 4-inch 

Sapphire " " 

Hussar Two 4.7-inch, four 6-pound- 



Weight in 


Pounds of k 


Broadside Salvo 


Heavy 


Secondary- 


Guns 


Guns 


3.400 


600 


3.400 


600 


3.400 


600 


3,400 


600 


3.400 


600 


3.400 


600 


3,400 


600 






1,360 






500 






600 






600 






600 


. 




355 






217 






217 



BRITISH MONITOR 

Humber Two 6-inch, two 4.7-inch. . . 

BRITISH DESTROYERS 

Scorpion One 4-inch, three 12-pound.- 



Wolverine One 4-inch, three 12-pound- 

ers 

Pincher One 4-inch, three 12 -pound- 
ers 

Renard One 4-inch, three 12-pound- 

ers 

Chelmer Four 12-pounders 



290 



FRENCH BATTLESHIPS 

Suffren Four 12-inch, ten 6.4-inch . . 3,880 495 

Gaulois " " " 5.5-inch.. 3,880 330 

Charlemagne " " " " .. 3.880 330 

St. Louis " " " " .. 3,880 330 

Bouvet Two 12-inch, two 10.8 inch, 

eight 5.5-inch 2,060 308 

Henri IV Two 10.8-inch, seven 5.5- 
inch 1,124 264 

Jaurdguiberry . . . .Two 12-inch, two 10.8-inch, 

eight 5.5-inch 2,416 264 



DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 71 

Weight in Pounds of a 

Broadside Salvo 
Heavy Secondary 
Name Guns Guns Guns 

FRENCH CRUISERS 

Kleber Eight 6.5-inch, four 3.9-inch . . 754 

Jeanne d'Arc Two 7.6-inch, fourteen 5.5- 
inch 763 

D'Entrecasteaux.Two 9.4-inch, twelve 5.5- 
inch 1,146 

RUSSIAN CRUISER 

Askold Twelve 6-inch 623 

Soon after this concentration unforeseen diffi- 
culties intervened, and the plan for early joint 
operations did not materialise. Early in March 
it had been decided to send out Sir Ian Hamilton 
to command the troops being assembled near the 
Dardanelles. His instructions contained the fol- 
lowing passage: — 

"The fleet has undertaken to force the passage of the 
Dardanelles. The employment of military forces on any 
large scale at this juncture is only contemplated in the 
event of the fleet failing to get through after every effort 
has been exhausted. Having entered on the project of 
forcing the Straits, there can be no idea of abandoning 
the scheme." 

At this time, in March, important telegrams 
passed between the Admiralty and Admiral Car- 
den. The First Lord, Mr. Winston Churchill, on 
March 1 1 th, asked whether the time had not ar- 
rived when "You will have to press hard for a 



72 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

decision," adding: — "Every well-conceived action 
for forcing a decision, even should regrettable 
losses be entailed, will receive our support." 
In his reply Admiral Garden said: — 

"I consider stage when vigorous action is necessary 
for success has now been reached. I am of opinion that 
in order to insure my communication line immediately 
Fleet enters the Sea of Marmora, military operations on 
a large scale should be opened at once." 

On March 15th the First Lord of the Admiralty 
sent another telegram to Admiral Garden, in 
which he said: — 

"When General Hamilton arrives on Tuesday night 
concert with him in any military operation on a large 
scale which you consider necessary. . . . The 29th divi- 
sion (18,000 additional men) cannot arrive until April 
2nd." 

On March 16th, Admiral Garden was forced 
to resign his command for reasons wholly based 
on the state of his health. He was succeeded by 
Vice Admiral de Robeck. On March 17th Sir 
Ian Hamilton arrived at Lemnos to take chief 
command of the Allied armies. A conference at 
once took place, attended by Vice Admiral de Ro- 
beck, Rear Admiral Guepratte commanding the 
French naval forces, General d'Amade command- 



DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 73 

ing the French land forces, and Sir Ian Hamilton. 

At about this time it was discovered that the 
transports had been improperly loaded; guns and 
munitions needed at once on landing were inac- 
cessible, being buried under tents and other sup- 
plies. Sir Ian Hamilton strongly demurred 
against launching a land attack immediately and 
made the point that in order to assure an effective 
landing practically the entire transport fleet must 
return to Egypt and be reloaded. 

The decision of the conference hung on two al- 
ternativesT — whether to make a combined attack 
at once under the handicap of improperly loaded 
transports, or to delay the land attack until the 
difficulty could be corrected with the penalty of 
losing valuable time. The latter course was de- 
cided upon and many hold that it was the fatal 
error of the campaign. It gave the Turks time 
to organise their defence. 

Enver Pasha the Turkish leader is reported to 
have declared at a later date: — "Their delay en- 
abled us thoroughly to fortify the peninsula, and 
in six weeks' time we had taken down there over 
two hundred Austrian Skoda guns." 

The decision to delay the landing of troops did 
not deter Vice Admiral de Robeck from carrying 
out the naval attack. On March 17th the Allied 



74 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

fleet sailed from Mudros, arriving off the straits 
at daylight on the i8th. 

The serious losses to the Allies during the bom- 
bardment of this date are told in an official state- 
ment from the British and French Admiralties 
from which the following extracts are taken : 

Mine-sweeping having been in progress inside the 
straits, a general attack was delivered by the British and 
French fleets March 18 on the fortresses at the narrows. 
At 10.45 a.m. the Queen Elizabeth, Inflexible, Agamem- 
non and Lord Nelson bombarded forts, while the Tri- 
umph and the Prince George fired at batteries. A heavy- 
fire was opened on the ships. At 12.22 p. m. the French 
squadron, consisting of the Suffren, Gaulois, Charle- 
magne and Bouvet, advanced up the Dardanelles and 
engaged the forts at closer range, and the forts replied 
strongly. Their fire was silenced by the 10 battleships 
inside the straits, all the ships being hit several times 
during this part of the action. By 1.25 p.m. all the 
forts had ceased firing. The Vengeance, Irresistible, 
Albion, Ocean, Swiftsure and Majestic, then advanced 
to relieve the six old battleships inside the straits. As 
the French squadron, which had engaged the forts in a 
most brilliant fashion, was passing out, the Bouvet was 
blown up by a drifting mine. She sank in 36 fathoms 
in less than three minutes. At 2.36 p. m. the relief bat- 
tleships renewed the attack on the forts, which again 
opened fire. The attack on the forts was maintained, 
while the operations of the mine sweepers continued. 

At 4.09 p. m. the Irresistible quit the line, listing 
heavilv. and at 5.50 p.m. sank, having probably struck 



DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 75 

a drifting mine. At 6.05 p. m. the Ocean, having also 
struck a mine, sank. Both vessels sank in deep water, 
practically the whole of their crews having been removed 
safely under a hot fire. The Gaulois was damaged by 
gun fire. The Inflexible had her forward control posi- 
tion hit by a heavy shell and required repair. The bom- 
bardment and the mine sweeping operations terminated 
when darkness fell. The losses of the ships were caused 
by mines drifting with the current, which were encoun- 
tered in areas hitherto swept clear, and this danger will 
require special treatment. 

The British casualties among personnel were not 
heavy, considering the scale of the operations, but prac- 
tically the whole of the crew of the Bouvet was lost with 
the ship, an internal explosion apparently having super- 
vened on the explosion of the mine. 

Vice Admiral de Robeck said, in part: "The 
power of the fleet to dominate the fortresses by 
superiority of fire seems to be established. Vari- 
ous other dangers and difficulties will have to be 
encountered, but nothing has happened which jus- 
tifies the belief that the cost of the undertaking 
will exceed what always has been expected and 
provided for. The British casualties in the per- 
sonnel are 61 men killed, wounded and missing. 
I desire to bring to the notice of Your Lordships 
the splendid behaviour of the French squadron. 
Their heavy loss leaves them quite undaunted. 
They were led into close action by Rear Admiral 
Gueprette with greatest gallantry." 



76 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

On March 19th Admiral de Robeck telegraphed 
the Admiralty that having had a satisfactory in- 
terview with Sir Ian Hamilton, General d'Amade 
and Admiral Wemyss, he proposed to proceed 
with the attack on the following day. It is sig- 
nificant that a meeting of the War Council in 
London was held on the same day of this de- 
spatch, March 19th, at which it was decided "to 
inform Vice Admiral de Robeck that he could 
continue the naval operations against the Darda- 
nelles if he thought fit." The attitude of Sir Ian 
Hamilton and the menace of mines and torpedoes, 
however, influenced Admiral de Robeck to change 
his mind and discontinue naval operations. 

Sir Ian Hamilton had witnessed the naval at- 
tack of March 18th and telegraphed the War Of- 
fice on the 19th: "I have not yet received ^y re- 
port on the naval action, but from what I actually 
saw of the extraordinarily gallant attempt made 
yesterday I am being most reluctantly driven to- 
wards the conclusion that the Dardanelles are less 
likely to be forced by battleships than at one time 
seemed probable, and that if the Army is to par- 
ticipate its operations will not assume the subsid- 
iary form anticipated. The Army's share will not 
be a case of landing parties for the destruction 
of forts, etc., but rather a case of a deliberate 
and progressive military operation carried out in 



DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 77 

force in order to rnake good the passage of the 
Navy." 

On March 23rd another telegram from Sir Ian 
Hamilton said: — "I have now conferred with Ad- 
miral de Robeck and we are equally convinced 
that to enable the fleet effectively to force the 
passage of the Dardanelles the co-operation of the 
whole military force will be necessary." On the 
same day Admiral de Robeck telegraphed the Ad- 
miralty that the mine menace was proving greater 
than he had expected; that time was required to 
make arrangements to meet this menace; that a 
decisive operation about the middle of the next 
month appeared better than to take great risks for 
accomplishing what might well prove to be only 
half measures; and that it did not appear practi- 
cable to land a sufficient force inside the Darda- 
nelles to carry out the service. On the 26th he 
added: — "The check on the 18th is not, in my 
opinion, decisive, but on the 22nd of March I met 
General Hamilton and heard his views, and I now 
think that, to obtain important results and to 
achieve the object of the campaign, a combined 
operation will be essential." 

From this time onward two points became per- 
fectly clear. One was that the Government had 
no intention of abandoning the attack on the Dar- 
danelles; the second was that the attack would 



78 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

be made both by the Navy and by Military forces 
employed on a large scale. Sir Ian Hamilton 
withdrew to Egypt to reload the transports and 
perfect preparations for landing in force, while 
the combined fleets made the necessary arrange- 
ments to do their share when the time came for 
making the grand effort. 

About six weeks later (April 25th to 26th) took 
place the famous combined land and sea attack, 
in which the Allied troops attained at a great cost 
a slight footing on the peninsula. The guns of 
the fleet afforded a covering fire for the troops, 
but there was no serious bombardment of the 
point of landing. The Turks evidently had made 
the most of the six weeks' delay and were well 
prepared. 

From the time of this landing it may truthfully 
be said that the naval force was used only as an 
auxiliary of the land forces, although the Navy 
performed arduous duties in the campaign which 
followed. On land, in spite of desperate fight- 
ing, the Allies made no great headway. There 
was another landing in August, which was almost 
as costly as the first — again without tactical re- 
sults — and the undertaking was abandoned in 
January, 1916. 

In this campaign the Allies lost five British pre- 
dreadnoughts, one French predreadnought and 



DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 79 

about 115,000 men killed, wounded or missing, 
with about 10,000 more sick. The cost of the 
expedition, ship losses not included, was about 
$1,000,000,000. As a diversion to hold an enemy 
force away from other fields it succeeded; but in 
the attainment of its main objective it was a 
failure. 

The decision to attempt forcing the Dardanelles 
has been much criticised, and it appears indeed to 
have been a formidable undertaking. But wheth- 
er or not it was unwise to attempt it is a debatable 
question. A successful attack upon the Darda- 
nelles might well have become of the very first 
importance and produced results which would 
have quickly been felt in the main eastern and 
western theatres of the war. Consider for a mo- 
ment the position of Russia at that time: a vast 
empire, with millions of men mobilised, crammed 
with surplus stores of wheat, yet for all practical 
purposes more cut off from the rest of the world 
than Germany. The White Sea was ice-bound, 
and Archangel, which is indifferently served by 
its railway, would not be open until some time in 
May. The Baltic was practically sealed. The 
way to the Black Sea was closed by the Darda- 
nelles and the Bosporus. Vladivostok was too far 
away to be of much use. Russia was in bonds, 
and it was the duty of her allies to burst them if 



80 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

they could. Immeasurable advantages would fol- 
low from the opening of a clear way to Odessa. 
Ships laden with wheat would stream outward 
and ships laden with the stores and equipment, 
which Russia so greatly needs, would stream in- 
ward. Moreover, the resources of fighting men, 
food supplies, and raw materials from Turkey in 
Asia would be cut off from the Central Powers 
and any possible menace to India, the Suez, and 
Egypt removed. 

The political results would have been equally 
great. The effect upon the hesitancy of the Bal- 
kan kingdoms and other neutrals would have been 
instant, and would have counteracted the impres- 
sion created by the successful German operations 
against the Russians. The fall of Constantinople 
would probably further have meant the collapse 
of the Turkish offensive. The Turks would never 
survive a blow at their heart. The bombardment 
of the Dardanelles, therefore, if the Allies had 
been able to carry it to its logical conclusion, 
would have had far-reaching effects on the con- 
duct of the war. 

It is interesting here to note the analogy be- 
tween the circumstances influencing the Allies to 
attempt to force the Dardanelles and the circum- 
stances during our civil war which influenced the 
North to open up the Mississippi. In the civil 



DARDANELLES OPERATIONS 81 

war it was desired to cut the Confederacy in two, 
so as to shut off the resources of Arkansas, Texas, 
and Louisiana from the Confederate armies and 
at the same time to open up communications be- 
tween the Gulf and the Northern States via the 
Mississippi and its tributaries. Moreover, just as 
forcing the Dardanelles would have been a de- 
terrent to Bulgaria's entering the war on the side 
of the Central Powers and would perhaps have 
influenced Greece and Rumania to declare for the 
Allies, so Farragut's capture of New Orleans de- 
terred France from action hostile to the Union 
and caused Louis Napoleon to abandon his scheme 
to despatch a formidable fleet to the mouth of the 
Mississippi and join an equal force from England 
with the object of repudiating the blockade as 
ineffectual and demanding free egress and ingress 
for merchantmen. 

There is also some analogy between the condi- 
tions confronting Admiral Farragut, requiring 
him to force his way by the Confederate forts in 
the lower Mississippi on his way to attack New 
Orleans, and the conditions facing Admiral de 
Robeck, supposing that his mission was to force 
the Dardanelles in order to attack Constantinople. 
Admiral Farragut was brilliantly successful in 
running the forts and capturing New Orleans, 
while the Dardanelles operations ended in bitter 



82 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

disappointment to the Allies. It would not be 
wise to push the analogy too closely, as erroneous 
inferences might be drawn; but one cannot help 
reflecting upon and comparing the circumstances, 
methods, and results attending these two great 
enterprises. 

Instead of condemning offhand the attempt to 
capture Constantinople as foolhardy in concep- 
tion, it might be better to ponder the possible 
causes of failure. Failure ccKainly was never 
due to lack of fighting qualities in the Allied sail- 
ors and soldiers, for there is probably no more 
heroic page in history than that recording the 
brave deeds done in this struggle for the Darda- 
nelles. 



CHAPTER VII 

North Sea Battles 

dogger bank encounter 

WITHIN a few months after the outbreak 
of hostilities the pressure of superior Al- 
lied sea power had effectively confined the Ger- 
man fleet. It is probable that the German Ad- 
miralty felt the need for a show of naval ac- 
tivity. Submarines and mines had accomplished 
some successes, but their more spectacular use had 
not yet developed, and cruiser raids against the 
British were instituted, most notable of which was 
the attack on the defenceless coast towns Scar- 
boro, Hartlepool and Whitby, in which 99 people 
were killed. This occurred on December 16, 1914. 
These raids accomplished no military result, but 
the attempted raid of January 24, 1915, led to 
a running fight in the North Sea between two bat- 
tle cruiser squadrons, during which the German 
armoured cruiser Bliicher was sunk, having been 
abandoned by her retreating consorts. No Eng- 
lish ship was lost. 

83 



84 



NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 



The battle cruiser engagement off the Dogger 
Bank was the first between modern big-gun ships. 
Particular interest is also attached to it because 
each squadron was accompanied by scouting and 
screening light cruisers and destroyers. It was 
fear of submarines and mines, moreover, that in- 
fluenced the British to break off the engagement, 
and it is also reported that a Zeppelin airship 
and a seaplane took part, and perhaps assisted in 
the fire control of the Germans.^ 

At daybreak on January 24, 1915, Vice Ad- 
miral Sir David Beatty's battle cruiser squadron, 
consisting of the Lion^ Princess Royal, Tiger, New 
Zealand, and Indomitable, were patrolling in com- 
pany with four light cruisers, while three light 

^The principal details of the vessels in the respective squad- 
rons follow: 



Name 


Com- 
pleted 


Displace- 
ment 


Speed 


Main 
Armament 


Armour 
Belt 




1912 
1914 
1912 
1912 
1908 

1914 
1913 
1911 
1910 


26,350 
28,000 
26,350 
18,800 
17,250 

28,000 
24,640 
22,640 
15,550 


28.5 

28 

28.5 

25 

26 

27 

29.2 
28.4 
25.3 


8 13.5-in. 
8 13.5-in. 
8 13.5-in. 
8 12-in. 
8 12-in. 

8 12-in. 
10 ll-in. 
10 ll-in. 
12 8.2-in. 


9-in. 


Tiger 


9-m. 




9-in. 




8-m. 




7-in. 




11-14-in. 


Seydlitz 

Moltke 


11-14-in. 
11-14-in. 




6-in. 







There were 40 heavy guns in each squadron, but whereas 
the British included twenty-four i3.s-inch and sixteen 12-inch, 
the German comprised eight 12-inch, twenty ii-inch, and 
twelve 8.2-inch. 



r».!»' S P 




85 



86 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

cruiser flotilla leaders, with their destroyers, were 
in station ahead. At 7.25 a. m. the Aurora^ one 
of these flotilla-leading light cruisers, engaged an 
enemy ship. This scouting and screening force 
got in touch with and guided the British battle 
cruisers toward the enemy battle cruiser squad- 
ron, under Rear Admiral Hipper, consisting of the 
battle cruisers Seydlitz^ Derjflinger, and Moltke, 
with the armoured cruiser Bliicher. The Ger- 
man capital ships were also accompanied by 
light cruisers and destroyers. It was a stern-, 
chase fight, in which ranging shots were tried 
at about 20,000 yards and hits reported at 
about 18,000 yards. Practically all the fight- 
ing between the battle cruisers was done at long 
ranges. The slower armoured cruiser Bliicher 
dropped astern, and early in the fight developed 
engine trouble. Her 8.2-inch guns were of little 
use, and at 10.48 she drew out of line in a de- 
feated condition. At 12.37 she sank, having re- 
ceived, very likely, her deathblow from a torpedo. 
Disregarding the Bliicher, the stern fire of the 
German battle cruisers consisted of four twelve- 
inch and sixteen eleven-inch, as opposed to the 
British bow fire of twelve 13.5-inch guns from 
the leading three ships and the bow twelve-inch 
from the New Zealand and Indomitable. These 
latter two ships, however, being two or three knots 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 87 

slower than the other three, fired for the most part 
only at the Bliicher. At 1 1 .03 the flagship Lion 
was put out of action, and she was later towed 
into port with a considerable list. Considering 
the long range, the gunnery on both sides appears 
to have been excellent, and it is hard to say which 
side did the better shooting or whose battle cruis- 
ers suffered the more damage. 

The light cruisers and destroyers took little part 
in the actual fighting. The British flotillas were 
kept most of the time on the unengaged quarter 
of Admiral Beatty's squadron. At about 9.30 the 
German destroyers threatened an attack, and one 
division of the British destroyers manoeuvred so 
as to pass ahead of the battle cruisers and screen 
them; but the threatened attack was not made. 
Later on the German destroyers again appeared 
to be preparing for an attack, and the Lion and 
Tiger opened fire on them, causing them to retire 
and resume their original course. Shortly before 
noon, about seventy miles from Heligoland, the' 
engagement was broken off by the British because 
of the presence of enemy submarines. 

The conditions surrounding this battle were 
ideal for illustrating the functions of battle cruis- 
ers. The German warship raid on the British 
coast of the previous month was still fresh in 
mind; and when this situation off the Dogger 



88 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

Bank arose, the timely interposing of Admiral 
Beatty's superior force, the fast chase, the long- 
range fighting, the loss of the Bliicher, and the 
hasty retreat of the enemy, were all particularly 
pleasing to the British people. As a result the 
battle cruiser type of ship attained great popu- 
larity. 

The question of speed, armour, and armament, 
however, is a perplexing problem. Before going 
deeper into this question it is advisable to con- 
sider further data on the war-time usefulness of 
battle cruisers. This type of ship will therefore 
be adverted to later on. 

BATTLE OF JUTLAND Part I 

In a narrative of the principal events of the 
battle of Jutland, together with a discussion of 
some of the points in strategy and tactics illus- 
trated, it should be appreciated that many of the 
details are lacking. Some of these details will be 
uncovered in the course of time, but many — hav- 
ing been lost in the sea along with the ships that 
went down — can only be matter for speculation. 

The battle of Jutland was fought between the 
British Grand Fleet and the German High Seas 
Fleet during the late afternoon and evening of 
May 31, 1916, with torpedo attacks continuing 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 89 

throughout the night. A decisive engagement was 
probably prevented by thick weather and ap- 
proaching darkness, but hard blows were given 
and sustained on both sides. 

It is a well-recognised experience of history that 
the public gauges the magnitude of a battle by 
the consequent changes in the political and mili- 
tary situation. At times a comparatively minor 
engagement between relatively small forces where- 
in little actual fighting occurs will, if followed 
by a decided change in an international situation, 
assume in the public eye the proportions of a big 
battle. On the other hand, it sometimes occurs 
that a great battle, measured by the size and 
power of the forces involved and the actual fight- 
ing done, will, if indecisive and unproductive of 
changes in the status quo^ appear small in the pub- 
lic eye and often arouse popular dissatisfaction on 
both sides. It may be that history will place the 
battle of Jutland in this latter class. But, even 
so, when one considers the actual fighting done, 
and judges by the size, number, and various types 
of the ships engaged, their ability to manoeuvre, 
their power to give and their power to sustain hard 
blows, this battle is far and away the greatest the 
world has ever seen. Never before has there been 
brought together such an array of fighting ma- 
chines — dreadnoughts, battle cruisers, scout cruis^ 



90 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

ers, destroyers, submarines, and aircraft. More- 
over, it took intelligence, nerve, and endurance 
of the personnel to operate this powerful machin- 
ery under varying conditions of wind, sea, and 
weather. Assuredly it would seem that in this 
action and all that it exemplifies both in the ships 
engaged and in the requirements demanded of the 
personnel there must have been illustrated the 
best there is of naval art and naval science. 
The British Grand Fleet comprised: 

(a) An advance force under Vice Admiral Beatty, 
consisting of six battle cruisers, (four Lions of 28.5 
knots speed, each carrying eight 13.5-inch guns, and two 
Indefatigables of 25 knots speed, each carrying eight 12- 
inch guns,) supported by the Fifth Battle Squadron, 
under Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas, (four 25-knot bat- 
tleships of the Queen Elizabeth class, each carrying eight 
15-inch guns). 

(b) The main body, under Admiral Jellicoe — flying 
his flag in the Iron Duke — consisting of a fast wing 
under Rear Admiral Hood, (three 26-knot battle cruisers 
of Invincible class, each carrying eight 12-inch guns), a 
division of four armoured cruisers under Rear Admiral 
Arbuthnot, and twenty-five dreadnoughts in three squad- 
rons commanded by Vice Admirals Burney, Jerram, and 
Sturdee. 

(c) About twenty light cruisers and 160 destroyers, 
divided between the advance force and the main body. 

The German High Sea Fleet comprised : 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 91 

(a) An advance force under Vice Admiral Hipper, 
consisting of five battle cruisers (three Derjjlingers of 
probably 27 knots speed, each carrying eight 12-inch 
guns, and two Moltkes of probably 28 knots speed, each 
carrying ten 11 -inch guns). 

(b) The main body under Admiral Scheer, consisting 
of sixteen dreadnoughts and six predreadnought battle- 
ships. 

(c) About twenty light cruisers and eighty or ninety 
destroyers, divided between the advance force and the 
main body. 

At 2.30 p. m., May 31, 1916, the naval situa- 
tion in the North Sea was approximately as fol- 
lows: The German advance force of five battle 
cruisers under Vice Admiral Hipper was some 
eighty or a hundred miles to the northwestward 
of Horn Reef, while fifteen miles to the south and 
west of him was Vice Admiral Beatty with the 
British advance force of six battle cruisers, sup- 
ported by four fast dreadnought battleships under 
Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas. Admiral Jellicoe, 
in command of the British Grand Fleet, was about 
fifty miles distant with the main body to the 
northeastward, while Admiral Scheer, in command 
of the German High Seas Fleet, was about the 
same distance away with his main body to the 
southeastward. German submarines were sighted 
soon after the beginning of the engagement. Brit- 
ish and German aircraft were present, but do not 



92 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

appear to have figured very prominently in the 
conflict. 

It is convenient to divide the battle into the 
following four phases: 

First Phase: British advance force encounters Ger- 
man advance force. Six British battle cruisers, sup- 
ported by four dreadnought battleships, engaged with 
five German battle cruisers, (349 p. m. to 4.45 p. m.). 

Second Phase: Action between British advance force 
and van of High Seas Fleet. Four British battle cruis- 
ers and four dreadnought battleships engaged with five 
German battle cruisers and van of German battle fleet, 
(4.45 p.m. to 6.15 p.m.). 

Third Phase: British Grand Fleet engaged with Ger- 
man High Seas Fleet, (6.15 p.m. to dark). 

Fourth Phase: Torpedo attacks and screening opera- 
tions during the night, {May '^\ to June 1). 

Each one of these phases will be taken up sep- 
arately in the order named. 

First Phase: Encounter Between the Battle 
Cruiser Squadrons Commanded by Vice Admiral 
Beatty {British) and Vice Admiral Hipper {Ger- 
man). 

The British Grand Fleet had left its bases on 
the 30th, and was sweeping through the North 
Sea to the southward with Vice Admiral Beatty's 
force cruising well in advance of the main body. 
Besides the six battle cruisers led by Vice Admiral 
Beatty in the Lion and the four 25-knot battle- 



To Skagerrack / 




British Advance Force 
Main Body 



REFERENCE 

____ I German Advance Force ____ 
Main Body 



This dias;rann indicates only the general course of the 
battle, details of "the formations and maneuvers being 
omitted. 



DIAGRAM OF BATTLE OF JUTLAND 



93 



94 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

ships of the Elizabeth class, led by Rear Admiral 
Evan-Thomas in the Barham^ this advance force 
was accompanied by three light cruiser squadrons 
and four flotillas of destroyers. At 2.20 p. m. the 
light cruiser Galatea reported the presence of Ger- 
man ships in considerable force and at 2.25 a Brit- 
ish seaplane was sent from its mother ship Enga- 
dine to scout to the northeastward. Visibility at 
this time was good. The wind was southeast. 

At 3.31 the German battle cruiser squadron 
(five ships) under Vice Admiral Hipper was 
sighted to the northeastward at a range of 23,000 
yards. The two squadrons formed for battle, and 
approached each other on slightly converging 
southeasterly courses. Light cruisers and destroy- 
ers of both sides assumed screening formations, 
and the opposing light cruisers in the more ad- 
vanced stations were engaged during the battle ap- 
proach. At 3.48 fire was opened simultaneously 
by both sides at about 18,500 yards' range. The 
squadrons fought on parallel courses curving to 
the southeast. At 4.08 the battleships under Rear 
Admiral Evan-Thomas opened fire at 20,000 
yards' range, but it is doubtful if these ships got 
close enough to do any effective work during this 
phase of the battle. About this time submarines 
were reported both on the engaged and unen- 
gaged beams of the British battle cruisers. De- 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 95 

stroyers were active in attempts to screen the big 
ships from underwater attack. 

Ten minutes after the engagement became gen- 
eral an explosion occurred in the Indefatigable^ 
and she sank almost immediately. At 4. 1 5 twelve 
British destroyers moved forward to attack the 
German battle cruisers; German light cruisers 
and destroyers made a similar advance at the same 
time. A fierce engagement ensued between these 
light craft at close quarters. The Germans did 
not press their torpedo attack, but six of the Brit- 
ish destroyers continued the advance under a 
heavy shell fire, and fired torpedoes at the Ger- 
man lines. At 4.30 a mighty explosion occurred 
in the Queen Mary, and she went down so quickly 
that the following ships in the formation are re- 
ported as having steamed right over her. At 4.42 
the German battle fleet was sighted to the south- 
east, and the British ships turned right about (16 
points =180 degrees) in succession. The Ger- 
man battle cruisers also altered course 16 points, 
and the action continued on a northwesterly 
course, beginning what we will call the second 
phase. 

According to German Admiralty reports, during 
the first phase, lasting about an hour, from 3.49 
to the time the British changed course 16 points 
at 4.45, the British battle cruiser Indefatigable 



96 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

(tonnage 18,750, main battery eight 12-inch, car- 
rying 899 men) was sunk at 4.05, and the Queen 
Mary (tonnage 27,000, main battery eight 13.5- 
inch guns, carrying 1,000 men) was destroyed at 
about 4:30. It is also reported that the British 
lost four destroyers and the Germans two. Be- 
fore taking up the second phase of the battle, a 
few points bearing on the first phase will be brief- 
ly discussed. 

Different theories have been advanced as to the 
probable causes of the loss of the two British bat- 
tle cruisers. It is reported that both ships suf- 
fered heavy explosions which appeared to come 
up through turret tops. This has led to the opinion 
that enemy shells exploded in the respective tur- 
rets, and, igniting chains of powder to the mag- 
azines, caused the blowing up of the magazines. 
This is not at all unlikely, and directs attention 
to the need of safety precautions in the supply of 
ammunition to turret guns. 

Following the engagement there was comment 
to the effect that Admiral Jellicoe violated the 
principle of concentration of forces by sending 
in advance a squadron of four battleships to sup- 
port Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers. The con- 
sensus of professional opinion, however, does not 
appear to support any such criticism. This ad- 
vance force was composed entirely of fast ships 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 97 

(the battleships had the unusually high speed of 
25 knots), operating on interior lines between the 
supporting British fleet and the enemy main fleet, 
with little or no chance of being cut off by a su- 
perior enemy force. 

There is also more or less criticism to the ef- 
fect that Admiral Beatty rashly exposed his com- 
mand ; that the Germans counted on his impetuos- 
ity; and it has been said that he did just what 
Admiral Hipper expected him to do and wanted 
him to do. On the other hand, it may be ar- 
gued that at the start of the action the situation 
was not unfavourable to the British because Ad- 
miral Hipper was almost cut off by a superior 
force and in danger of being compelled to turn 
toward the British Grand Fleet. The plan of co- 
ordination between the main body under Admiral 
Jellicoe and the British advance force is not clear, 
but it is evident that Admiral Beatty tried to get 
to the southward of Admiral Hipper, and upon 
the approach of the High Seas Fleet was com- 
pelled to make a right about turn, a manoeuvre 
likely to prove disastrous if attempted under gun 
fire. Reports are somewhat obscure as to just 
what happened at this time, but it seems that the 
British ships accomplished the turn without suffer- 
ing much damage, and that the German battle 
cruisers turned around at about the same time. 



98 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

Probably the battleships under Admiral Evan- 
Thomas were used to provide a covering fire while 
Admiral Beatty countermarched. Some incline 
to the opinion that Admiral Hipper failed to take 
advantage of his speed to draw ahead to a semi 
T-ing or capping position where he might have 
hammered Admiral Beatty's ships on the knuckle 
of their pivoting point without subjecting his own 
ships to anything worse than a long range fire 
from the 15-inch guns of the enemy battleships. 
It may be that the German battle cruisers did 
not have enough speed to do this, or it may be 
that Admiral Hipper was intent only on drawing 
the enemy into the fire of the approaching Ger- 
man battle fleet. At any rate, whatever the ac- 
tual circumstances, neither side lost any ships at 
this time and the battle continued on northerly 
courses, beginning the second phase. 

Second Phase: Action Between British Advance 
Force of Battle Cruisers^ Supported by Four Bat- 
tleships, and German Battle Cruisers, Supported 
by German High Seas Battle Fleet. 

The Fifth Battle Squadron is reported to have 
closed the German battle cruisers on an opposite 
course, engaging them with all guns, when Ad- 
miral Beatty signalled Admiral Evan-Thomas the 
position of the German battle fleet and ordered 
him to alter course 16 points. At 4.57 the Fifth 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 99 

Battle Squadron fell into line astern the battle 
cruisers and came under the fire of the leading 
ships of the German battle fleet, which, in the 
meanwhile, had joined the line of battle in rear 
of Admiral Hipper's battle cruisers. The action 
continued at about 14,000 yards' range on north- 
westerly courses curving north and then northeast- 
erly. At 5.56 Admiral Beatty sighted the lead- 
ing ships of the British Baltic battle fleet bearing 
north, distant five miles, and altered course to east, 
increasing speed to the utmost, thereby reducing 
the range to 12,000 yards, and opening a gap be- 
tween his battle cruisers and Rear Admiral Evan- 
Thomas's supporting battleships. The German 
van also turned eastward. 

This completed the second phase of the battle, 
during which four British battle cruisers and four 
battleships were engaged for about one hour and 
a half with the van of the German fleet led by five 
battle cruisers followed by battleships of the Koe- 
nig class. Light cruisers and destroyers were also 
intermittently engaged during this phase and a 
few isolated but determined torpedo attacks were 
pushed home. These apparently met with little 
success, the attackers suffering severe punishment. 

In this second phase, while at first glance it ap- 
pears that four British battle cruisers supported 
by four battleships were engaging the entire Ger- 



100 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

man High Seas Fleet, such was not strictly speak- 
ing the case. The superior speed of the British 
squadrons enabled them to keep in the van, out of 
range of the enemy centre and rear. At this time 
the advantage of light was with the Germans, be- 
cause the British ships had a sky brightened by the 
setting sun for background, while the German 
ships were more obscured in the mist by reason of 
their dark background. But the British Vice Ad- 
miral reports administering severe punishment to 
enemy ships during this phase. It is not clear 
whether the Germans turned to the eastward to 
avoid being capped or T-ed by the faster enemy 
ships, or whether they originated the easterly 
change ot course because of the approaching Brit- 
ish battle fleet, but this manoeuvre put the Brit- 
ish fleet in a tactically favourable position for gun 
fire as well as ultimately placing them between 
the German fleet and its bases. 



CHAPTER VIII 

North Sea Battles {Continued) 

BATTLE OF JUTLAND Part II 

Third Phase: British Grand Fleet Engages 
with German High Seas Fleet. 

DURING the first and second phases of the 
battle the British Grand Fleet was closing 
at titmost fleet speed on a southeast by south 
course. Three battle cruisers, led by Rear Ad- 
miral Hood in the Invincible., together with screen- 
ing light cruisers and destroyers, were in advance 
operating as a fast wing. At 5.45 an outpost light 
cruiser was engaged with a division of German 
light cruisers. At 6.10 Admiral Beatty's engaged 
squadron was sighted by the Invincible. At 6.21 
Admiral Hood led his squadron into action, taking 
station in the van just ahead of the Lion and clos= 
ing at 6.25 to a range of 8,000 yards. A few min- 
utes later the Invincible was sunk by gun fire. 

In the meanwhile the British battle fleet was 
coming into action, filling the previously men- 
tioned gap opened up between Admiral Beatty 
and Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas. At ^.^^ ad- 

lOI 



102 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

vanced British armoured cruisers, light cruisers, 
and destroyers were engaged with German cruisers 
and destroyers. At 6.16 the armoured cruis- 
ers Warrior, Black Prince, and Defence under 
Sir Robert Arbuthnot were drawn between the 
lines and disabled by close-range fire from the 
German battleships. At 6.14 Admiral Jellicoe 
formed the Grand Fleet in battle line, and dur- 
ing deployment at 6.17 the first battle squadron 
opened fire on a German battleship of the Kaiser 
class. At 6.30 the other battle squadrons engaged 
ships of the Konig class. The four battleships of 
the Elizabeth class, previously engaged during the 
second phase, formed astern of the main battle 
fleet. At this time the Wars pile of this fifth bat- 
tle squadron had her helm jam with right rud- 
der, causing her to turn toward the German line, 
where she was subjected to severe fire, but the 
trouble being soon corrected she was extricated 
from this predicament. Admiral Jellicoe reports : 

Owing principally to the mist, but partly to the smoke, 
it was possible to see only a few ships at a time in the 
enemy's battle line. Toward the van only some four or 
five ships were ever visible at once. More could be seen 
from the rear squadron, but never more than eight to 
twelve. . . . The action between the battle fleets lasted 
intermittently from 6.17 p.m. to 8.20 p.m., at ranges 
between 9,000 yards and 12,000 yards. During this time 
the British fleet made alterations of course from south- 





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104 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

east by east to west (168^ degrees) in the endeavour to 
close, but the enemy constantly turned away and opened 
the range under cover of destroyer attacks and smoke 
screens. The alterations of course had the effect of 
bringing the British fleet (which commenced the action 
in a position of advantage on the bow of the enemy) to 
a quarterly bearing from the enemy's battle line, but at 
the same time placed us between the enemy and his bases. 
During the somewhat brief periods that the ships of the 
High Seas Fleet were visible through the mist the heavy 
and effective fire kept up by the battleships and battle 
cruisers of the Grand Fleet caused me much satisfaction, 
and the enemy vessels were seen to be constantly hit, 
some being observed to haul out of the line and at least 
one to sink. The enemy's return fire at this time was 
not effective and the damage caused to our ships was 
insignificant. 

From the reports it appears that the area of 
the battle was covered by mist and smoke of vary-, 
ing density, interspersed* with sections wherein op- 
posing ships could see each other at the battle 
range. This gave rise to a series of local actions 
during which all ships of the battle fleet became 
engaged, but at no time simultaneously. These 
detached actions were for the most part between 
few ships for brief periods. The aggregate fight- 
ing, however, seems to have been considerable, as 
may be gathered from the following synopsis of 
the principal incidents reported by Admiral Jel- 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 105 

licoe and Vice Admiral Beatty. The following ex- 
tract is from the report of the former: 

At 6.17 the third battle squadron engaged German 
battleships, battle cruisers, and light cruisers at a range 
of 11,000 yards. The fourth battle squadron, in which 
was placed the Commander in Chief's flagship Iron 
Duke, engaged the battle squadron, consisting of the 
Konig and Kaiser classes, as well as some of the Ger- 
man battle cruisers and light cruisers. The mist ren- 
dered range taking difficult, but the fire of the squad- 
ron was effective. The Iron Duke opened at 6.30 on 
a battleship of the Konig class at 12,000 yards range, 
hitting on the second salvo, and continuing to hit until 
the target ship turned away. The fire of other ships 
of the fourth squadron was principally directed at enemy 
battle cruisers and cruisers as they appeared out of 
the mist. The ships of the second battle squadron were 
in action with vessels of the Kaiser and Konig classes 
between 6.30 and 7.20, and fired also at a battle cruiser 
which had dropped back, apparently severely damaged. 
The first battle squadron received more of the return 
fire than the remainder of the main fleet. The Colos- 
sus was hit, but not seriously damaged, and other ships 
were straddled with fair frequency by the German 
salvos. 

Admiral Jellicoe made special mention of the 
Marlborough of the third battle squadron, stating 
that at 6.17 she fired seven salvos at a German 
battleship of the Kaiser class, then engaged a 
cruiser and again a battleship. At 6.^4 she was 



106 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

hit by a torpedo and took up a considerable list 
to starboard, but at 7.03 reopened on a cruiser, 
and at 7.12 fired fourteen rapid salvos at a battle- 
ship of the Konig class, hitting her frequently un- 
til she turned out of line. These details in the 
case of the Marlborough permit some rather inter- 
esting speculations. It seems that this ship alone 
fired approximately between 200 and 250 13.5- 
inch shells, each one weighing about 1,240 pounds, 
aggregating in the neighbourhood of 140 tons of 
high explosive steel shell, at the effective battle 
range of 12,000 yards in the beginning, and closing 
to 9,000 yards during the course of the action. If 
this is at all indicative of the fighting done by 
the other battleships of the' main body it is ap- 
parent that a considerable weight of metal was let 
loose. In the first and second phases it is esti- 
mated that each of the ships under Vice Admiral 
Beatty and Rear Admiral Thomas fired four or 
five times this amount (about 600 tons each) and 
the Germans quite as much, if not more. 

After the injury to the Marlborough Vice Ad- 
miral Burney transferred his flag to the Revenge. 

It appears that the British battle cruisers after 
the loss of the Invincible were out of action for 
about half an hour. At about 6.50 the two re- 
maining ships of Admiral Hood's squadron were 
ordered to prolong Admiral Beatty's line astern, 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 107 

and, having lost sight of the enemy, the battle 
cruiser squadrons reduced speed to l8 knots. 
Course was gradually changed to south and then 
to southwest in an effort to regain touch with the 
enemy. At 7.14 two German battle cruisers and 
two battleships were sighted at about 15,000 
yards' range, bearing northwesterly. At 7.17 Ad- 
miral Beatty's ships re-engaged and increased 
speed to 22 knots. At 7.32 the British battle 
cruisers had again reduced speed to 18 knots. 
German destroyers advanced, emitting clouds of 
dark grey smoke, under which screen the German 
capital ships turned away and were lost sight of 
at 7.45. British light cruisers were ordered to 
sweep westward to regain touch, and at 8.20 Ad- 
miral Beatty ordered a westerly course in support. 
Soon afterward German battle cruisers and bat- 
tleships were heavily engaged at 10,000 yards' 
range. Admiral Beatty reports that the leading 
ship was hit repeatedly by the Lion and turned 
out of line eight points, emitting high flames ; that 
the Princess Royal set fire to a three-funnel bat- 
tleship, and that the New Zealand and Indomita- 
ble both engaged the third ship, forcing her to 
haul out of line on fire and heeling over. The 
mist at this time shut them from view, but the 
Falmouth reported the German ships as last seen 
at 8.38, steaming to the westward. The British 



108 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

battle cruisers did not regain touch, and at 9.24 
changed to the southerly course set by Admiral 
Jellicoe for the battle fleet. 

During the third phase the conditions of mist 
and failing light favoured torpedo attack, but few 
details have been reported. Light cruisers of the 
fourth squadron occupied a position in the van 
until 7.20 p. m., when they carried out orders to 
attack German destroyers. Again at 8.18 p. m. 
these light cruisers moved out to support the 
eleventh destroyer flotilla in a torpedo attack. 
They came under a heavy fire from the enemy bat- 
tle fleet at ranges between 6,500 and 8,000 yards, 
but succeeded in firing torpedoes at German bat- 
tleships. 

At 6.25 the third light cruiser squadron at- 
tacked the German battle cruisers with torpedoes, 
and the Indomitable reported that a few minutes 
later a German battle cruiser of the Derfflingei- 
class fell out of line. This may have been tht 
Liitzow, as at about this time Vice Admiral Hip- 
per, while under a heavy fire, transshipped his flag 
in a destroyer from the disabled Liltzow to the 
Derfflinger. 

It is thus seen that during the third phase, last- 
ing from 6.15 to about 8.30 p. m., practically the 
entire British Grand Fleet was engaged with prac- 
tically the entire German High Seas Fleet. Earl) 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 109 

in the phase the British armoured cruiser Defence 
(tonnage 14,600, carrying four 9.2-inch guns and 
755 men) was sunk. At the same time the ar- 
moured cruiser Warrior (tonnage 13,500, carry- 
ing six 9.2-inch guns and 704 men) and her sister 
ship, the Black Prince, were disabled. The War- 
rior was taken in tow by the Engadine, but broke 
away during rough weather in the night, and sank 
after the crew had been taken off. The Black 
Prince came in close contact with a German bat- 
tleship during the night and was sunk by gunfire. 
Rear Admiral Hood's flagship, the Invincible 
(tonnage 17,250, carrying eight 12-inch guns and 
750 men), was sunk soon after engaging. 

Between 6 and 6.30 the Germans lost the light 
cruiser Wiesbaden. The German battle cruiser 
Liitzow (tonnage 28,000, carrying ten 12-inch 
guns and 750 men) was disabled, and sank while 
returning to port. The German battleship Pom- 
mem (tonnage 13,040, carrying four 11 -inch guns 
and 750 men) was probably disabled during the 
day battle and sunk in the night by a torpedo. The 
German light cruisers Frauenlob and Rostock 
were destroyed in the evening fighting, while the 
light cruiser Elbing was abandoned because of 
damage due to collision with another German 
ship. According to official admission, each side 
seems to have lost about four destroyers, either 



110 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

during this phase or during the night fighting. 

The details of how Admiral Jellicoe manoeu- 
vred his ships into action were not disclosed in his 
report, but the British battle fleet probably ap- 
proached with squadrons or divisions in line or 
line of bearing. That is, the ships were in several 
parallel columns on a southerly course, with the 
leading ships in a line approximately east and 
west, at such a distance apart as to permit all 
ships to swing into one column, heading either 
east or west. The deployment into a battle line 
heading easterly seems to have been skillfully ef- 
fected under trying conditions. Just what th'^ 
relative positions of the two fleets were during 
this phase is not known, but the British would ap- 
pear to have had a tactical advantage in turning 
the German van. The conditions of poor visibil- 
ity, however, did not permit them to get full bene- 
fit of it, although they had the German ships 
backed by the twilight sky, an important advan- 
tage, which must have increased as darkness ap- 
proached. 

Fourth Phase: Torpedo Attacks and Fighting 
During the Night of May j/ to June i. 

Admiral Jellicoe reports that after the arrival 
of the Grand Fleet the tactics of the Germans 
were generally to avoid further action, in which 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 111 

they were favoured by conditions of visibility. 
At this stage of the battle, shortly after 8.40, 
Admiral Jellicoe quotes Vice Admiral Beatty as 
follows : 

In view of the gathering darkness, and the fact that 
our strategical position was such as to make it appear 
certain that we should locate the enemy at daylight un- 
der most favourable circumstances, I did not consider 
it desirable or proper to close the enemy battle fleet dur- 
ing the dark hours. 

Admiral Jellicoe then reports : 

At 9 p. m. the enemy was entirely out of sight, and 
the threat of torpedo boat destroyer attacks during the 
rapidly approaching darkness made it necessary for me 
to dispose of the fleet for the night, with a view to its 
safety from such attacks, while providing for a renewal 
of action at daylight. I accordingly manoeuvred to re- 
main between the enemy and his bases, placing our 
flotillas in a position in which they would afford protec- 
tion to the fleet from destroyer attack and at the same 
time be favourably situated for attacking the enemy's 
heavy ships. 

The British fleet, after making dispositions to 
guard against night torpedo attacks, steamed at 
moderate speed on southerly courses. Conse- 
quently during the night the British heavy ships 
were not engaged, but Admiral Jellicoe reports 
that the British Fourth, Eleventh, Twelfth, and 



112 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

Thirteenth Flotillas delivered a series of successful 
torpedo attacks. 

Apart from the proceedings of the flotillas, the 
second light-cruiser squadron, stationed in the 
rear of the battle fleet, was in close action for 
about fifteen minutes at 10.20 p. m. with a Ger- 
man squadron, comprising one large cruiser and 
four light cruisers. In this action the South- 
hampton and the Dublin suffered rather heavy 
casualties, although their steaming and fighting 
qualities were not seriously impaired. 

This night fighting comprises an interesting 
and perhaps an important phase of the battle, but 
too little is known about it at this time to permit 
profitable discussion. During both the day and 
night conditions were favourable for the use of 
torpedoes. Destroyer attacks seem to have been 
numerous, persistent, and daring. It may be as- 
sumed that a great many torpedoes were fired, but 
the resulting damage does not appear to have 
been very extensive. 

Early on the morning of June 1 (3 a. m.) Ad- 
miral Jellicoe's battle fleet was to the westward 
of Horn Reef, some ninety miles from the bat- 
tlefield, as shown on the chart. The British fleet 
then turned to the northward and retraced its 
course. 

Visibility was three to four miles. Admiral 



'.Skagerrack 




JELLICOE 
3 A.M. 
June l 



80 Miles 
To Heligoland 



Kiel Canal 



DIAGRAM INDICATING FLEET MOVEMENTS AFTER BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

113 



114 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

Jellicoe reports that the British fleet remained in 
the proximity of the battlefield and near the line 
of approach to German ports until ii a. m., June 
1 ; that the position of the British fleet must have 
been known to the enemy, because at 4 a. m, the 
fleet engaged for about five minutes a Zeppelin 
which had ample opportunity to note and sub- 
sequently to report the position and course of the 
British fleet; that the waters from the latitude of 
Horn Reef to the scene of the action were thor- 
oughly searched, but no enemy ships sighted; and 
that at 1.15 p. m., it being evident that the Ger- 
man fleet had succeeded in returning to port, 
course was shaped for British bases, which were 
reached without further incident. By 9.30 p. m. 
of the next day, June 2, the fleet having fueled 
and replenished with ammunition, was reported 
ready for further action. 

The conduct of the British fleet on the evening 
of May 31, during the night, and on the morning 
of June 1 raises a good many perplexing questions. 
In the morning the British ships retraced their 
tracks to the northward, taking about the same 
lane they had followed in the night. 

Considerable criticism has been made of Ad- 
miral Jellicoe for not pressing the retiring enemy 
ships on the evening of May 31. Did approach- 
ing darkness, threat of destroyer attack, and the 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 115 

weather conditions constitute adequate reasons for 
not closing an enemy inferior in numbers, in gun 
power and in speed? This will probably be a 
much discussed question for many years to come. 
Also many people are puzzled that, with the 
Grand Fleet in position to put itself between the 
German High Seas Fleet and its bases, there was 
no decisive engagement on the following day, June 
1. A study of the chart on page 1 13 indicates that 
the fleets could not have been very far apart. 
Considering that the June nights between evening 
and morning twilight are only five hours long in 
these latitudes, and also considering the numer- 
ous scouts, both German and British, it looks as 
though they should have been pretty well in- 
formed of each other's whereabouts. But before 
criticising Admiral Jellicoe for not pressing a re- 
newal of the engagement, it might be well to re- 
flect upon the conditions confronting him on that 
morning : Visibility only three to four miles ; close 
to enemy bases and comparatively far from home 
bases; a fleet somewhat knocked about after the 
previous day's fighting, and no doubt a number 
of the ships short of both fuel and ammunition; 
destroyers and light cruisers scattered, many more 
or less damaged, and perhaps the majority with 
torpedoes expended; an enemy skilled in the use 
of submarines and mines. 



116 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

It is hard for persons unused to the sea to vis- 
ualise the conditions and circumstances attend- 
ing this engagement. Even seagoing men of ex- 
cellent balance are liable, when transplanted tem- 
porarily to the tranquillity of a war college, to 
be somewhat influenced by environment, and, 
while in enthusiastic search of illustration for pet 
theories, they may overlook or fail to give due 
weight to modifying factors which cannot be sim- 
ulated on the game board. Students of tactics on 
shore make their decisions after study and discus- 
sion in the comfortable quiet of a well-lighted 
room, and then use T square and ruler to move 
their miniature ships on a motionless wooden 
ocean. The fighters of the Jutland battled faced 
quite a different proposition. Decisions had to be 
made quickly, accurately transmitted by signal, 
and promptly carried out on a sea darkened by 
mist, smoke, and approaching night. All this had 
to be done, moreover, in the midst of battle, un- 
der the strain of apprehension, in the uncertain- 
ties of meagre and conflicting information. 

The actual results of the Battle of Jutland did 
not change the military situation. The British 
control of the sea remained an absolute factor, as 
before the battle, and the German High Seas Fleet 
continued to be a fleet in being and a menace to its 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 117 

enemies. Consequently the battle must be classed 
as indecisive. 

Moral effect is an important factor in war, and, 
although the military situation was not changed 
by the Battle of Jutland, there is no question of 
the fact that the Qerman public was elated by 
the statement from Berlin that the British fleet 
had been withdrawn from the field of battle. This 
manoeuvre, however, was because of night-fall and 
was toward the German base of Heligoland, not 
toward British home bases. This should be con- 
vincing rebuttal to Germany's claim that her fleet 
gained a victory. 

Those who support Admiral Jellicoe in his de- 
cision not to close the enemy battle fleet, maintain 
that, inasmuch as naval superiority was essential 
to the Allied cause, it should not have been risked 
upon such a hazard as would have been involved 
by continuing the battle under the conditions 
which have been described. On the other hand, 
many hold the opinion that the destruction of 
the German fleet was of such urgent importance 
as to justify this risk. It is too soon to seek a 
final solution of so intricate a problem. 

The following is the British statement of losses : 



118 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

BATTLE CRUISERS 



Queen Mary. . 
Indefatigable . 
Invincible .... 



Ton- Armour 
nage Belt 



27,000 
18,750 
17.250 



9 m. 
Sin. 
7 in. 



Main 
Battery 



l3.S-m. 

i2-in. 

i2-in. 



Speed 



28 
26 
26 



Men 



1,000 
899 
750 



C'p'd 



'08 



ARMOURED CRUISERS 



Defense 

Black Prince. 
Warrior 



14,600 


6 in. 


4 9.2-in. 


23 


755 


I3.SS0 


6 in. 


6 9.2-in. 


20.5 


704 


13.550 


6 in. 


6 9.2-in. 


22.9 


704 



'oS 
'06 
'08 



DESTROYERS 





1,900 

920 
950 
950 

950 






3 4-in. 
3 4-iii. 

3 4-in. 


31 

29.50 
31.32 
31.32 

31-32 


160 

100 
100 
100 

100 


'14 


Turbulent 






















Nestor 


^ 


Shark 













The following is the German statement of 
losses : 

BATTLESHIP 



Ton- 
nage 

Pommem 13.040 



Arma- 
ment Speed 
4 ii-in. 19 
14 6.7-in. 



Latzow. 



BATTLE CRUISER 

28,000 8 i2-in. 27 

12 6-in. 



Date 
Completion 

1907 



191S 



LIGHT CRUISERS 



Rostock 4,820 

Fraueniob 2,656 



12 4.1-m. 
10 4.1-in. 



Elbing 

Wiesbaden. 



Five. 



NEW LIGHT CRUISERS 



DESTROYERS 



27.3 
21.5 



1914 
1903 



NORTH SEA BATTLES 119 

The following are the totals of tonnage and 
personnel reported lost : 

TOTAL TONNAGE LOST 

British 117. 150 

German 60,720 

TOTAL PERSONNEL LOST 

British 6,10s 

Gennan 2,414 



CHAPTER IX 

Submarine Warfare 

THROUGHOUT the war the submarine was 
a conspicuous naval weapon, and German 
science developed it with characteristic energy, 
system, and thoroughness. In the first months 
the more powerful Allied navies practically swept 
the seas of all enemy merchant ships and con- 
tained the battle fleets of the Central Powers 
within comparatively narrow limits. Beyond 
these limits, except for a few raids on commerce 
by surface cruisers, the naval operations of both 
Germany and Austria were restricted to the use 
of submarines. 

Considering the disadvantages inherent in un- 
derwater navigation, the results attained were 
truly astonishing. The following incidents may 
be mentioned as examples of various and nu- 
merous submarine activities. In the first days of 
the war one small German submarine sank three 
British armoured cruisers in less than one hour. 
On Oct. 7, 1916, the U-53 appeared in Newport 
Harbor, exchanged official calls, read the daily 



SUBMARINE WARFARE 121 

papers, sent dispatches, and departed a few hours 
after her arrival. The next day the U-boat de- 
stroyed off Nantucket four British traders and one 
Dutch trader. In the Spring of 1917 a German 
submarine bombarded peaceful Funchal. Also be- 
fore the entry of the United States into the war 
Captain Konig introduced a new type, a commer- 
cial submarine, the successful trans- Atlantic block- 
ade runner, Deutschland. In addition, the under- 
water mine layer was developed, and it is dis- 
turbing to think of how this huge mechanical fish 
secretly threaded the ocean highways, laying its 
engines of destruction. Finally, U-boat cruisers 
of about 2,800 tons' displacement, nearly 300 feet 
long, fitted with a double bottom multiple com- 
partment protection utilized for carrying oil to 
permit a cruising radius of about 18,000 miles, 
and mounting 5.9 inch guns, besides carrying tor- 
pedoes, are reported to have appeared and taken 
part in the war. The U-boat as an outlaw com- 
merce destroyer did enormous damage. 

It is not surprising that the submarine seized 
upon the imagination. And Germany took ad- 
vantage of the mystery surrounding underwater 
attack to circulate propaganda designed to 
strengthen hopes at home, and at the same time 
break down morale in enemy countries. This re- 
sulted in a somewhat confused perspective. In 



122 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

studying this phase of the war, therefore, it is 
important that we should search out the facts, 
reason to logical conclusions, and take the true 
measure of the U-boat. 

The outstanding characteristic of the subma- 
rine, as its name indicates, is its ability to navi- 
gate below the surface of the water. This enables 
it to evade the enemy, to make a surprise attack, 
and to escape by hiding. These faculties are 
manifestly suitable for the weaker belligerent to 
use against the stronger enemy. Navies that dom- 
inate, that have power to seek and destroy in the 
open, are not dependent upon abilities to evade 
and to hide. It is for this reason that Allied 
submarines found their chief opportunity to strike 
in sea areas controlled by the fleets of the Central 
Powers, the Baltic, the Dardanelles, and other 
waters close to Teutonic bases, while German 
submarines were active in all other ocean areas 
within the cruising radius of their U-boats. Since 
the Allies controlled practically all the high seas, 
the field of the U-boat was large, while the ac- 
tivities of Allied submarines were confined to the 
relatively narrow coastal waters controlled by 
Germany, Austria, and Turkey. 

Without depreciating the utility of the subma- 
rine, it may be truly said that if the Allies had 
not possessed a single one they would still have 



SUBMARINE WARFARE 123 

enjoyed the incalculable advantages of control of 
the high seas. The German U-boats, moreover, 
did not prove effective against enemy battle fleets. 
In order to facilitate submarine commerce-destroy-* 
ing operations Germany found it necessary, be- 
cause of inherent weaknesses in underwater craft, 
to adopt methods in violation of the laws of 
civilised warfare. Before going deeper into the 
uses and limitations of the submarine it might 
be well to touch briefly upon some of the rules 
governing its legitimate employment. 

The purpose of rules regulating ocean-borne in- 
tercourse in times of peace and governing both bel- 
ligerent and neutral conduct in time of war is to 
carry out practically the principles of the freedom 
of the seas, and it need hardly be added that 
these principles are identical with those govern- 
ing all rules of right conduct at sea and on shore ; 
namely, principles of liberty, justice, and hu- 
manity. 

As weapons and other conditions change, new 
situations arise which may require modifications 
in these rules; but both in time of peace and in 
time of war reason calls for a general concur- 
rence of Governments before a modified or new 
rule can become operative ; and any belligerent in- 
stituting methods in violation of previously estab- 
lished regulations assumes the burden of proof to 



124 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

show that new conditions compel new rules in or- 
der to carry out the never-changing principles of 
the freedom of the seas. 

There is little room for confusion of thought 
on this point. Unfortunately, however, it is the 
experience of war-time practice that military ne- 
cessity and the doctrine of "might makes right" 
twist these rules into a bewildering tangle. One 
belligerent breaks a rule and attempts to justify 
his conduct. The enemy, as a matter of policy, 
turns a deaf ear to the arguments in justification, 
and, seeing only the broken rule, proceeds to re- 
talitate by breaking another rule on the ground 
that military necessity forces him to resort to this 
act of reprisal. And so one act of reprisal leads to 
another until unconscionable degrees of lawless- 
ness are reached. 

It has been suggested as a possible solution ob- 
viating the difficulties of drawing up a set of good 
working rules to govern naval operations against 
commerce that one sweeping sanction of immunity 
might suffice by which all trade ships would be 
allowed to carry on their peaceful pursuits unmo- 
lested in time of war as in time of peace. The 
objection, however, to such a rule is, that when 
the world is divided between nations at peace and 
nations at war, this rule would satisfy peoples at 
peace and one side of the belligerents, but the 



SUBMARINE WARFARE 125 

other belligerents would find it discriminatory and 
would oppose it as an infringement upon their 
rights to use the seas in accordance with principles 
of equity and freedom. 

To deny belligerents, moreover, their right to 
use the seas for suppressing enemy commerce and 
imposing economic pressure in order to hasten the 
settlement of their differences, would deprive the 
world of what is generally looked upon, when con- 
ducted according to the rules of civilised warfare, 
as a humane method of re-establishing conditions 
of peace. It may be added that those who aim 
at a world peace secured by a concert of power 
may reasonably assert that, while the freedom of 
the seas is a foundation principle on which to make 
a world peace secure, naval power, by instituting 
blockades, may at times prove a humane and ef- 
fective means of compelling recalcitrant Govern- 
ments to observe the provisions of this peace. 

During a war, the maritime interests of bellig- 
erents and neutrals are bound to conflict; and it 
is impossible to give either of them unlicensed use 
of the seas without restricting the freedom of the 
other. Hence a compromise is necessary, and so 
long as nations recognise a state of war as involv- 
ing conditions subject to law in which both bel- 
ligerents and neutrals have rights, it is manifest 
that rules are required to define and guarantee 



126 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

these rights. It will not be attempted here to ex- 
amine closely the many rules drawn to govern 
naval warfare, some of which were still subjects 
of controversy when the great war began; but, 
as an aid to the memory, a few of the recognised 
and established regulations affecting the use of 
the submarine will be briefly outlined : 

1. A blockade to be binding must be effective; that is, 
it must be maintained by a force sufficient to render in- 
gress to or egress from the enemy coast line dangerous. 

2. A blockade must not bar access to neutral ports or 
coasts. 

3. During the continuance of a state of blockade no 
vessels are allowed to enter or leave the blockaded place 
without consent of the blockading authority. 

4. The prohibition of contraband trade with the at- 
tendant adjudging of penalties is a belligerent right. 
This right can only be exercised upon the high seas and 
the territorial waters of the belligerents and in accord- 
ance with the rules and usages of international law. 
(Contraband of war may be defined as articles destined 
for the enemy and capable of use as an assistance to the 
enemy in carrying on war either ashore or afloat.) 

5. Lawfully commissioned public vessels of a bel- 
ligerent nation may exercise the right of visiting and 
searching merchant ships upon the high seas, whatever 
be the ship, the cargo, or the destination. If the exami- 
nation of ship's papers and search show fraud, contra- 
band, an offence in respect of blockade, or enemy service, 
the vessel may be seized. Force may be used to over- 



SUBMARINE WARFARE 127 

come either resistance or flight, but condemnation, fol- 
lows forcible resistance alone. In exercising these rights 
belligerents must conform to the rules and usages of 
international law. 

6. When a vessel in action surrenders (usually indi- 
cated by hauling down the national flag or showing the 
white flag of truce), firing must cease on the part of the 
victor. To continue an attack after knowledge of sur- 
render, or to sink a vessel after submission, is a violation 
of the rules of civilised warfare only permissible in 
cases of treachery or renewal of the action. 

7. Absolute contraband, including guns, ammunition, 
and the like, is liable to capture on the high seas or in 
the territorial waters of the belligerents if it is shown 
to be destined to territory belonging to or occupied by 
the enemy, or to the armed forces of the enemy. It is 
immaterial whether the carriage of the goods is direct 
or entails transshipment, even at a neutral port, or a 
subsequent transport by land, although it may be through 
neutral territory. Also there must be a trial and judg- 
ment of a prize court of the captor having proper juris- 
diction in regard to the goods involved, whether de- 
stroyed or not. 

The status of armed merchantmen is generally 
misunderstood. Merchantmen have the right to 
arm for defence. A merchantman may repel an 
attack by any enemy ship, but only a man-of-war 
can attack men-of-war. 

According to international law the character of 
a ship is determined by her employment ; and it is 



128 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

an established right of merchant vessels that they 
may carry arms — for defence only — without nec- 
essarily altering their status before the law .as 
traders engaged in legitimate peaceful pursuits. 
This right is well established by precedent, and 
although prolific of complications, it has on the 
whole operated to sustain the principles of free- 
dom of the seas. Its usefulness was conspicuous 
in the days of piracy; and the "long toms" on 
board our clipper ships proved strong arguments 
in suppressing lawlessness. 

In the heat of war, moreover, belligerents are 
inclined to infringe the privileges of noncombat- 
ants, and experience has shown that the right of 
merchant vessels to arm for defence has tended 
to prevent belligerents from unlawful interference 
with peaceful traffic. The belligerent right to 
stop, visit, search, and capture merchantmen is a 
high sovereign power, and it seems reasonable 
to require that the vessels authorised to exercise 
it should possess potential strength. It would be 
a somewhat absurd condition, inviting abuse and 
irregularity, if rules were so framed as to permit 
a fast enemy motor boat, manned by three or four 
men armed with rifles, to stop, search, and cap- 
ture an ocean liner, without allowing the liner to 
attempt lawfully either flight or resistance. On 
the other hand, a motor boat, submarine, or any 



SUBMARINE WARFARE 129 

other duly commissioned and authorised man-of- 
war has the right to employ force to overcome re- 
sistance or to prevent flight ; and the merchantman 
has no redress for damage sustained during at- 
tempted flight or resistance. In the majority of 
cases, it is obvious that prudence will influence 
merchantmen to surrender promptly in the face of 
a respectably powerful man-of-war rather than 
forfeit immunity by attempting flight or resist- 
ance. 

If an armed merchantman of a neutral country 
on friendly terms with the warring nations should 
resist by force a belligerent man-of-war, the neu- 
tral Government would properly discountenance 
the act as incompatible with the relations of am- 
ity existing between the two countries. If, how- 
ever, neutral rights are violated to an intolerable 
degree a state of armed neutrality may supplant 
the relations of amity, and under these unusual 
conditions a Government has the right and may 
be in duty bound to preserve its neutrality by 
using such force as the circumstances may require ; 
but in this delicate situation care must be exer- 
cised that force is used only in defence of neutral 
rights. 

From the beginning of the war submarines 
helped to prevent a close blockade of the coasts 
of the Central Powers, and the inability on the 



130 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

part of the Allied navies to institute a coast line 
blockade strictly in accordance with the estab- 
lished rules of international law led to what is 
generally known as a distant blockade. The 
British Orders in Council regulating this distant 
blockade lengthened the contraband lists and ex- 
tended the doctrine of ultimate destination until 
Germany's commerce with non-contiguous coun- 
tries was practically cut off. 

As the effectiveness of the blockade increased, 
Germany retaliated by taking undue advantage 
of the war area doctrine, and claimed increasing 
latitude in the use of the U-boats. As in the case 
of the invasion of Belgium, Germany made mili- 
tary necessity the excuse for the illegal acts of 
the German Navy. Underwater attack against the 
blockading battle fleets met with little success; but 
the unscrupulous use of the submarine as a com- 
merce destroyer brought better results. The vigor- 
ous protest of neutrals against the violation of 
their rights caused Germany, for a time, to make 
an effort to comply with the rules and usages of in- 
ternational law; but this effort proved ineffectual. 
The vulnerability of the submarine, with the in- 
creasing efficacy of the ways and means developed 
to safeguard merchantmen from its attack, pre- 
sented to the German Government the alternative 
either of suffering a curtailment of submarine 



SUBMARINE WARFARE 131 

effectiveness or of abandoning lawful methods. 
Germany's decision to take the latter course was 
announced to the world by official notification that 
within a war zone embracing large areas of the 
high seas her submarines would sink all ships, neu- 
tral or belligerent. 

This unwarranted course forced the United 
States into the war against Germany, and aroused 
the hostility of a great part of the world. Even 
from the German point of view, the only thing 
that would have made the result profitable would 
have been to win a decision in the war by means 
of the U-boats. This Germany did not succeed 
in accomplishing. Although there were enormous 
losses of shipping, the submarines did not succeed 
in shutting off transportation by sea. 



CHAPTER X 

Anti-Submarine Tactics 

THE cruising radius of the larger submarines 
ranges from about 6,000 miles to 9,000 
miles (18,000 miles is the reported radius of the 
most recent cruiser type) when steaming on the 
surface at a slow speed of five to ten knots. The 
newer boats are reported to have a maximum speed 
of eighteen knots, but economy of fuel is so im- 
portant, and the consumption is so much greater 
for high speeds, that submarines use the econom- 
ical slower speeds except perhaps for short spurts. 
It is obvious that submarines operating from dis- 
tant bases cannot well afford to chase merchant- 
men unless the latter happen to be slow ones. Their 
usual procedure is to lie in wait along the trade 
routes and attack the ships which run up to them. 
Submarines, after cruising a certain distance 
while submerged, are compelled to come to the 
surface to recharge their batteries. Here again the 
maximum submerged speed of about fourteen 
knots for the newer boats and about ten knots for 
the older types is extremely uneconomical. For 

132 



ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 133 

example, approximately speaking, the average 
submarine when submerged can go four to five 
hours at ten knots, a total distance of about forty 
miles; or ten hours at about seven knots, a total 
distance of seventy miles; or thirty-six hours at 
about four knots, a total distance of 14 miles; 
or seventy-two hours at steerage way (about two 
and one-half knots), a total distance of 180 miles. 
The more recent U-boats can go much farther, 
under favorable conditions as far as 250 miles, 
at a stretch without coming to the surface. But 
when the limit is reached, whatever it may be, the 
submarine must stop and wait for an opportunity 
to come to the surface to recharge batteries. 

It follows, then, that anti-submarine tactics 
which force the enemy to go comparatively long 
distances at high speeds tend to limit their activi- 
ties. Experience has taught submarine command- 
ers that when the prospects are such as to promise 
considerable uneconomical cruising, either on the 
surface or submerged, it is usually a wise policy 
to abandon the attack. 

The armament of submarines consists of both 
guns and torpedoes. The hull of the' newer types 
is protected to some extent by armour, but even 
so a gun engagement with a well-armed enemy 
involves great risk. The practice of arming mer- 
chant ships has forced commerce-destroying sub- 



134 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

marines to rely on the torpedo as the principal 
weapon of attack. 

The general characteristics of the torpedo are 
now pretty well known. It is a highly scientific 
mechanism consisting of many intricate parts in- 
geniously assembled in a metal shell about twelve, 
to twenty feet long, twenty-one inches in diame- 
ter, weighing about one ton, and valued in this 
country at about $6,000. In appearance a tor- 
pedo somewhat resembles a small, elongated auto- 
submarine. It has horizontal and vertical rud- 
ders which can be so adjusted, in conjunction with 
an automatic steering device, as to make the tor- 
pedo keep at a certain depth and either travel 
straight or in a curve. The torpedo is propelled 
by a screw driven by an automatic compressed 
air engine, capable of giving a speed as high as 
thirty-six knots. By the act of launching from 
the tube a starting lever is tripped, which causes 
the propelling mechanism to go ahead at full 
speed. The head of the torpedo carries a power- 
ful bursting charge. The object of submarine tac- 
tics is to detonate this high explosive against the 
underwater body of the target ship. 

To accomplish this object the submarine com- 
mander has to make preliminary observations 
through his periscope, estimate the course, speed, 
and distance of the enemy, manoeuvre his boat to 



ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 135 

a favourable position, make the necessary firing 
adjustments, aim the torpedo, and then launch it. 

It is obvious that the closer the target the better 
the chances of scoring a hit. As a general rule it 
is not profitable for submarines to fire torpedoes 
at greater ranges than one thousand yards because 
the percentage of hits at longer ranges is com- 
paratively small. Glancing hits, moreover, are 
not often effective. When the target ship is end 
on, the torpedo, even when correctly aimed to 
hit, frequently glances off without exploding (bow 
wave and wake currents assist this deflection), or 
if it does explode fails to do much damage. [Ger- 
many evidently practiced caution both with her 
torpedoes and with her submarines. Torpedoes 
were so expensive, the supply was so limited, and 
the U-boats themselves were so precious that every 
effort was made to avoid risk of failure and de- 
struction.] 

It is thus seen that submarine tactics are not al- 
together simple. If the target ship is fast, steers 
zigzag courses, keeps a bright lookout, carries 
guns, and is also attended by escort ships specially 
equipped for destroying submarines, the difficul- 
ties in the way of successful attack are consider- 
ably increased. 

The problem facing the submarine Captain may 
be summarised as follows : 



136 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

Keeping in mind the importance of safeguard- 
ing his own ship and also the necessity of econo- 
mising in both fuel and torpedoes, he first studies 
the situation and if he is in a favourable position 
ahead of his quarry, he decides to attack. Assum- 
ing that the approaching vessel is armed he sub- 
merges before there is likelihood of discovery. 
He then observes at more or less frequent inter- 
vals through his periscope, takes bearings of the 
approaching target ship, and estimates her course, 
distance, and speed. His purpose is to avoid dis- 
covery and at the same time to manoeuvre into a 
favourable position for launching at about one 
thousand yards' range a torpedo so aimed and ad- 
justed as to strike the enemy ship at an angle of 
incidence to her fore and aft line greater than 
thirty degrees. 

There are, of course, any number of variations 
in the methods of making a submarine attack, but 
as an illustration, suppose a U-boat submerged 
and approaching from a bow bearing at a speed of 
six knots toward a target ship advancing at twelve 
knots. (With good glasses a periscope can be dis- 
tinguished in comparatively smooth water by an 
alert lookout at 3,000 to 4,000 yards.) 

As the ship can probably escape by manoeuvring 
if the periscope is seen before the torpedo is 
fired, it follows that the critical time for both the 



ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 137 

attacker and the attacked is during the interval of 
approach from the range of 4,000 yaras to the 
firing range of about 1,000 yards. This interval 
will last on an average from seven to ten minutes, 
depending upon the speeds, upon the angle of ap- 
proach and upon how accurately the submarine 
judges the course of the target ship. Beginning at 
4,000 yards the submarine can be expected to show 
about one foot of periscope and observe for a 
period of about thirty seconds. After this four or 
five successive observations will probably be taken 
at intervals of about one minute, the period of 
time that the periscope is exposed diminishing 
gradually to ten or twelve seconds. 

In the meanwhile the submarine will have 
closed to about 2,000 yards, and from now on 
only a few inches of periscope will be exposed, 
but at more frequent intervals, about every thirty 
seconds, and the length of time the periscope is 
shown will decrease to from ten to five seconds. 

At about one thousand yards the firing exposure 
will be made, and this will probably be for about 
twenty-five seconds in order to assure a well-aimed 
torpedo. 

The above procedure is not absolute — some sub- 
marine commanders show more periscope in at- 
tacking and others less — but i. may be taken as 
typical. This means that in an average attack 



138 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

from the time the submarine can be seen to the 
time the torpedo is fired about ten minutes elapse, 
during which there are about fifteen exposures of 
the periscope for gradually diminishing periods of 
time, ranging from thirty seconds down to five 
seconds, except the last exposure for firing, which 
lasts about twenty-five seconds. 

There has been some talk of a German inven- 
tion designed to enable a submarine to make a 
successful approach and attack without showing 
any periscope. It is improbable that any such 
device is in general use at present. 

Anti-submarine tactics may be divided into 
three general classes — first, tactics to detect and 
to locate; second, tactics to destroy; and, third, 
tactics to evade. Tactics to detect and to locate 
include all manner of lookout systems installed in 
ships and aircraft, underwater listening devices 
known as microphones or hydrophones, and intel- 
ligence reports from home and foreign informa- 
tion agencies by which probable positions of 
enemy submarines are plotted from day to day 
together with conjectures as to their future move- 
ments. Tactics to destroy include the use of 
depth bombs, mines, guns, nets, and the ram. Tac- 
tics to evade include the use of smoke screens made 
by smoke boxes, smoke funnels and the like, zig- 
zag tactics, quick manoeuvring in the presence of 



ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 139 

a submarine to frustrate attack or dodge the tor- 
pedo, and logistic calculations by which informa- 
tion of all sorts is collated and utilised to keep 
convoys clear of areas known to be dangerous. 

Although these three classes of anti-submarine 
tactics are closely related and interdependent, for 
the sake of clearness they will be briefly discussed 
separately and in turn. 

TACTICS TO DETECT AND TO LOCATE 

The lookout system is the most important part 
of the submarine defence of a large ship. Every- 
thing depends on first seeing the periscope or the 
torpedo in time, and then transmitting the infor- 
mation quickly and accurately to the ship control 
and fire-control stations so that the attack may 
be thwarted by prompt manoeuvre and gun fire 
supplemented by the use of depth bombs, smoke 
screen, or other expedient, according to the cir- 
cumstances. The organised submarine lookout 
system for capital ships comprises a large number 
of lookouts stationed both aloft and below. The 
horizon circle is divided into sectors, each consist- 
ing of a comparatively small arc numbered and 
assigned as an individual lookout station. 

Each sector is covered by at least two lookouts 
and the more dangerous sectors on the beam are 
usually covered by three or more lookouts. The 



140 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

means of making reports from the lookout sta- 
tions to the bridge and to the gun-fire control 
stations are designed to assure prompt and accurate 
transmission. The personnel is intensively trained 
both to develop skill in distinguishing objects in 
the water with the proper glasses provided and also 
to use judgment in making reports. Lookouts are 
frequently relieved, and great care exercised that 
the waters all around the ship are continuously 
swept day and night by alert lookouts. A ship can 
usually avoid attack if the submarine or even the 
torpedo is sighted when still far enough away to 
permit a radical change of course before the tor- 
pedo can travel the intervening distance. Safety 
depends upon "seeing," and an .alert lookout by 
gaining 200 or 300 yards in sighting a periscope 
may avert destruction. 

The advantage of altitude in maintaining a 
lookout for objects both above and below water 
is obvious. For this reason aircraft lookouts are 
widely used both in convoy and patrol work. 
These include the various types of aeroplanes, air- 
ships, observation kites, and observation balloons. 

The ability of submarines to hide, together with 
conditions of choppy sea, fog, mist and failing 
light under which it is easier to see a big ship than 
it is to see a small periscope tend to handicap the 
lookouts. It has been endeavoured, therefore, to 



ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 141 

devise means of detecting the presence of the sub- 
marine by the sense of hearing. Water is a bet- 
ter conductor of sound than is the air, and before 
the war tests had shown that a submarine bell 
could be heard with the receivers installed on 
board ship ten miles away when the vessel was 
in motion, and up to twenty-one miles with en- 
gines stopped. William Dubilier, an American 
electrical engineer, devised a harbour defence sys- 
tem against U-boats which he has explained as 
consisting of a number of special microphones ar- 
ranged at a certain depth around the entrance of 
the harbour, each microphone accurately faced in 
a known direction. The operator by slowly shift- 
ing the contact of his receiver from one micro- 
phone to another can note the one in which the 
sound of the submarine is loudest and so report 
the direction of the enemy at that time. The 
French naval authorities had a school for the sole 
purpose of training men to listen for the sounds 
of submarines by means of hydrophones. The 
operator was stationed in the utter quiet of a 
padded cell with his ear receiver connected to a 
series of diaphragms, so sensitive as to record the 
passage of a submarine at a considerable distance, 
and also roughly indicate the direction in which 
it might be travelling. It is obvious that the 
perfection of such means for detecting and locat- 



142 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

ing submerged submarines constitutes an impor- 
tant step toward rendering commerce destruction 
by underwater craft a dead issue. 

TACTICS TO DESTROY 

To defeat a submarine campaign against com- 
merce, successful tactics to destroy, to harass, to 
make the submarine hunted as well as hunter, are 
essential both to lessen the numerical strength of 
the enemy and also to damage his morale. 

The gun is chiefly useful to compel a submarine 
to keep submerged and use torpedoes at a dis- 
advantage. While it is difficult to hit a periscope, 
and even if a lucky hit is scored no serious damage 
is done as spare periscopes are carried, still, the 
presence of the gun is important both to em- 
barrass attack and also to menace the submarine 
should she for any reason be forced to come to 
the surface. 

The usual service shell fired by naval guns at 
comparatively short ranges are deflected upwards 
on striking the water and ricochet. In order to 
get a shell to dive and follow an underwater 
trajectory to reach the submerged U-boat, a non- 
ricocheting type was developed. These plunging 
shell are somewhat similar in their operation to 
depth bombs and render gun-fire more danger- 



ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 143 

ous to submarines. It may be supposed that 
such shell kept falling just short of a periscope 
and so fused as to burst both on contact and at 
a certain depth make it uncomfortable for an 
attacking U-boat. 

Under ordinary circumstances most submarine 
skippers would not consider it wise to risk a gun 
engagement on the surface. The policy of arming 
merchantmen together with the convoy system has 
created conditions under which surface attack has 
to be made in the face of effective gun-fire. This 
greatly reduces the usefulness of the larger type 
of commerce-destroying submarine cruisers which, 
because of their size, are unhandy for making 
submerged attack. Torpedoes, moreover, are ex- 
pensive and cannot be carried in large numbers. 
On the whole it may be concluded that the gun 
is an important factor in anti-submarine tactics. 

An under-water weapon is needed to attack an 
under-water enemy. Mines and depth bombs 
are, therefore, very useful against submarines. 
The depth bombs, variously known as depth 
charges or water bombs, are designed to be dropped 
over the stern of a ship or thrown in pairs simul- 
taneously to a distance on either side of the ves- 
sel by means of a specially designed depth bomb 
thrower known as a "Y" gun. These bombs are 
fitted with an hydrostatic valve operated by the 



144 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

weight of water so that the charge explodes at 
the depth to which the valve is set. In order to 
do damage these charges do not have to be ex- 
ploded against the hull of the submarine, but are 
made so large and powerful (300 to 600 lbs.) 
that when exploded at some distance away the 
concussion is sufficient to blow in the sides of 
the submarine or to disarrange the delicate and 
complicated internal machinery and fittings. The 
presence of a submarine being evidenced by sight- 
ing a periscope or a torpedo its location at the 
particular time is approximated as accurately as 
possible and marked. The destroyers and other 
anti-submarine craft in the vicinity then proceed 
to lay a scientific depth bomb barrage covering 
the locus of all points the submarine could reach 
in the elapsed time. A bombed submarine may 
be destroyed and sunk, or it may be so damaged 
as to be forced to come to the surface and sur- 
render; or it may succeed in limping home, or in 
reaching a neutral port for internment. Even 
when no material damage is suffered the effects 
of being bombed are damaging to the morale of 
the crew. 

Early in the war nets were used to good pur- 
pose, but after a time the submarines were fitted 
with net cutting devices and learned to negotiate 
with fair success this type of defence. Besides 



ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 145 

channel nets and harbour nets a type of drag 
net was used. This net has been described as 
being of wire with a fifteen-foot mesh cut into 
lengths of one hundred and seventy feet with a 
depth of twenty-seven feet. To the top edge of 
this netting large wooden buoys were lashed. De- 
stroyers or patrol boats with good speed operated 
in pairs to handle these nets, sections of which 
were suspended between them. A periscope being 
sighted and the course of the submarine estimated, 
the two vessels with the drag net between them 
would steam ahead of the submarine and then cut 
away the lashings holding the net so that the 
enemy U-boat would steer into it and become en- 
tangled. The buoys marking the net would thus 
be towed along by the submarine and indicate her 
position so that she could be destroyed by depth 
bombs or other means. Submarine sweeps have 
also, been described as consisting of powerful ex- 
plosives towed at a certain depth and set to ex- 
plode on contact. Various kinds of nets are use- 
ful for harbour defence and against the smaller 
types of submarines in shoal waters, but are not 
of much value against the ocean-going submarine 
cruisers. 

The use of so-called "O" ships or mystery ships 
comprise an interesting phase of anti-submarine 
warfare. The service of these require both cour- 



146 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

age and skill. A mystery ship may be defined as 
a naval submarine destroyer disguised as a mer- 
chantman. The usual type is a merchant ship, 
mounting carefully concealed guns and manned 
by a trained naval crew dressed in civilian clothes. 
The object is to decoy the enemy submarine into 
easy range and then suddenly unmask the guns 
and destroy her by rapid and accurate gun-fire 
before she has a chance to submerge. As an ex- 
ample, suppose that a "O" ship, loaded with lum- 
ber so that she will not sink, puts to sea and is 
torpedoed. At once "panic" parties including 
men dressed as women scramble into the ship's 
lifeboats, launch them with much confusion and 
hastily row away, giving the idea that all hands 
are abandoning the ship in great terror. Then 
when the submarine approaches the apparently 
deserted ship with a view to looting her the hidden 
crews unmask their guns and open fire. As the 
methods of the mystery ships become known to 
the enemy, however, submarines learn to be cau- 
tious, and successes by these tactics decrease in 
number. 

Concurrent with improvements In methods for 
detecting and locating submarines, together with 
the development of means for destroying them, 
there has been extension in the use of restrictive 
mine fields. The diagram shows the mine fields 



ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 147 

in the North Sea as reported at the close of the 
war. The first to be laid protected the mouth of 
the Thames and also helped block the English 
Channel. Another one extending from the neigh- 
bourhood of the Dutch Coast to that of Denmark 
enclosed the waters of Heligoland Bight and was 
laid early in 1917. The third field, obstructing 
ocean passage from the North Sea around Scot- 
land, extended between the Orkneys and the Nor- 
wegian Coast. This was reported as covering an 
area of about 12,758 square miles. During the 
summer of 1918 the efficiency of anti-submarine 
mine barrages in the North Sea was greatly in- 
creased. The United States Navy equipped a 
large mine fleet which took an important part in 
this work which contributed so effectively to over- 
coming the U-boat. 

Up to April, 1917, no mine had been devel- 
oped suitable for blocking the North Sea across 
the Scotland-Norway line where the depths of 
water are as great as nine hundred feet. To re- 
strict the enemy submarines it was necessary to 
mine this line from the surface to the depth of 
two hundred and fifty to three hundred feet. The 
Bureau of Ordnance of the United States Navy 
Department submitted a plan for laying this 
barrage with a new type of mine. As a result, 
100,000 mines were manufactured by the United 




MINE FIELDS LAID BY BRITISH AND AMERICAN NAVIES IN THE NORTH SEA 
(Diagram of the Battle of Jutland is also included) 

148 



ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 149 

States, of which 85,000 were shipped abroad. 
Eighty per cent, of the Scotland-Norway mine 
barrage was laid by the United States Navy. The 
total personnel engaged numbered 6,700. Re- 
sults obtained justified the effort and cost ex- 
pended. 

TACTICS OF EVASION 

The primary objective of anti-submarine tactics 
is to destroy the enemy submarines. But, since 
it is easier and wiser for the larger vessels, trans- 
ports, and merchantment to evade the attack, 
every effort should be made by them to practise 
tactics of evasion to supplement tactics to de- 
stroy. In convoy the latter can much better be 
conducted by the escorting destroyers. 

Zig-zag tactics make attack difficult. Also, a 
quick manoeuvre the instant a periscope or tor- 
pedo is sighted will often save the ship. Alert 
seamanship is, therefore, a main reliance of capi- 
tal ships in avoiding submarine attack. 

It may be mentioned here that at the start of 
Germany's unrestricted submarine campaign 
against commerce it was extremely hard to con- 
trol merchantmen and get them to practise simple 
anti-submarine tactics — such as steering zigzag 
courses — calculated to embarrass the submarine in 
the accomplishment of its purpose. It was diffi- 
cult for seamen who for years had navigated the 



150 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

usual lanes to understand and carry out instruc- 
tions intended to safeguard them from a foe they 
could not see. When the tangible proof of the 
enemy's presence arrived it was too late. Utmost 
vigilance was necessary at all times, and in the 
early stages of the war the percentage of tor- 
pedoed ships was not sufficiently high to spur the 
crews to great exertions. 

There were many influences inclining the indi- 
viduals on board ships passing through the war 
zone to the opinion that getting safely by was 
largely a question of luck. There seemed to be 
more or less prevalent a sort of fatalistic atti- 
tude toward the submarine, or the gambler's atti- 
tude of taking a chance against being torpedoed, 
with a resulting laxity in the observance of safe- 
guarding measures. Whatever the cause of this 
indifference to the practice of simple anti-subma- 
rine tactics of evasion, there is plenty of evidence 
that many a ship played into the hands of the 
U-boat either by failure to carry out instructions, 
or by a poor lookout system, or by neglect to steer 
zigzag courses before sighting the submarine. 
This was unfortunate, but not surprising. The 
nature of the submarine enemy was such that to 
combat it successfully required a personnel well 
trained and well disciplined. The extension of 
the convoy system strongly advocated by the 



ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 151 

United States Navy resulted in a closer observ- 
ance of safeguarding measures and in many ways 
contributed to the defeat of the U-boats. 

A smoke screen has also been found useful to 
enable merchantmen to escape in cases where the}'- 
are not sufficiently well armed to repel the gun 
attack of submarines manoeuvring on the surface 
of the water. These screens may be made by es- 
corting destroyers, or by smoke boxes thrown over- 
board, or by smoke funnels mounted at the stern 
filled with a phosphorous compound which when 
lighted emits a dense black smoke so heavy that 
it hangs over the surface of the water. It is 
claimed that the clouds produced by these smoke 
boxes and funnels will be effective for six hours 
under usual weather conditions. 

In order to evade and to confuse enemy sub- 
marines wide use has been made of camouflage 
painting of hulls and exterior fittings of all types 
of ships. On January 12, 1918, however, the 
British Admiralty issued a statement to the effect 
that "the theory of rendering ships invisible at 
sea by painting them various colours is no longer 
tenable, and that the numerous schemes tried by 
the Admiralty under actual conditions at sea have 
invariably been disappointing." 

It is generally understood that a scheme of 
camouflage painting which renders a ship more 



152 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

difficult to see under certain light conditions may 
render the ship more easy to see under other light 
conditions. Experience seems to indicate that the 
standard Navy gray for all conditions is as serv- 
iceable for concealing the presence of the ship as 





A CONVOY SHOWING ESCORT AND AN EXAMPLE OF 
"DAZZLE" PAINTING 

any colour or scheme of colours so far devised. 
The so-called dazzle painting, however, has dem- 
onstrated usefulness as a means of making an 
accurate estimate of course and speed difficult. 

The convoy system combines all three classes 
of anti-submarine tactics, and by bringing ocean 
traffic under control renders the work of the com- 
merce-destroying submarine much more difficult. 



ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 153 

The attacking submarine must reckon with the 
naval escort and risk destruction in approaching 
the convoy. The make-up of the convoy and es- 
cort depends on varying conditions. In so far as 
availability of ships and readiness for sailing per- 
mit the convoy is forrried with a view to homege- 
neity in speed so that fast vessels may not be 
held back by slow ones. Cruisers act as ocean 
escorts to guard convoys from enemy raider at- 
tack, and submarine cruisers operating on the sur- 
face, to supervise generally, and to stand by in 
readiness to act in any emergency. In submarine 
danger waters the convoy is surrounded by escort- 
ing destroyers, yachts, or submarine chasers of 
other type and frequently attended by aircraft. 
The strength of the escort varies according to the 
value of the convoy and the number of submarines 
supposed to be operating in the vicinity. No 
fixed rule can be laid down as the naval vessels 
available must be distributed in such manner as 
will best meet the requirements of the moment. 

The disadvantages of the convoy system are in- 
creased likelihood of collision, reduction of speed 
to that of the slowest ship, and improved chances 
that a submarine may score a lucky hit at long 
range. These, however, are outweighed by the 
advantages as is attested by results obtained. 

Seagoing craft of all descriptions approach- 



154 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

ing the characteristics of the destroyers and capa- 
ble of carrying guns and bombs are useful. 
Yachts, fast tugs, and other comparatively small 
vessels capable of keeping the sea and making rea- 
sonable speed can all do good work in the war 
zone. Torpedo boats and the smaller submarine 
chasers and patrol boats, though not so useful as 
more seaworthy vessels, are still of value for oper- 
ating nearer the shore. Mine sweepers also are 
needed. 

Seaplanes, dirigibles (Blimps), and kite bal- 
loons make good scouts because of the large areas 
they can cover. Weather conditions are seldom 
such that submarines entirely submerged can be 
seen by aircraft, but this does not make the latter 
less valuable for detecting periscopes and subma- 
rines awash or on the surface. Also aircraft mark 
the spot where a periscope is sighted and so assist 
destroyers and patrols in the effective use of their 
bombs. 

Cruisers and converted cruisers are needed for 
distant convoy work, to carry seaplanes, to carry 
kite balloons, and also for various administrative 
and mothership duties. 

An anti-submarine force, therefore, includes 
cruisers, converted cruisers, destroyers, subma- 
rines, torpedo boats, patrol craft, mine sweepers. 



ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 155 

seaplanes, dirigibles, and kite balloons, all sup- 
plied in as large numbers as can be obtained. 

In the last year of the great war as the German 
submarine crews learned by hard experience of 
the increasing number and variety of schemes used 
to destroy them they began to realise that the 
chances were against them. This in itself was a 
restraint, which made the U-boats more wary and 
consequently less effective. At best there was not 
much comfort or security in a long submarine 
cruise. The prospect of dying like a rat in a trap 
was not pleasant, whether because of accident, or 
shipwreck, or hostile attack. The strain of con- 
stant guard against the devices of an alert enemy 
told on even the strongest nerves. Each new 
method or contrivance which increased the anxie- 
ties and difficulties of the U-boats proved helpful 
in checking their activities, and often contributed 
in unexpected ways to their destruction. 

The submarine menace was very real. Facts 
and figures show that it was one of the most im- 
portant problems of the war. But anti-submarine 
tactics were developed right along, and, while the 
U-boat as a lawless commerce destroyer was un- 
foreseen and countermeasures consequently not 
prepared during previous years of peace, still, at 
no time was there any real doubt but that it would 
be successfully met by the Allied navies. 



CHAPTER XI 

United States in the War 
Overseas Transportation of United States Troops, 

PREVIOUS to 1917 the idea of a United 
States overseas expeditionary force num- 
bered by millions would have been generally re- 
garded as a remote if not impossible contingency. 
Consequently no extensive peace-time prepara- 
tions had been made for such an undertaking. The 
task of providing a transport fleet was, therefore, 
a pioneer work. Ships had to be obtained, offi- 
cers and crews enrolled and trained. It was neces- 
sary to provide docks, storehouses, lighters and 
tugs, coaling equipment, repair facilities, and all 
the varied machinery for operating and maintain- 
ing a large transportation service. An efficient ad- 
ministrative organisation had to be developed. 

The work of the navy in connection with the 
transportation of troops to France constitutes a 
distinct phase of the present war. The attending 
political and military circumstances incident to 
the collapse of Russia, the .critical situation on 
the western front, and the threat of the German 

156 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 157 

submarine combined to make this phase of special 
significance. Throughout the year following the 
entry of the United States into the war the mili- 
tary and naval developments were such that the 
safe transportation across the Atlantic of troops 
and supplies became a problem of more and more 
pressing importance. 

Such, in brief, was the problem confronting 
Rear Admiral Albert Gleaves, then Commander of 
the Destroyer Force of the Atlantic Fleet, when, on 
May 29, 1917, he received orders designating him 
Commander of United States Convoy Operations 
in the Atlantic in addition to his other duties.* 

The United States Army in France was a de- 
cisive factor in obtaining speedy victory. The 
transportation of this army overseas under naval 
protection was, therefore, a major operation of 
first importance. A large share of this urgent 
mission devolved on the United States Navy, and 
its successful accomplishment in the face of great 
difficulties is another page to the record of the 
service in keeping with its past history and tradi- 
tions. 

The vast work of transporting a United States 
Army numbering 2,079,880 souls to Europe was 
not done by the United States Navy unassisted. 

* At the close of the war, in recognition of his services, 
Rear Admiral Gleaves vi?as promoted to the rank of Vice 
Admiral. 



158 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

Help was received from many quarters and the 
different organisations concerned performed their 
respective functions in utmost harmony and co- 
operation. 

At the time the United States entered the war 
the enormous toll of shipping gathered by the 
U-boat in the East Atlantic and the boast of von 
Hindenburg that the submarine blockade of Eng- 
land would starve her out and win the war, indi- 
cate the seriousness of the naval situation in those 
waters at that time. Inasmuch as the principal 
field of British naval activities was the North Sea 
and English Channel, the task of breaking the 
U-boat blockade in the Atlantic naturally became 
the immediate mission of the United States Navy. 
The prompt despatching of destroyers, yachts, and 
all other available craft of a type useful against 
the submarine to the East Atlantic, and the splen- 
did work these vessels did in cleaning up these 
waters of U-boat devastation is a matter of record, 
the importance of which in winning the war is con- 
ceded from all quarters. This was the first step 
in preparation for sending the United States Army 
overseas. 

The next step was the development of the trans- 
port service and the convoy and escort system. In 
this work the Cruiser and Transport Force co-oper- 
ated with the destroyers and other anti-submarine 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 159 

craft abroad. In addition, Great Britain, France, 
and Italy supplied troop ships. As would be ex- 
pected from Great Britain's enormous merchant 
marine, she was able to supply the greatest carry- 
ing capacity. She had the ships ready for this use, 
and 48^ per cent, of the American Army was 
transported in British steamers; 2^ per cent, was 
carried in French ships, and 3 per cent, in Italian. 
The remaining 46^ per cent, were carried in 
United States ships, and all but 2^ per cent, of 
these sailed in United States naval transports. 

All the troops carried in United States ships 
were escorted by United States men-of-war; that 
is, cruisers, destroyers, converted yachts, and other 
anti-submarine craft. Also for the most part the 
troops carried in British, French, and Italian ships 
were given safe conduct through the danger zones 
by United States destroyers. Roughly, 82^ per 
cent, of the maximum strength of the naval escorts 
provided incident to the transportation of United 
States troops across the Atlantic was supplied by 
the United States Navy, 143^ per cent, by the 
British Navy, and 3^ per cent, by the French 
Navy. The Army organised and developed an 
efficient system for loading and unloading the 
ships at the terminal ports. The navy transported 
the troops and safeguarded them en route. 

The declaration of war with Germany found 



160 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

the United States without a transport fleet and 
without a merchant marine capable of supplying 
ships for transporting a large military expedi- 
tion. Starting with almost nothing at the begin- 
ning of the war, a United States naval transport 
service was built up which numbered at the time 
of the armistice, twenty-four cruisers and forty- 
two transports, manned, exclusive of troops car- 
ried, by about 3,000 officers and 42,000 men. This 
force carried almost a million soldiers to Europe 
without the loss of a single soldier by the hand of 
the enemy. 

On homeward-bound voyages, the Cruiser and 
Transport Force was not as fortunate as on the 
East bound trips. In a measure this was due to 
need of concentrating maximum naval escort pro- 
tection on troop-laden convoys. Frequently this 
necessitated lighter escort for the ships returning, 
and it was on these homeward-bound vessels that 
the submarines scored their successes. The United 
States Naval Transports Antilles, President Lin- 
coln, and Covington were torpedoed and sank. The 
Finland and Mount Vernon were torpedoed, but 
were able to reach port for repairs. The United 
States armoured cruiser S>an Diego struck a mine 
laid by a German submarine and sank. 

The service was not without hazard, as is 
shown by the casualties suffered. "Nor were enemy 



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162 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

guns and torpedoes the only menace — danger from 
fire and internal damage was enhanced by the ma- 
chinations of enemy secret agents, and the likeli- 
hood of collision was increased by^ the necessity of 
manoeuvring without lights in convoy formation 
vessels manned for the most part by inexperienced 
crews." ^ 

In connection with the successful operation of 
these ships special mention should be made of the 
volunteer and reserve personnel, particularly the 
officers and men from the United States merchant 
marine service who enrolled in the navy for the 
period of the war.^ These rendered splendid 
service, and the interests of the United States for 
the future require that the cordial relations of co- 
operation established between the merchant ma- 
rine and the navy be maintained. 

^ Quoted from the General Report of the Secretary of 
the Navy. 

^ In the larger transports it was the policy of the depart- 
ment to have the captains, executive ofificers, chief engineers, 
gunnery officers, senior medical Officers, and senior supply 
officers detailed from the regular navy and the remainder 
of the officer complement filled from the various classes of 
reserve and volunteer officers. This worked very well, and 
too much credit cannot be given the latter for the loyal service 
rendered and the aptitude shown in adapting themselves to 
naval war conditions. 

In special cases it was possible, after a certain amount of 
experience had been gained, to relieve heads of departments, 
originally assignments of regular naval officers, by reserve 
officers. For example, in the case of the Harrishurg, Louis- 
ville, Plattsburg, Manchuria, Mongolia, and Finland, after 
a few trips the reserve captains took over command of the 
ships. 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 163 

OTHER WAR ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES 

NAVY 

Excerpts quoted from the Annual Report of the Secretary 
of the Navy, December, igi8. 

OPERATIONS AT HOME AND ABROAD. 

The operations of our Navy during the world war 
have covered the widest scope in its history. Our naval 
forces have operated in European waters from the 
Mediterranean to the White Sea. At Corfu, Gibraltar, 
along the French Bay of Biscay ports, at the English 
Channel ports, on. the Irish coast, in the North Sea, at 
Murmansk and Archangel, our naval forces have been 
stationed and have done creditable work. 

Naval men have served on nearly two thousand craft 
that plied the waters. On the land, marines and sailors 
have helped to hold strategic points, regiments of ma- 
rines have shared with the magnificent Army their part 
of the hard-won victory, a wonderfully trained gun 
crew of sailors have manned the monster 14-inch guns 
which marked a new departure in land warfare. In 
diplomacy, in investigation at home and in all parts of 
the world by naval officers and civilian agents, in pro- 
tecting plants and labor from spies and enemies, in 
promoting new industrial organizations and enlarging 
older ones to meet war needs, in stimulating production 
of needed naval craft — these are some of the out-stand- 
ing operations. 

THE INCREASE OF THE NAVY. 

In 1912 there were 3,094 officers and 47,515 enlisted 
men in the Navy. By July 1, 1916, the year previous 
to our entrance into the war, the number had grown to 
4,293 officers and 54,234 enlisted men. On July 1, 
1917, three months after the declaration of war, the 
number of officers had increased to 8,038 — 45694 regu- 



164 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

lars, 3,344 reserves ; and the number of enlisted men to 
171,133 — 128,666 regulars, 32,379 reserves, 10,088 
National Naval Volunteers. The increase since that 
time is shown below: 

April 1, 1918: Officers. Men. 
Regular Navy — 

Permanent 5,441 198,242 

Temporary 2,519 

Reserves 10,625 85,475 

Total , 18,585 283,717 

Nov. 9, 1918: 
Regular Navy — 

Permanent , 5»656 206,684 

Temporary 4'833 

Reserves 21,985 290,346 



Total 32474 497.030 



TEAMWORK AT HOME AND ABROAD. 

Throughout its enormous expansion since the begin- 
ning of the war, the enlarged naval force has kept this 
vital factor — teamwork — always in mind. The Navy 
at home has shown its capacity for teamwork in cooper- 
ating with the Army, the War Industries Board, and 
the many other governmental activities already estab- 
lished and the new ones wisely created for the success- 
ful prosecution of the war.' Abroad, the American Navy 
has given a demonstration, which can be characterized 
only as wonderful of its readiness to join with our 
associates in teamwork for the common end and the 
common good. In the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, the 
Pacific, and the Arctic ; with England, with France, with 
Japan, with Italy, and all allied nations, the United 
States navy has cooperated without friction, looking al- 
ways to the end to be attained. 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 165 

SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND MEN OVERSEAS. 

War was declared on April 6, 1917. On the 4th of 
May a detachment of destroyers was in European waters. 
By January 1, 1918, there were 113 United States naval 
ships across, and in October, 1918,, the total had reached 
338 ships of all classes. At the present time there are 
5,000 officers and 70,000 enlisted men of the United 
States Navy serving in Europe, this total being greater 
than the full strength of the Navy when the United 
States entered the war. 

NAVAL BASES ABROAD. 

In order to efficiently cooperate with our allies. United 
States naval port officers have been stationed at 20 of 
the principal seaports of Great Britain, France, and 
Italy. Fifteen naval bases have been established. 

In connection with aviation, two repair and assembly 
bases, 4 kite balloon stations, 18 seaplane stations, 5 
bombing plane stations, and 3 dirigible stations have been 
established and manned with Navy personnel, which in- 
cludes 624 officers, 97 observers, and over 15,000 enlisted 
men. 

The destroyers upon their first arrival were based on 
Queenstown which has been the base of the operations 
of these best fighters of the submarines during the war. 
Every facility possible was provided for the comfort 
and recreation of the officers and men engaged in this 
most rigorous service. 

When the submarine chaser flotillas were sent overseas 
it was decided to route them via the Bermudas and the 
Azores in order to get them across materially fit and with 
the personnel in fighting trim. Having formulated the 
plan of getting our chasers across, it was necessary to 
secure for them certain base facilities on the way over. 
To that end negotiations were entered into with the 
Portuguese whereby we received from them the use of 
a temporary base at Ponta Delgada in the Azores. This 
base was built up to such an extent that we were able 
to care for the needs of our small and other craft that 



166 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

might require the use of a base while passing to and fro 
across the Atlantic. 

During the year the forces abroad have been increased 
by vessels of all types. The most valuable type of 
vessel abroad for operations against submarines is, of 
course, the destroyer. There has been a constant in- 
crease in the number of destroyers sent abroad since the 
declaration of war, and the number now operating 
abroad is twice as great as the number which were nor- 
mally kept in commission during peace time. Of these, 
25 per cent are new, having been built, commissioned, 
and dispatched abroad since the declaration of war. 
These little craft have performed their duties in a most 
efficient manner and at the same time have maintained 
themselves in a state of material readiness which is re- 
markable when it is considered that each destroyer dur- 
ing a period of three months averages about 20,000 miles 
cruising. 

The fitting out and operation of the 110-foot subma- 
rine chasers has had a marked effect upon the submarine 
campaign both here and abroad. At the beginning of 
this year there were 38 of these submarine chasers in 
commission. There are now 406 submarine chasers in 
commission, of which 235 have been dispatched abroad 
and the remainder assigned to duty in home waters. 

The problem of sending such a large number of these 
small vessels with a limited cruising radius across the 
ocean was one that required careful thought. A plan 
of sending these chasers in groups, convoyed by a fuel 
ship and fueling at sea, was finally adopted and was 
most successful. In connection with the operations of 
a group of these chasers in the Adriatic, the following 
cable has been received: 

Italian naval general staff expresses highest appre- 
ciation useful and efficient work performed by United 
States chasers in protecting major vessels during action 
against Durazzo; also vivid admiration of their brilliant 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 167 

and clever operation, which resulted in sinking two 
enemy submaries. 

The principal antisubmarine efforts were at first car- 
ried on by surface craft, but it was later realized that 
the submarine itself is the enemy of the submarine, es- 
pecially when our enemy submarines are forced to work 
upon the surface, as they sometimes are. Therefore, it 
was decided to send certain numbers of our submarines 
to the Azores, to keep that base clear, and also to the 
coast of Ireland to operate from that general strategic 
area. So, first in 1917, and later in 1918, two groups of 
our submarines were dispatched across the water, and 
after a hard winter passage made their ports and have 
been operating from those localities ever since. Before 
our submarines had been dispatched abroad, the process 
of concentrating our reserves in these craft on our Atlan- 
tic coast, there to prepare for future contingencies, had 
been undertaken. 

During the year numerous convoys of small craft have 
been towed or escorted abroad for the Army and for the 
Governments of our allies without any loss. These 
craft include barges, derricks, tugs, and submarine 
chasers. The safe despatch abroad of this miscellane- 
ous craft through submarine-infested waters has been 
accomplished in a very satisfactory manner. 

The employment of the fighting craft of the Navy 
may be summed up as follows ; 

THE ESCORTING OF TROOP AND CARGO CONVOYS AND 
OTHER SPECIAL VESSELS. 

In the summer of 1917, the submarine problem hav- 
ing become so acute and the losses to merchant ships 
so great, it became necessary to adopt more effective 
methods of handling merchant shipping, in order that 
a greater degree of safety should be afforded. The sys- 
tem of convoying ships was adopted. While this slowed 
up shipping fully 20 per cent and increased the dangers 



168 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

of collision and other difficulties, experience has amply 
justified the wisdom of the policy. The convoy system, 
the adoption of which was suggested by President Wil- 
son shortly after our entrance into the war, was applied 
to both cargo and troop ships and its success was almost 
immediately apparent. It consisted in gathering to- 
gether certain numbers of vessels, sailing at regular 
intervals along established lanes, under the guard of 
heavier ships to protect against raiders, and destroyers to 
protect against submarines. 

This system went into effect with the first of our 
troop convoys, which crossed in June, 1917, and has 
continued ever since, to the day the armistice was signed. 
It had much to do with breaking the back of the sub- 
marine offensive, for it deprived the U-boat of the bene- 
fit he derived from attacking individual, unprotected ships 
and forced him to devote his efforts, for the most part, to 
ships which were protected by destroyers. To engage 
with a convoy, the submarine was forced to enter the 
danger zone and frequently it was he and not our ships 
which became the victim. 

In these convoys efforts, all of our destroyers, our 
armored cruisers, our smaller cruisers, and later the old 
battleships of our fleet, have been engaged, continuously, 
winter and summer. It has been hard, grinding work, 
but that it was well done is attested by the fact that two 
million troops were sent abroad, with not the loss by 
enemy action of a single east-bound ship carrying troops 
under the protection of our forces. 

The history of the convoy operations in which our 
naval forces have taken part, due to which we have been 
able so successfully to transport such a large number of 
our military forces abroad, and so many supplies for 
the Army, is a chapter in itself. It is probably our 
major operation in this war and will, in the future, 
stand as a monument to both the Army and the Navy, 
as the greatest and most difficult troop transporting ef- 
fort which has ever been conducted across seas. The 
work is not finished. The bringing of our forces back 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 169 

is still a naval problem, and it will be undertaken with 
the same spirit which characterized the transportation 
and convoy of our troops to Europe. 

TROOPS TRANSPORTED THE ROAD KEPT OPEN TO FRANCE. 

Two million American fighting men have been safely- 
landed in France. This is the record of the cruiser and 
transport force of the Atlantic Fleet of the United States 
and of the American troops carried by British ships, and 
some assistance from other allied ships. 

From a small beginning at the outbreak of war — a 
few cruisers and hastily gathered together transports, 
the latter for the most part slow^ — the cruiser and trans- 
port force has been gradually expanded into a great 
fleet, now comprising 24 cruisers and 42 transports, 
manned by 3,000 officers and 41,000 men. These are 
augmented by 4 French men-of-war and 13 foreign 
merchant vessels, a grand total of 83 vessels. This en- 
tire force, under command of Rear Admiral Albert 
Gleaves, whose ability and resource have been tested and 
established in this great service in cooperation with the 
destroyers, converted yachts and other anti-submarine 
craft operating abroad, has developed an antisubmarine 
convoy and escort system the results of which have sur- 
passed even the most sanguine expectations. The suc- 
cessful development of antisubmarine tactics in the At- 
lantic is an achievement of the United States Navy, 
the value of which it would be hard to overestimate. 

Strategy has required the cruiser and transport force 
to operate with utmost secrecy. Convoy duty has not 
been spectacular, but it has demanded endurance, con- 
stant vigilance, and devotion to duty of the highest order 
under circumstances of the most trying and arduous 
nature. Too much credit can not be given to the officers 
and enlisted personnel who have accomplished this haz- 
ardous and responsible mission. Winter and summer 
they averaged approximately 70 per cent of the time 
at sea. 



170 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

Up to November i, 1918, of the total number of 
United States troops in Europe, 924,578 made passage 
in United States naval convoys under escort of United 
States cruisers and destroyers. Since the 1st of Novem- 
ber, 1917, there have been 289 sailings of naval trans- 
ports from American ports. In these operations of the 
cruiser and transport force of the Atlantic Fleet not one 
eastbound American transport has been torpedoed or 
damaged by the enemy, and only three sunk on the re- 
turn voyage. 

Taking into consideration the dangers and difficulties 
attending the service of the cruiser and transport force, 
the comparatively light casualty list is eloquent testi- 
mony of an efficient personnel organized and trained 
under a wise administrative command. 

Notwithstanding this, however, more than half of our 
naval casualties inflicted by the enemy have been suf- 
fered in the cruiser and transport force. These losses 
were to be expected in a service involving great hazard, 
not only from enemy guns and torpedoes, but also from 
the machinations of enemy secret agents and from 
navigational dangers enhanced by operating without 
lights under unfavorable conditions. 



SOME ILLUSTRATIVE FIGURES. 

As an indication of the work being done by United 
States naval vessels in the war zone, the following aver- 
ages of miles steamed per month are given : 

MILES. 

Destroyers 275,000 

Miscellaneous patrol craft 120,000 

Mine sweepers 10,000 

Mine layers . 10,000 

Battleships and submarines 90,000 

Submarine chasers 121,000 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 171 

or a total of 626,000 miles per month. The above figures 
include vessels actively engaged in naval duties only, 
under command of the ^orce commander. United States 
naval forces in Europe, and not troop ships, transports, 
cargo carriers, or miscellaneous merchant vessels flying 
the American flag, constantly plying through the war 
zone. Nor does it include cruisers or battleships en- 
gaged in oversea escort duties. 

DISTANCES STEAMED BY DESTROYERS. 

Distances steamed by various destroyers can be shown 
when the record of several of the first to arrive in 
European waters is examined. Three of these are shown 
to have steamed during the first year of service in the 
zone : 

MILES. 

U. S. S. Porter 64,473 

U. S. S. Conyngham 63,952 

U. S. S. Davis 63,015 

An individual instance of activity is given for one of 
the new destroyers. The U. S. S. Kimberley, during 
the month of June, steamed 7,019 miles, and was at 
sea 470 hours during the month ; i. e., about 65 per cent 
of the time. 

TYPICAL ESCORT RECORDS. 

During July and August, 1918, 3,444,012 tons of 
shipping were escorted to and from France by American 
escort vessels; of the above amount, 1,577,735 tons were 
escorted in and 1,864,677 tons were escorted out of 
French ports. Of the tonnage escorted into French ports 
during this time, only 16,988 tons, or O.009 per cent, were, 
lost through enemy action, and of the tonnage escorted 
out from French ports, only 27,858 tons, or 0.0 13 per 
cent, were lost through the same cause. During the same 
period, July and August of this year, 259,604 American 
troops were escorted to France by United States escort 
vessels without the loss of a single man through enemy 



172 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

action. The particulars in the above paragraph refer 
to United States naval forces operating in the war zone 
from French ports. 

During the same time — July and August — destroyers 
based on British ports supplied 75 per cent of the escorts 
for 318 ships, totaling 2,752,908 tons, and including th^ 
escort of vessels carrying 137,283 United States troops. 
The destroyers on this duty were at sea an average of 
67 per cent of the time, and were under way for a period 
of about 1 6,000 hours, steaming approximately an ag- 
gregate of 260,000 miles. There were no losses due to 
enemy action. 

The American force based on Gibraltar, including de- 
stroyers, gun-boats, cruisers, yachts, and Coast Guard 
cutters during July and August, have been at sea 56 
per cent of the time, and actually under way 15,500 
hours, steaming during this period 160,000 miles. They 
have supplied approximately 25 per cent of the escorts 
for Mediterranean convoys between Gibraltar on the 
one hand and France and Italy on the .other, and have 
performed 70 per cent of the ocean escort duties between 
Gibraltar and England. The above figures are given as 
indicative of what is accomplished month by month by 
our vessels in the war zone. 

In addition to duty performed by destroyers and other 
escorting vessels, the extensive naval activities of our 
battleships with the British Grand Fleet, mining units, 
patrol units, submarine hunting, mine sweeping, salvage, 
etc., have been many and varied. 

FUEL SUPPLY — PIPE LINE ACROSS SCOTLAND. 

The coal used by the American Expeditionary Forces 
in France is carried to that country in vessels largely 
officered and manned by the Navy. Of the 70 or more 
ships operating in Army coal service two-thirds have 
now been commissioned in the Navy, and the others will 
shortly follow. 

The destruction of tankers carrying oil to our own 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 173 

ships and the British fleet in the North Sea gave much 
anxiety, and in order to avert the submarine menace in 
sending the tankers around the north of Scotland it was 
determined by the American and British Navies to build 
a pipe line across Scotland. Our naval experts under- 
took the big task, and thereby reduced the distance and 
danger of supplying the fleet with oil. 

NORTH SEA MINE BARRAGE. 

The outstanding antisubmarine offensive project of 
the year was the closing of the North Sea by a mine 
barrage extending from the Orkney Islands to the terri- 
torial waters of Norway, together with a barrage across 
the Straits of Dover. The plan to close the North Sea, 
and thereby deny enemy submarines free access to the 
Atlantic from German bases, had its inception in the 
Bureau of Ordnance in April, 1917, immediately follow- 
ing the entrance of the United States into the war. At 
this time there had not been developed anywhere a type 
of mine suitable for the Scotland-Norway line, whereon 
the depths of water are as great as 900 feet and where 
a prohibitive number of mines of the then existing type 
would have been required to mine this line from the 
surface to a depth of 250 to 300 feet. 

A memorandum covering the possibilities of the new 
mine was prepared, advocating the laying of a barrage 
consisting of mines of this type across the North Sea, 
and this was given to Admiral Mayo, then leaving for 
England, where the project could be discussed with the 
British Admiralty. As a result of his conference with 
the British authorities and of detailed information fur- 
nished them by British mining officers sent to this coun- 
try, the Admiralty gave its approval to the scheme, and 
both Navies worked together in this big undertaking, 
more extensive and important than any mine barrage 
ever before considered, much less carried out. 

The following facts show briefly the magnitude of the 
operation so far as the United States is concerned. One 



174 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

hundred thousand mines were manufactured, of which 
about 85,000 have been shipped abroad. Two new mine 
bases were established abroad, with a capacity for as- 
sembling and issuing 1,000 mines a day. 

,More than 50,000 American mines have been laid in 
strategical areas in European waters. The Navy has 
taken part in and actually laid 80 per cent of the great 
mine barrage, 230 miles long, from Scotland to Nor- 
way. A total of 56,439 mines have been laid, all of 
which were designed and manufactured b)'' the United 
States and transported and laid by the United States 
Navy. The total personnel engaged in mining activity 
alone is upward of 6,700 men. 

HUGE MINE-LOADING PLANT IN OPERATION. 

A special mine-loading plant, with a capacity of more 
than 1,000 mines a day was established ne.ar Yorktown, 
Va., by the Navy Department, in accordance with con- 
gressional authorization, about 11,000 acres of land 
having been secured for the purpose. 

An immense number of mines will be stowed at this 
depot, and it will include a mine-loading plant, a mine- 
assembling plant, and storage for a large amount of 
high explosives. In addition to this mine-loading depot, 
the mine-loading plants at the various ammunition depots 
have been operating successfully during the past year. 

More than a score of cargo vessels were placed in 
service as mine carriers to transport mines to Europe. 
Many mine layers and several auxiliary vessels were 
fitted out and assigned to the execution of the North Sea 
project. 

The manufacture of the large number of mines re- 
quired was a work of unprecedented magnitude and 
necessitated unusual methods. It was clearly impossible, 
in the time available, to manufacture the mine as a 
whole in any plant ; therefore the mine was divided into 
its many component parts and the parts were separately 
produced in a large number of industrial factories 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 175 

throughout the country. To show the extent of sub- 
division of work, 140 principal contractors and over 
400 subcontractors were engaged. The parts were as- 
sembled into subassemblies in this country, and the 
subassemblies were shipped to Europe, where the com- 
plete assembly was made just prior to issue to the mine 
planters. By carrying out the work in this manner a 
gain of a full year was made in the planting of the 
barrage. 

The military results already obtained from the bar- 
rage more than justify the effort and cost expended. 
The number of submarines sunk or disabled in the bar- 
rage probably will never be definitely known, since' it 
is impossible to keep close observation continuously on 
a line 250 miles long, but ordnance officers report that 
there is reason to believe that at least 10 submarines had 
ended their career at the barrage before the middle of 
October. 

THE ASSIGNMENT TO DUTY AND OPERATION OF NAVAL 
VESSELS TO INCREASE THE FORCE IN HOME WATERS. 

During the year numerous smaller craft, including de- 
stroyers, torpedo boats, mine sweepers, submarines, and 
submarine chasers have been commissioned and assigned 
to the home districts for operating against enemy subma- 
rines and protecting coastwise shipping and for sweeping 
the channels and approaches to the coast. Action of ene- 
my submarines in placing mines at focal points along the 
coast has required extensive mine-sweeping operations. 
This has necessitated the commissioning of new mine 
sweepers and t\ie conversion of other craft which have 
been taken over for that purpose. 

NAVAL DISTRICTS. 

One of the agencies adopted during the war for more 
efficient naval administration is the organization and 
development of naval districts. In the efficient admin- 



176 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

istration of the large and diversified work carried on by 
the Navy, some method of grouping activity and decen- 
tralizing authority is essential. For the purpose of 
naval administration, the United States and its posses- 
sions have been divided into convenient subdivisions 
known as naval districts. The supervision of all naval 
activities in each of the districts has been placed under 
a commandant of the district, who is a naval officer of 
rank and experience. In this way the department has 
been able through the various commandants of districts 
to carry out problems involving patrol and defenses of 
the coast, mine sweeping, communications, information, 
industrial developments, housing facilities, commandeer- 
ing vessels, etc. 

THE NAVY THAT FLIES 

Of untold importance during the year was the estab- 
lishment and placement under operation of naval-air 
stations at all the strategic and important points on the 
coast of the United States. Likewise, a station was 
established in the Canal Zone. As a result of those 
activities, the larger part of the American coast has been 
constantly patrolled by naval aircraft. Furthermore, 
the Navy Department has already planned and is fully 
prepared to establish enough additional stations to so 
complete the system that every foot of the coast of the 
United States can be thoroughly and constantly pa- 
trolled. Many of the stations now in operation are 
equipped not only with seaplanes but also with dirigibles 
and kite balloons. The extent of activities that are being 
carried on can be readily illustrated. Thus, during 
June, 1918, a total of 25,642 flights, covering about 
2,155,860 miles, were made by seaplanes at stations 
along the United States coast. These figures include 
both patrol and training. During that same period of 
time lighter-than-air craft made a total of 613 flights, 
covering about 56,420 miles. 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 177 

THE CARRYING OUT OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE 
MEASURES AGAINST ENEMY SUBMARINES IN THE 
WESTERN ATLANTIC. 

The wisdom of making a clean-cut line of demarca- 
tion between the military and industrial activities on 
our coast and of foreseeing the character of hostile opera- 
tions against which we should make preparation was 
clearly shown when the enemy first directed his opera- 
tions against our coast. About the middle of May, 1918, 
the enemy evidently decided that he must make an 
effort to stop us from sending more military forces 
abroad or at least to so distract our efforts that we should 
be more concerned with protecting our own coast than 
we were in forwarding troops. 

When the submarines appeared off our coast, the poli- 
cies already formulated were promptly put into effect. 
It had been determined before by the department that 
the logical military objective would be our troop and 
cargo convoys, but these were so well guarded that the 
submarine evidently preferred not to engage with them, 
but devoted his efforts against our coastwise trade, and 
principally against our unarmed sailing vessels. Along 
with this campaign of destruction, which had no military 
value whatsoever, the enemy adopted the practice of 
strewing our coast with mines. This feature of his cam- 
paign had been anticipated and our sweepers had been 
actively engaged in clearing the channels through which 
our convoys regularly sail. It was natural, however, 
with the long expanse of sea-coast which we had to 
protect, that the enemy should succeed in laying de- 
tached mine fields which more than once proved destruc- 
tive to our coastwise shipping. 

Up to the time that the U-boats appeared, it had been 
the practice to allow coastwise ships to sail direct, and as 
far as was practicable lights were burned and the ordi- 
nary aids to navigation were kept going. 

Immediately upon their arrival in American waters, 
without in the slightest degree allowing the enemy's ef- 



178 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

forts to diminish the rate of flow of troops and supplies- 
abroad, all coastwise shipping was hauled in close under 
the protection of our district forces and a series of rout- 
ings, escort and air patrols were started which rendered 
reasonably secure the vessels that plied up and down our 
coast. In order to further render our shores secure, and 
to force the hostile submersibles to operate farther afield, 
our own submarines were immediately sent out against 
them. Hunting groups of destroyers and chasers, which 
had been formed and were in readiness, were put into 
action. 

The net result was that very soon, from a military 
point of view, the hostile submarine's efforts became 
practically nil and he was forced to operate farther 
afield — that is, well out into the Atlantic, where his 
principal prey became the single unarmed ships return- 
ing home on their westbound voyages. This move on 
the part of the Germans had been anticipated, as for 
the greater part westbound ships rarely returned home 
singly, but usually in company with another craft which 
carried a gun sufficiently large to cope with that of 
the submarine. On the whole, the operations of German 
submarines against our coast can be spoken of as one 
of the minor incidents of the war, and had the enemy 
chosen to carry his operations into the Gulf, or even to 
the coast of Brazil, he would have found that prepara- 
tions had been made to anticipate them. 

THE PROTECTION OF VESSELS ENGAGED IN COASTWISE 
TRADE. 

The appearance of enemy submarines in these waters 
necessitated the putting into effect of the convoy system 
for coastwise shipping and for the protection of individ- 
ual ships engaged in the coastwise trade. This has 
been accomplished in accordance with the previously made 
plans and has worked smoothly, the protection to ship- 
ping being afforded by the craft assigned to naval dis- 
tricts. 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 179 



PROTECTION OF OIL SUPPLIES FROM THE GULF. 

To forestall enemy submarine operations in the Gulf 
and Caribbean, a force was established called the Ameri- 
can Patrol Force, and its headquarters was in the vicinity 
of Key West. While the coastwise shipping could be 
adequately protected by routing close along our coast, 
the problem became a different one the instant it entered 
the Gulf and Caribbean areas, and it was this problem 
and the problem of antisubmarine operations which the 
American patrol detachment had to undertake. As was 
foreseen, the protection of the oil supplies from the Gulf 
to our own coast and then abroad were quite vital to 
the success of the general campaign, and these supplies 
the patrol detachment was prepared to safeguard by 
adopting at once the convoy system the instant they 
were threatened. 



COAST GUARD — ITS WORK WITH THE NAVY. 

Upon the declaration of the existence of a state of 
war, the Coast Guard, pursuant to the provisions of act 
of Congress approved January 28, 19 15, entered at once 
upon its war-time duties as a part of the Naval Estab- 
lishment. Plans for the mobilization of the service and 
its operation as a part of the naval forces in the con- 
tingency of war had already been formulated, so 
that the transition from its peace-time uses was 
effected with the minimum of disturbance. The 
vessels and stations were assigned to the various naval 
districts and fleets where their services could be used 
to the best advantage. A number of the cruising cutters 
were equipped with more effective batteries and assigned 
to patrol duty in the submarine zone. Others were 
placed on the coast patrol and given various naval 
duties in home waters. The crews of Coast Guard sta- 
tions have been increased in number and a vigilant and 
extended patrol of the beaches maintained day and night. 



180 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 



ENTIRE COAST CONNECTED BY WIRE. 

The communication service maintained between sta- 
tions has been extended so as to embrace all stations 
along the Atlantic coast and a number of outlying light- 
houses and light vessels. This system comprises 2,327 
miles of land line and 402 miles of submarine cable. 
Through this instrumentality our entire Atlantic sea- 
board is kept in instant and constant touch with Wash- 
ington, the various headquarters, and other important 
centers. The system has proved of incalculable value 
to the Navy in time when attacks have been made by 
the enemy off our coast and the presence of enemy craft 
has been suspected. It is also serving a useful purpose 
in aiding and directing instant and personal communi- 
cation between commanding officers and the various 
units, thereby facilitating action in urgent and im- 
portant matters. 

Much ammunition and high explosives shipped abroad 
in connection with the war have been forwarded through 
the port of New York. The safe handling and loading 
of such vast quantities of explosives in this congested 
harbor have demanded and received the most careful 
and untiring efforts. This work has been largely en- 
trusted to officers and men of the Coast Guard, and it 
is gratifying to note that there has not been a single 
accident or mishap connected with this vast undertaking, 
either in the harbor of New York or on other navigable 
waters, during the period of the war. 

SAVING LIVES AND PROPERTY 

While the various units of the Coast Guard are used 
in the war-time duties of the hour, on many occasions 
they are and have been able to render effective aid to 
the distressed on the seas and along our coasts. During 
the past fiscal year the Coast Guard was instrumental 
in saving the lives of 1,250 persons, removing 11,084 
persons from danger, caring for 477 persons in distress. 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 181 

and saving property valued at $15,198,332. Added to 
these tangible appraisable services there were 1,473 ^^" 
stances where miscellaneous assistance was rendered. 
These embrace a multiplicity of humanitarian deeds in- 
uring to the public interest and good, the exact nature 
and value of which it is impracticable to appraise or to 
set out in figures. Among these services may be enumer- 
ated those of aid to the sick and injured; furnishing 
food, fuel, and water to persons temporarily cut off 
from such supplies ; recovering dead bodies ; extinguish- 
ing fires in the vicinity of Coast Guard stations ; warn- 
ing vessels from running into danger; and an extensive 
line of other useful endeavor. 

PERSONNEL ON A WAR FOOTING. 

The personnel of the Coast Guard is on a war footing 
and on June 30, 1918, consisted of 228 commissioned 
officers, 36 cadets, 442 warrent officers, and 5,920 en- 
listed men. There has been no increase in the number 
of commissioned officers but it has been found necessary 
in order best to utilize the services of these officers to 
give them advanced temporary rank on the general plan 
of running-mates with officers of corresponding length 
of service in the Navy. 

THE COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY. 

Pursuant to law the President is authorized to trans- 
fer the vessels, equipment, stations and personnel of 
this service to the Navy. 

In addition to the making of special wire-drag and 
other confidential surveys for the Navy, the Coast and 
Geodetic Survey supplied the Navy with 126,000 charts 
in 1917 and with more than 102,000 in 1918. 

THE BUREAU OF LIGHTHOUSES. 

Under the provisions of statute law, 46 steamers used 
as lighthouse tenders, 4 light vessels, and 21 light sta- 



182 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

tions, together with 1,132 persons employed thereon, were 
transferred to the service and jurisdiction of the Navy 
Department and have continued in that service through- 
out the war. 

The duties performed by the transferred units con- 
sisted principally of work on submarine nets and buoy- 
age in connection therewith, patrol and watch service, 
drill in mine laying, etc. Prior to the war, for a number 
of years, a large proportion of the lighthouse tenders 
had been equipped with mine-laying equipment and had 
periodic drills in this work. 

OPERATIONS IN SOUTH AMERICAN AND ASIATIC WATERS. 

As enemy activity has been confined principally to the 
North Atlantic and European waters, it has necessitated 
the concentration of our purely naval forces in these 
waters. Our Navy has, however, some representatives 
in South American and Asiatic waters. The activities 
in these waters are of general character, but have served 
to bring us into closer cooperation with the allies in 
those waters with whom we are associated. 

AID GIVEN TO ALLIED SHIPPING. 

Means were taken to guard the extensive station at 
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, against injury, to establish sea 
patrols, and to increase the personnel to meet the sud- 
denly increased demands of war conditions. These activi- 
ties were not confined to the yard proper but extended 
to the whole fourteenth district. It is a pleasure to 
record that in all this work full and hearty cooperation 
was established and maintained with the Army and all 
other departments of our Government. Thus far, in 
spite of the enemy sympathizers, both resident and tran- 
sient, in that cosmopolitan community, no report has 
been made of the loss of a dollar's worth of property 
or of injury to a single individual. Aid has been given 
to domestic and allied shipping and protection extended 
to Government and private property. 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 183 



NAVY BATTERY OF I4-INCH GUNS AT FRONT. 

One of the great achievements of the Navy during 
the past year was the design and construction of the 
14-inch naval guns on railway mountings now on 'the 
western front, which hurled shells far behind the Ger- 
man lines. The mount was designed, built, and de- 
livered in less than four months. On December 26, 

1917, not a drawing had been started. On April 25, 

1918, a completed gun was rolling on its own wheels to 
Sandy Hook Proving Ground for long-range tests. 

These guns were originally intended for the new battle 
cruisers, but a change of ship design left them available 
for other use. As the Navy had no immediate need for 
them afloat, the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance recom- 
mended that they be utilized for land service with our 
Army in France. 

It was realized that to be most effective the railway 
battery must be completely mobile and independent of 
any permanent artillery base. The guns themselves 
were mounted on cars which could move freely over the 
French railways. It was necessary to make the repair 
shops and barracks for the personnel mobile. Twelve 
cars were constructed to accompany each gun. There 
were machine-shop cars, armored ammunition cars, 
kitchen cars, berthing, crane, and wireless cars. These 
cars, as well as the gun mounts, were all built and 
equipped under the direction of the Bureau of Ordnance. 
This battery is sufficiently mobile so that were an 
order to move position received while the gun was in 
action, gun, personnel, kitchen, fuel, berthing cars, and 
all could be under way in about an hour. 

MANNED BY NAVY GUNNERS. 

The land battery was manned exclusively by blue- 
jackets under the command of Rear Admiral C. P. 
Plunkett. The men were trained at the Naval Proving 
Ground, and went to France ahead of the guns to pre- 



184 



NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 




U. S. NAVAL GUN IN ACTION NEAR SOISSONS 



pare everything for their assembly. The first group 
arrived in France on June 9, 1918, The first gun was 
shipped from the United States on June 20. It was 
ready to fire the last week in August; but did not go 
into action against the enemy until September 16 in 
the vicinity of Laon, from which time this gun with its 
sister guns was engaged in firing against German bases 
far behind the enemy lines and hitherto completely be- 
yond the reach of allied artillery. 

The naval land batteries fire heavier projectiles and 
have greater range than an)^ gun ever before placed on 
mobile shore mounting. The German long range 
"freak" guns which fired on Paris were non-mobile. 
They were built on permanent steel and concrete foun- 
dations which were eventually sought out by allied aero- 
planes and the guns subsequently silenced. The shells 
were small and specially built for long flight. This fact 
reduced their military efficiency. The German long- 
range guns, while they had a certain moral effect, were 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 185 

without great practical military value. The American 
naval guns fire projectiles approximately seven times 
heavier than the shells the Germans used against Paris. 

CAN HURL BIG PROJECTILES 30 MILES. 

In 1916 the Germans had one 15-inch naval gun in 
Flanders, which became famous through its long-range 
bombardment of Dunkirk and other allied bases. This 
gun was on a permanent foundation and could not be 
shifted from point to point on the front. Our 14-inch 
gun can move from one end of France to the other, and 
it hurls its projectile a distance of approximately 30 
miles (52,000 yards). 

Briefly, the American Navy has designed, built, and 
is now. manning with bluejackets specially trained for 
land service, the largest and most high-powered mobile 
land artillery in the world. So successful have these 
guns been that additional orders for many more were 
requested before the armistice. 

NAVAL LOSSES CAUSED BY SUBMARINE WARFARE. 

Since this country entered the war practically all the 
enemy's naval forces, except the submarines, have been 
blockaded in his ports by the naval forces of the allies, 
and there has been no opportunity for naval engagements 
of a major character. The enemy's submarines have, 
however, formed a continual menace to the safety of all 
bur transports and shipping, necessitating the use of 
every effective means and the utmost vigilance for the 
protection of our vessels. Concentrated attack was made 
by enemy U-boats on the ships which carried the first 
contingent of our troops to Europe, and all that have 
gone since have faced this liability to attack. 

Our destroyers and patrol vessels, in addition to con* 
voy duty have waged an unceasing offensive warfare 
against the submarines. In spite of all this, our naval 
losses have been gratifyingly small. Not one American 



186 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

troop ship, as previously stated, has been torpedoed on 
the way to France, and but three, the Antilles, the 
President Lincoln, and the Covington, were sunk on the 
return voyage. 

Only three fighting ships have been lost as a result of 
enemy action — the patrol ship Alcedo, a converted yacht, 
sunk off the coast of France November 5, 1917; the 
torpedo-boat destroyer Jacob Jones, sunk off the British 
coast December 6, 1917; and the cruiser San Diego, sunk 
near Fire Island, off the New York coast, on July 19, 
1918, by striking a mine supposedly set adrift by a Ger- 
man submarine. The transport Finland and the de- 
stroyer Cassin, which were torpedoed, reached port and 
were soon repaired and placed back in service. The 
transport Mount Vernon, struck by a torpedo on Sep- 
tember 5 last, proceeded to port under its own steam, and 
was repaired. 

The most serious loss of life due to enemy activity 
was the loss of the Coast Guard cutter Tampa, with all 
on board, in Bristol Channel, England, on the night of 
September 26, 1918. The Tampa, which was doing 
escort duty, had gone ahead of the convoy. Vessels fol- 
lowing heard an explosion, but when they reached the 
vicinity there were only bits of floating wreckage to 
show where the ship had gone down. Not one of the 
111 officers and men of her crew were rescued ; and 
though it is believed she was sunk by a torpedo from an 
enemy submarine, the exact manner in which the vessel 
met its fate may never be known. 

LOSS OF THE COLLIER "CYCLOPS." 

There has been no more baffling mystery in the annals 
of the Navy than the disappearance last March of the 
U. S. S. Cyclops, Navy collier of 19,000 tons displace- 
ment, with all on board. Loaded with a cargo of man- 
ganese, with 57 passengers, 20 officers, and a crew of 
213 aboard, the collier was due in port on March 13. 
On March- 4 the Cyclops reported at Barbados, British 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 187 

West Indies, where she put in for bunker coal. Since 
her departure from that port there has not been a trace 
of the vessel, and long-continued and vigilant search of 
the entire region proved utterly futile, not a vestige of 
wreckage having been discovered. No reasonable ex- 
planation of the strange disappearance can be given. It 
is known that one of her two engines was damaged and 
that she was proceeding at reduced speed, but even if 
the other engine had become disabled it would have not 
had any effect on her ability to communicate by radio. 
Many theories have been advanced, but none that seems 
to account satisfactorily for the ship's complete vanish- 
ment. After months of search and waiting the Cyclops 
was finally given up as lost and her name stricken from 
the registry. 



SALVAGING AND ASSISTING VESSELS IN DISTRESS. 

During the year a salvaging division has been organ- 
ized, and the operation of this division has resulted in 
the saving of lives and property. There have been 
numerous calls on this division for assistance from all 
kinds of vessels during the year, including towing, rescu- 
ing, and convoying disabled vessels, as well as salvaging 
vessels which were sunk or grounded in home waters. 
All such calls, from all sources, have been promptly an- 
swered and assistance rendered. 

The question of salvage of vessels damaged by mines 
or torpedoes has been a very acute one abroad, and also 
important along United States coasts. The Navy De- 
partment during the year has taken over many of the 
vessels and much of the equipment engaged in coast 
salvage work and has sent one unit abroad, where it is 
now operating. The salvage work has been fully organ- 
ized, utilizing the services of a number of very compe- 
tent salvage engineers who had been engaged in this 
work with private companies. 



188 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 



ANTISUBMARINE DEVICES. 

The department has been keenly appreciative of the 
necessity of employing every effort to develop devices 
with which to combat the enemy's submarine operations. 
Advices and suggestions were freely requested and care- 
fully considered by the department, the Naval Consult- 
ing Board, the National Research Council, the various 
bureaus and departments, the General Board of the 
Navy, and other boards in Washington. 

In order to coordinate the efforts in this matter the de- 
partment appointed a special board of officers to have 
complete charge of carrying out experiments on anti- 
submarine devices. The General Electric Co., the West- 
ern Electric Co., and the Submarine Signal Co. patri- 
otically offered every assistance in this work, and with a 
fine spirit of co-operation have rendered valuable service. 

An experimental station was established at New 
London, Conn., under the supervision of the special 
board, and many scientists of unusual attainments were 
assembled there in connection with the experiments and 
development of devices for detecting submarines. 

The naval activities at New London, Conn., 
embrace also a station for assembling and in- 
stalling various devices developed and training the 
personnel for the efficient employment of such devices 
afloat. The results achieved by these methods have been 
most gratifying ; and the operations of vessels fitted with 
these devices, both abroad and in home waters, has had 
a marked effect in restricting submarine operations. 

AEROPLANE BOMBS FOR USE AGAINST SUBMARINES. 

A heavy aeroplane bomb has been developed for anti- 
submarine warfare, which has not only all of the quali- 
ties of an aero bomb, but those also of a depth charge. 
When an aeroplane sights a submarine and attacks with 
bombs, the bombs will explode if a direct hit be ob- 
tained upon the submarine. A submarine attacked from 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 189 

a height Is a rather difficult target to hit and these 
bombs compensate somewhat for that. Should the bomb 
miss the submarine it will detonate on reaching a pre- 
determined depth and will thus have the effect of a 
depth charge. 

Formerly, bombs were of a more or less delicate nature 
and impact with the surface of the water was sufficient 
to detonate them. A submarine running below the sur- 
face was therefore practically immune from damage 
from aircraft attack ; but these bombs can be set to 
explode at considerable depth below the surface and in 
all they make the aeroplane a much more formidable 
antisubmarine asset than ever before. 

The Navy's new bomb sights for aeroplanes are con- 
sidered to be the equal of anything in use at present. 
These were developed after exhaustive investigations had 
been made of all sights in use by our allies and our 
enemies; the latter from captured machines. 

DEPTH CHARGE MOST EFFECTIVE ANTISUBMARINE "WEAPON. 

The successful operation of the depth charge and the 
development of tactics for attacking submarines with 
them have been the most potent factors in the solution 
of the German submarine menace. These charges are 
now being produced in quantities considerably in excess 
of the needs of our Navy and merchant fleet, and so tre- 
mendous is their destructive quality and so thoroughly 
has strategy for their use been developed, that it is a 
lucky submarine which shows itself or its periscope 
within view of a destroyer and survives the subsequent 
bombardment. 

With the earlier development of the submarine its 
possibilities as a weapon of offense were vaguely con- 
ceived. Defense against submarines, however, was 
largely confined to the general doctrine of gun and 
torpedo. The Germans made such great strides in sub- 
marine development that the opportunity of catching a 
submarine on the surface and destroying him by gunfire 



190 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

became exceedingly scant. Because of his low freeboard 
he could detect the approach of a hostile vessel and sub- 
merge before that vessel sighted him. Through con- 
struction improvements and intensive training of per- 
sonnel, the submarine could submerge even when caught 
napping before guns could be effectively trained upon 
him. Through a skillful use of the periscope a sub- 
marine could attack with little danger except from an 
occasional lucky shot or from ramming. 

Some method of attacking the submarine under water 
was necessary. Charges of explosives such as shells or 
bombs detonating by contact would injure a submarine 
if the U-boat were struck, but a moving submarine lOO 
feet below the surface is a difRcult target to hit. There 
was desired, therefore, not so much a contact charge 
which would function on striking the submarine, as an 
explosive charge which would fire near the submarine at 
a good depth below surface and have such a tremen- 
dously powerful effect as to damage the enemy although 
it were 200 feet away from the point of detonation. 

Prior to the entrance of the United States into the war 
the use of depth charges had begun, but had not been 
carried out to any marked extent abroad ; yet the United 
States realized the necessity of being adequately armed 
with this new weapon against the submarine. 

EXPLOSIVE INCREASED NEW TYPE DEVELOPED. 

Our Navy undertook depth-charge development 
shortly after the opening of unrestricted warfare. The 
first design contained 50 pounds of explosive and was 
operated on a float-and-line principle. A float detached 
itself from the charge proper upon striking the water 
and remained on the surface while the charge sank and 
in sinking payed out rope attached to the float; when 
a predetermined length of rope had run out the charge 
exploded. 

On the declaration of the war these charges were al- 
most immediately available for issue to the vessels of 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 191 

the United States Navy. It was soon apparent, however, 
that with the construction of larger and stronger sub- 
marines the 50 pounds of explosive was not sufficient 
and immediately the development of larger charges was 
undertaken. The naval torpedo station at Newport de- 
veloped a type of hydrostatically operated depth charge 
which subsequently was proven at least the equal of any 
other depth charge known to be in existence. 

The depth charge has taken a place in the front rank 
of effective weapons of warfare alongside of the gun 
and torpedo, and it is destined to remain in that company 
as long as the submarine is employed as a weapon of war 
upon the seas. Our destroyers abroad made extensive 
use of the depth charge, and of all the weapons it was 
the one most feared by the German submarine. It has 
perhaps been noticed that German submarines were re- 
luctant to attack convoys accompanied by destroyers 
and that they confined their attentions largely to ships 
which, through breakdown or any other reason, fell out 
of line and dropped far behind the escorting destroyers. 

TACTICS IMPROVED "y" GUN DESIGNED. 

Along with the development of the weapon itself tac- 
tics for its use have progressed from an occasional chance 
shot to a veritable bombardment. At first vessels car- 
ried one or two depth charges and dropped only one 
against the submarine. Gradually the number of depth 
charges carried has increased until now a destroyer will 
frequently carry more than a hundred. 

The possible movements of a submarine after its dis- 
covery has been carefully studied and scientific curves 
have been determined enabling a swift attacking vessel 
to drop depth charges in the form of a barrage about 
the submarine, regardless of which direction the sub- 
marine turns after attack or how great her speed. 

A new gun known as the "Y" gun has been designed 
and built especially for firing depth charges. All our 
destroyers and sub-chasers were equipped with this wea- 



192 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

pon. It is proving in service the equal of any material 
in use as depth-charge projectors and has increased the 
efficiency of depth-charge attack, as it enables depth 
charges to be thrown astern or on either side of the at- 
tacking vessel, thus widening the danger zone for an 
enemy submarine. Already the Navy has armed with 
depth charges a large number of allied ships. 

NEW TYPE PRODUCED IN 30 DAYS. 

One year ago the depth charge was a comparatively 
new weapon to our service. Ten thousand 50-pound 
charges had been manufactured up to that time. Since 
then twenty-eight thousand 300-pound charges and five 
hundred 600-pound charges have been delivered. There 
are now three manufacturers working on contracts for 
over 30,000 more. 

As a side light on what can be accomplished in the 
way of rapid production, it is interesting to note that on 
July 26 orders were issued, on the request of Vice 
Admiral Sims, to manufacture a new type of charge 
holding double the usual amount of explosive. The 
design was completed and first shipment made from the 
manufacturers' plant within 30 days from that date. 

NONRICOCHETING PROJECTILE ACTS AS A DEPTH CHARGE. 

The ordinary pointed projectile, hitting the water al- 
most horizontally, is deflected and ricochets. Conse- 
quently the hull of a submarine below the surface of 
the water is protected from ordinary shell at short 
ranges. A special type of nonricocheting shell has been 
developed for use against the submarines and has now 
been issued to ships sailing the war zone. 

This shell has an additional feature. It is equipped 
with a delay-action fuse, so that if it misses the sub- 
marine it dives below the surface until a predetermined 
depth has been reached, where is explodes. If it happens 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 193 

to be near a submarine, a direct hit is not necessary, be- 
cause its detonation has the same effect as a depth charge, 
but naturally to a considerably smaller extent. 

CAMOUFLAGE SYSTEM OF "dAZZLE PAINTING." 

Since the beginning of the war the question of paint- 
ing vessels in such a manner as to prevent their being 
seen, or to enable them to escape submarine attack, has 
been much discussed. It is not quite the same as "camou- 
flage" as it is generally understood on land, where 
objects at rest are painted or marked in such a manner 
as to prevent their being identified against a fixed back- 
ground. Experience has shown that no system of mark- 
ing will materially reduce the visibility of a vessel ; that 
a uniform coat of paint is about as good as anything 
for the purpose of reduction of visibility, but unfor- 
tunately the most desirable color varies with conditions. 
Experiments which have been carried on for years in 
our service had indicated a light gray, commonly called 
"battleship gray," as about the most desirable color for 
all-around purposes. This appears to have been con- 
firmed by war experience. There has been developed, 
however, particularly during the last year, a system of 
so-called "dazzle" painting — the vessel being painted in 
an apparently grotesque and bizarre manner for the pur- 
pose, not of rendering it invisible, but rendering it diffi- 
cult for the submarine commander, peering through his 
periscope for a few seconds at a time, to determine the 
course of the vessel. While not always effective, there 
is no doubt that dazzle painting is a palliative against 
submarine attack, and during the last year its applica- 
tion, not only to naval vessels, but to all vessels of the 
Emergency Fleet Corporation, has been systematically 
undertaken. A division was formed in the Bureau of 
Construction and Repair which undertook the prepara- 
tion of the designs for all vessels, and the Emergency 
Fleet Corporation arranged to paint the vessels in ac- 
cordance with the designs supplied. Up to the 1st of 



194 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

October not less than 1,127 vessels had been specially 
painted upon designs prepared in the Navy Department. 

ARMING MERCHANT SHIPS. 

Almost the first problem which faced the Navy was 
to secure, as far as possible, the safety of our merchant 
fleet engaged in carrying food, munitions, and supplies 
to the military forces at the front. Germany, in at- 
tempting her submarine war, in the beginning chose 
to use her submarines in the way that would net her the 
best and quickest returns, regardless of obligations to 
protect civilian passengers. She, therefore, instead of 
using torpedoes attempted to sink by gunfire or by bombs 
all the merchant ships that fell in the path of her 
U-boats. 

The department quickly realized that an answer to 
this which would immediately reduce submarine efficiency 
and confine its activities to under-water activities was 
to arm our merchant ships. In so doing, we were forced 
to make use of the means at hand rather than what we 
desired to do, but immediately plans went forward to 
anticipate Germany's next move, which afterward she 
did make in the form of her cruiser submarines. The 
cruiser submarine was Germany's counter to the arming 
of our merchant ships, but by the time those submarines 
were in operation, the best of our merchant fleet had 
been armed with a caliber of gun which was able to cope 
with the heaviest gun of the cruiser submarine. 

In the first part of this war some of the most interest- 
ing encounters were those between our armed merchant 
ships and single enemy submarines, and there are cases 
on record where our armed guards fought until the ship 
under them went down or they were forced to abandon 
the vessel in flames. 

MERCHANT SHIPS PROTECTED BY INCREASED ARMAMENT. 

At the declaration of war it was realized that to pro- 
tect the country's shipping from attacks of enemy sub- 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 195 

marines it would be necessary to arm those merchant 
vessels traversing the war zone. At first it appeared 
that guns of about 3-inch caliber would be amply large 
for defensive work ; but with the advent of the enemy 
submarines mounting from 4 to 6 inch guns, it soon be- 
came evident that larger calibers would be required. 
In addition, the large and rapidly increasing demands 
of the naval service for guns had to be met. 

The arming of merchant ships has largely been ac- 
complished. Since the war started 2,570 ships, exclud- 
ing regular war ships of the Navy, have been armed in 
one way or another. The first merchant ship to be 
armed was the oil tanker Campana. Since that time 
every merchant ship in the Atlantic trade needing arms 
has been armed as the guns have become available, and 
those guns provided with naval crews. Since the arm- 
ing of the Campana more than 1,600 merchant vessels 
have been furnished with batteries, ammunition, spare 
parts, and auxiliaries — a procedure which had never 
been contemplated by the department prior to the out- 
break of war. In addition to this more than 650 patrol 
boats and all of our subchasers have been armed and 
guns of various calibers have been furnished to por- 
tions of the British and French naval and merchant 
fleets. Our 14-inch guns mounted on British monitors 
participated in the attack on Zeebrugge. Our medium- 
caliber guns mounted on floats manned by Italian crews 
were important factors in the defense of Venice. We 
have manned a large portion of the French fishing fleet 
and have equipped not only with guns, but with depth 
charges, a number of French mine sweepers. 

Some of the merchant ships have even been armed 
with depth charges, and practically all of these ships 
carrying naval guns and naval gun crews have been 
equipped with special smoke-producing apparatus pro- 
vided to enable the ship to conceal herself in a cloud of 
smoke when attacked by a submarine. Several types 
have been developed, and the proper type issued to ships 
according to the character of the vessel. Vessels having 



196 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

necessary gun power — that is, guns sufficiently large to 
out-range an enemy submarine— invariably prefer to 
engage in gun duels with the enemy rather than to escape 
in a smoke screen. 

NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE. 

The scope of the duties of the Naval Communication 
Service has been greatly enlarged to provide an efficient, 
workable system for handling all communications with 
men-of-war, to provide the necessary codes and ciphers 
to insure secrecy, and to promulgate regulations to in- 
sure the proper receipt of orders by all vessels of the 
Navy. In addition to the usual duties in connection 
with the combatant ships of the Navy, this service has 
placed all radio communication with merchant vessels 
in the Atlantic Ocean, Caribbean Sea, and Gulf of 
Mexico upon a military basis. To accomplish this, such 
vessels have been provided with standard rules for com- 
munication, and codes and ciphers to handle same, in 
order to render their voyages through the war zone as 
free from danger as possible, as well as to insure their 
receiving orders at sea. This service has close coopera- 
tion with the detailing of radio men to all merchant ships 
crossing the Atlantic, as well as to all Shipping Board 
ships built by the Emergency Fleet Corporation. A 
comprehensive system for inspection of radio personnel, 
radio apparatus, and their communication records has 
been provided on the foregoing ships, so that they are 
inspected upon arrival in port, when they are given the 
necessary instructions to properly carry out their work. 

The expansion of the Code and Signal Section has 
necessarily been great. This section not only supplies 
men-of-war but all merchant ships in the Atlantic with 
codes and ciphers and coordinates the communication 
procedure and codes of countries cooperating with us in 
the war with those of our own men-of-war and merchant 
vessels. This enables all United States vessels to com- 
municate with secrecy in any part of the world. 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 197 



GROWTH OF RADIO SYSTEM. 

The Navy has operated all coastal and high-power 
radio stations since the start of the war. While the 
commercial service on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts has 
been practically abandoned for the war, in order to han- 
dle naval and military traffic only, the commercial 
service elsewhere has been carried on with but few re- 
strictions as far as ship to shore work is concerned. The 
Navy occupies a strong position in the commercial radio 
field on account of efficient service rendered, and I think 
presages the way for making this service entirely gov- 
ernmental. 

The commercial radio service between Japan, Hawaii, 
and San Francisco has been temporarily suspended, in 
order to prevent information reaching the enemy through 
this source. This work will be resumed when conditions 
warrant, in order to relieve the severe congestion of the 
trans-Pacific cables. Official business is still handled 
over this trans-Pacific radio circuit, but all such traffic 
passes through the hands of the Navy for proper en- 
ciphering to insure secrecy. 

The high-power radio service of the Navy has made 
great progress during the past year. On the Atlantic 
coast the Navy has completed and is operating its new 
high-power station at Annapolis, Md., in addition to 
those already in service. It is now possible to transmit 
messages simultaneously from four high-power radio 
stations to European stations and at the same time re- 
ceive dispatches from several European stations. 

The Naval Communication Service is cooperating with 
the State Department and the Committee on Public In- 
formation in the broadcasting of information of advan- 
tage to the United States to all parts of the world by 
high-power radio. 

Official dispatches by trans-Atlantic radio are handled 
not only for the departments of this Government, but 
also between foreign embassies here with their home 
offices abroad. It has been the aim of the Naval Com- 



198 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

munication Service to create, for the benefit of this coun- 
try and its allies, practical, fast and exact radio com- 
munication with Europe, supplementing the cables and 
to a certain extent relieving them of the heavy traffic 
brought on by the war. The results accomplished are 
satisfactory. 

CABLE CENSORSHIP. 

The office of the chief cable censor, which administers 
and regulates cable censorship as a whole, is in the Navy 
Department ; and local stations, where the actual cen- 
soring of cablegrams is for the most part done, are main- 
tained at the points of cable landings within the United 
States and its territorial possessions. 

Close contact has been established and maintained 
with the various departments of the Government, and 
also with the special governmental boards and bureaus, 
the War Trade Board, the Food Administration, the 
Shipping Board, the Alien Property Custodian, etc. 

As a result of the cooperation of cable censorship, 
these governmental agencies have been enabled to con- 
duct their work more effectively ; they have received from 
cable censorship a very positive assistance in the execu- 
tion of their policies and have, in many instances, fur- 
ther received special information, gleaned from the 
cables, which has resulted in the saving of large sums 
of money. Further coordination of action has been at- 
tained by close contact with the censorships of Great 
Britain, France, Portugal, Brazil, and Cuba. Repre- 
sentatives of cable censorship are also placed at every 
station of postal censorship, and a satisfactory system 
has been developed by which inconsistent policies be- 
tween the two censorships have been avoided. 

POWERFUL RADIO PLANT COMPLETED. 

Hawaii, situated as it is at the "crossroads of the 
Pacific," whether in the piping times of peace or in the 
midst of war's alarms, will always demand our attention 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 199 

and consideration. While the needs for men and ma- 
terial in other parts of the theater of war have lessened 
our activities in the Pacific, yet this important outpost in 
that sea has not been neglected and work on the original 
plans for its development, with necessary modifications, 
has been continued as far as circumstances permitted. 
At the outbreak of the war, acting promptly and accord- 
ing to prearranged plans, our naval people took over six 
commercial radio stations and in 48 hours placed them 
under naval control. In this same field the great Pearl 
Harbor radio plant, one of the most powerful in the 
world, was pushed to completion and now forms a link 
in the chain of communications to our far distant sta- 
tions. 

IMPORTANT WORK OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 

The exigencies of war have imposed new and impor- 
tant duties upon Naval Intelligence. In peace the func- 
tion of this agency of the Navy Department is to keep 
in touch with naval problems, naval expansion, and 
naval interest in all the countries of the world so that the 
President, the naval administration, and the responsible 
naval leaders in Congress may have access to the latest 
information with reference to naval affairs abroad. Its 
reports from naval attaches in the leading countries and 
from other sources furnish the General Board, the Chief 
of Operations, and the bureaus data which gives them 
the benefit of what has been learned or put into practice 
in other countries. During the war its duties abroad 
have increased many fold ; at home it has — in touch with 
the 15 naval districts and branch offices — done a most im- 
portant work in protecting naval and other plants mak- 
ing war material ; preventing sabotage, and in keeping 
an eye on alien enemies or others with a destructive pro- 
pensity. Close cooperation has been had with the De- 
partments of State, War, Justice, Treasury, and Labor, 
and, in addition, with the War Trade Board, the United 
States Shipping Board, and the Alien Property Custo- 



200 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

dian. The interchange of information and the results 
of investigations with these departments of the Govern- 
ment have been most effective and valuable to the prose- 
cution of the war. 

A detailed account of the work of the office may not 
be stated as it is of a highly confidential character, but, 
generally speaking, the scope of its activities include 
observation, investigation, and report of all subjects 
affecting the Navy and the prosecution of the war from 
a naval point of view. It includes naval operations at 
sea and on land, the status, changes, and progress of 
the material and personnel of foreign navies, and a close 
counterespionage watch at home. This latter includes 
the investigation of unauthorized radio stations, of alien 
enemies and suspects, of matters connected with the cable 
and mail censorship which affect the Navy, the protec- 
tion of water fronts and vessels, and of plants having 
contracts with the Navy Department with a view of safe- 
guarding those plants against sabotage. 

The guarding of our ships while in port and the 
guarding against the danger from enemy agents among 
the passengers and crews on both our trans-Atlantic and 
coastwise ships have been largely performed by the 
Office of Naval Intelligence, and the results achieved 
bear eloquent witness to the efficiency of the service ren- 
dered. 

WORK OF THE GENERAL BOARD. 

The General Board, of which the late George Dewey, 
the Admiral of the Navy, was long the head, has given 
wise counsel during this year when the study of naval 
strategy and naval needs has had practical application 
in actual warfare. Rear Admiral Charles J. Badger, 
chairman of executive committee, and other able offi- 
cers of the board, in addition to their illuminating re- 
ports, have been in intimate touch with the Secretary 
of the Navy and the Chief of Operations and with the 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 201 

officers of allied navies in our country, and their advice 
has been of the greatest value. 

The work of the General Board for the fiscal year 
ending June 30, 1918, included action upon all questions 
referred to it by the Secretary of the Navy for investi- 
gation and recommendation. In addition, the General 
Board has from time to time made such suggestions and 
recommendations to the department as in its judgment 
were called for by the progress of the war. 

Many of the questions proposed have required care- 
ful research and a knowledge of the latest and most 
approved practice at home and abroad. In order that 
the board might have the latest and best information 
upon all subjects connected with service operations and 
technical matters, officers returning to the United States 
from duty in the war zones have been invited to appear 
before the General Board and an official stenographic 
record has been kept of their observation of actual war 
conditions and their opinions and recommendations with 
regard to service methods, practices, and mechanisms. 

SUBJECTS BOARD HAS ACTED UPON. 

The scope of the work of the General Board is indi- 
cated in the following partial list of subjects that have 
been acted upon. 

PAPERS REFERRED FOR THE ACTION OF THE BOARD. 

Antiaircraft defense of naval stations. 

Defense plans for naval districts. 

Purchase of certain Pacific islands. 

Comments and recommendations on quarterly reports 
of bureaus on preparations for war. 

Discussion of types of seaplanes and seaplane carriers. 

Tactics and strategy of submarines. 

Proposed operations against submarines. 

The use of homing pigeons by the Navy. 

Sovereignty and control over islands and harbors in 
Caribbean and Panama. 



202 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

Defense of the Panama Canal ; organization of naval 
forces ; mine and net defenses. 

Searchlight illumination in naval operations. 

Seaplane catapults for battle and scout cruisers. 

Acquisition of naval-station site, Fonseca Bay, Hon- 
duras. 

Recommendations upon suggestions for the conduct 
of the war. 

Distribution and employment of drifting mines. 

The proposed purchase and operation by the Govern- 
ment of the Cape Cod Canal. 

Proposed construction of a mine barrier in the North 
Sea. 

Proposed measures to prevent German submarines 
from operating against allied commerce in the Atlantic. 

Plans for defense of Guam and plans for construction 
of operating base. 

Types of vessels for offensive use against submarines. 

Design of new submarines. 

General aeronautical policy of the United States. 

Treaty concerning prizes captured during present war. 

Reply to German Government re reciprocal repatria- 
tion of sanitary personnel. 

Guns for long-range bombardment. 

Shore mounting of heavy guns. 

Ownership of islands and reefs pending in the Pacific 
Ocean and elsewhere. 

Mine-laying arrangements for destroyers. 

Plan for blockading enemy coast by submarines. 

Subroarine devices for detection of submarines. 

Plans for proposed patrol boats. 

Proposed removal of guns from battleships. 

THE navy's part IN THE UPBUILDING OF OUR MERCHANT 
MARINE. 

The Navy has always had very much at heart the 
upbuilding of a merchant marine, for from this source 
it must largely draw its supply of seafaring men needed 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 203 

to man our naval craft. Therefore, it very early became 
a matter of extreme importance to the Navy to ascer- 
tain the best way in which this large merchant service 
which was being built by the Emergency Fleet Corpora- 
tion, and which had been requisitioned by the Shipping 
Board, could be put to efficient war work. Plans were 
worked out in cooperation with the Shipping Board and 
with the Army whereby all of the ships turned over for 
Navy purposes, the cargo ships turned over to the War 
Department for supplying their Army abroad, and ves- 
sels of a certain size running through the war zone 
should be manned by naval crews. 

Had the war been of a different character, it is possi- 
ble that merchant shipping might not have been dislo- 
cated to the extent that it was, but the character of the 
war was such that practically every commercial interest 
disappeared and all interests became military in their 
character. The needs of the Army alone, both in troops 
and supplies, were so great as to practically demand the 
turning over to their use, not only all of our own avail- 
able tonnage, but such allied tonnage as could be char- 
tered. It, therefore, appeared quite necessary that this 
tonnage operating for a military purpose should be under 
'strict military control, which in so far as transporting 
across sea was concerned was a naval matter. Above 
all, the character of the warfare waged by enemy sub- 
marines was such that at no time could the seas be called 
free, and there was the constant menace to crew and 
cargo which required the highest technical skill to com- 
bat it. For these reasons it became necessary to man 
with naval crews those vessels that crossed the war zone, 
and in this matter the Shipping Board and War De- 
partment heartily concurred. The troop transports were, 
from the very beginning, manned with naval crews, as 
it was recognized that the lives of our soldiers could 
only, on the seas, be entrusted to those whose experience 
fitted them to give the maximum amount of safety. The 
wisdom of this policy is shown by the results, in the 



204 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

number of troops and cargo safely transported across 
the Atlantic. 

With the end of this war, another problem will face 
the Navy. If it is considered to be the policy that the 
upbuilding of war-devastated Europe and furnishing 
food for its peoples will be a governmental problem to 
be administered by us as a Nation, this important service 
should be performed by that Government organization 
best fitted to cope with the problem. If this be the case, 
the military problems of the past year and a half merely 
merge themselves into economic problems similar to 
those which we as a nation have just successfully coped 
with. Then it may be that the Army organizations 
which have so successfully ministered to our forces in 
France will be called upon to supply food for the starv- 
ing millions. If that be so, then the Navy would proper- 
ly be called upon to man the ships for this purpose and 
while the process of demobilization goes on, in so far 
as our lesser purely military units are concerned, it may 
be necessary for a number of years to come for the 
Navy to take an important part in the merchant marine 
service. 

NAVAL OVERSEAS TRANSPORTATION SERVICE. 

On January 9, 1918, the Naval Overseas Transporta- 
tion Service was established, owing to the foreseen neces- 
sity to expeditiously supply the naval forces in foreign 
waters and to assist the Army if necessary with their 
tremendous task of transporting and supplying the 
American Expeditionary Force in France. This organi- 
zation sprang into being almost overnight, and has 
proved its right to be reckoned as one of the most im- 
portant and successful operations of the Navy. 

At the outbreak of the war the lack of an American 
merchant marine was immediately felt. The United 
States Shipping Board was authorized, and the vast task 
of creating a merchant marine was undertaken. The 
United States was without a sufficiently large trained 
merchant marine personnel, as the seagoing population 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 205 

of this country was small compared to that which fol- 
lowed the pursuits on shore. The difficulty of obtaining 
this trained personnel to man the vast American mer- 
chant marine was immediately felt, and the Navy De- 
partment was ready to assist in every way. It was asked 
to man immediately two vessels, in order to hasten their 
departure overseas, and from this inception the Naval 
Overseas Transportation Service has grown in lo rnonths 
to a fleet of 321 cargo-carrying ships aggregating a 
dead-weight tonnage of 2,800,000, and numerically 
nearly equalling the combined Cunard, Hamburg-Ameri- 
can, and North German Lloyd Lines at the outbreak of 
the war. Of this number 227 ships represented vessels 
previously in operation. From the Emergency Fleet 
Corporation the Navy has taken over for operation 94 
new vessels, aggregating 700,000 dead-weight tons. On 
March 21, 1918, by order of the President 101 Dutch 
merchant vessels were taken over by the Navy Depart- 
ment pending their allocation to the various vital trades 
of this country, and 26 of these vessels are now a part 
of the naval overseas fleet. This vast fleet of cargo 
vessels has been officered and manned through enroll- 
ment of the seagoing personnel of the American mer- 
chant marine, officers and men of the United States 
Navy, and the assignment after training of graduates 
of technical schools and training stations, developed by 
the Navy since the United States entered the war. 

There are required for the operation of this fleet at 
the present time 5,000 officers and 29,000 enlisted men, 
and adequate arrangements for future needs of per- 
sonnel have been provided. The Navy has risen to the 
exacting demands imposed upon it by the war, and it 
will certainly be a source of pride to the American peo- 
ple to know that within 10 months of the time that this 
new force was created, in spite of the many obstacles 
in the way of its accomplishment, an American naval 
vessel, manned by an American naval crew leaves an 
Arnerican port on the average of every five hours, carry- 
ing subsistence and equipment so vital to the American 



206 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

Expeditionary Force. I would be derelict in my duty 
unless I expressed my keenest appreciation and heartiest 
admiration for those men of the Naval Overseas Trans- 
portation Service who have traveled the lonely lanes of 
the ocean, which have been for so long infested with the 
menacing submarine. These terrors have not been re- 
garded as terrors by this personnel. They have braved 
the dangers most willingly and have thereby exemplified 
the best traditions of the Navy of the United States. In 
the many engagements with the enemy submarines our 
fleet has necessarily suffered, but it is believed that the 
losses of the enemy have been relatively much greatei' 
than ours. 

AN ENGINEERING WAR. 

It is a truism to say that, both on land and sea, this 
is very largely an engineering war. On ship and shore 
and in the air its mighty enginery is, in its destructive 
power, its transports and control, a product of the 
chemistry of explosives and of engineering in all its 
branches. It is the engineer, too, who, girdling the 
earth with wireless telegraphy, has given means of in- 
stant communication between a Government and its fleets 
and armies half a world away. 

ELECTRIC PROPULSION A GREAT ADVANCE. 

The most striking engineering accomplishment during 
the year was the completion of the electrically propelled 
battleship New Mexico, the results of whose trials con- 
firm the judgment of the department in adopting this 
type of machinery for the battle cruisers, and mark an 
engineering advance which will affect battleship con- 
struction the world over. Electric propulsion had its 
inception in the Navy, having first been applied in the 
collier Jupiter, where its superior advantages were so 
clearly demonstrated that the Bureau of Steam Engineer- 
ing recommended it for adoption in the New Mexico and 
subsequent battleships, and still later in the high-pow- 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 207 

ered battle cruisers. It will be recalled that this decision 
of the department led to the bitterest criticism not only 
from engineers pecuniarily interested in other types of 
machinery but also from others eminent in their pro- 
fession who had no pecuniary interest, but who feared 
that we were embarking upon an experiment that would 
be fraught with national calamity. Despite the criti- 
cism of these eminent engineers, the decision of the Navy 
Department, supported by the judgment of the best 
electrical engineers in the country, was followed in the 
full conviction that no mistake was being made. 

"new Mexico" met with every test. 

The wisdom of this decision has been amply vindi- 
cated by the performance of the New Mexico, which has 
been tested in every way, her trials including many more 
than those specified in the contract. She has failed in 
none of them ; the operation of her machinery has been 
highly satisfactory in every respect; and to-day, in this 
unique vessel, the United States Navy has a battleship 
which has no peer in the world's navies, not only for 
economic propulsion and less liability to serious derange- 
ment, but for her military superiority in greater maneuv- 
ering power and increased underwater protection. As 
so often before, American ingenuity and inventive skill 
now lead the world in the propelling machinery of bat- 
tleships. 

repair of GERMAN SHIPS. 

When war was declared with Germany all the German 
ships lying in our ports, many of them of the highest 
class of trans-Atlantic passenger steamers, were im- 
mediately taken over by our Government. Upon exam- 
ination by our officers, it was found that the machinery 
of all of them had been deliberately damaged by their 
crews, in many cases seriously, and the character of the 
injury was such as to denote that the work had been 
carried out under a central direction and that it had 
been well planned. 



208 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

When taken over, these ships, to the number of 103, 
were put under control of the Shipping Board, which 
later transferred 34 of them to the Navy for use as 
troop and freight transports, and subsequently added 
20 more to be repaired and returned to the board. 

The principal damage was the breaking of cast-iron 
parts of the main engines, chiefly the cylinders, though in 
one case piston rods, connecting rods, and boiler stays 
were sawed half in two, and in others the boilers were 
ruined by dry-firing and had to be renewed. There was, 
in addition, much vandalism of a minor character, but 
the remedying of this was insignificant in comparison 
with the gigantic task of repairing the cylinders, some 
of which were more than 9 feet in diameter. 

ELECTRIC WELDING SOLVED CYLINDER PROBLEM. 

It was speedily recognized that the large passenger 
ships thus taken over would have to be our chief re- 
liance in transporting troops to France, and their quick 
repair became a matter of great national interest. After 
a survey by representatives of the Shipping Board, which 
at the time had custody of them, it was decided to make 
new cylinders. This decision was in accord with usual 
practice and also with the rules of marine underwriters, 
and but for the number of ships and the large number 
of cylinders involved would probably have been fol- 
lowed. But the time required was prohibitive and while 
the subject was under discussion a few of the ships were 
transferred to the Navy and sent to the New York Navy 
Yard for repairs. 

As the Navy was not bound either by previous prac- 
tice or the rules of marine insurance societies, the engi- 
neer officer of the yard, after conference with an electric 
welding company, recommended that the broken cylin- 
ders be repaired by welding, and in this he was heartily 
supported by the industrial manager of the yard. The 
matter was referred to the Bureau of Steam Engineering, 
and the assistant to the bureau was directed to make a 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 209 

thorough examination of all conditions on the ex-German 
ships. As a result of his investigations, orders were 
issued to make all repairs where possible by electric weld- 
ing and to resort to mechanical patching only where 
welding was impracticable. 

PROVED A COMPLETE SUCCESS. 

This decision, so far-reaching in its application and 
so fraught with danger to the professional reputation of 
the officers concerned, was made in the face *of opposition 
by engine builders and by marine insurance companies 
but with such confidence in the ultimate result as left 
no room for doubt of its success. Electric welding was 
well known, but its application on such an extensive 
scale was unprecedented ; by its use these damaged cyl- 
inders could be saved, the work could be done without 
removing the cylinders, and all the vessels could be made 
ready for service probably a year before they could have 
been if the cylinders were renewed. 

Upon completion of repairs, which were carried out 
uninterruptedly for 24 hours a day, each vessel was sent 
to sea for a test under full-power conditions for 48 
hours, the purpose being to ascertain whether the work 
of repair had been well done and to determine whether 
the ships were in condition to be intrusted with the trans- 
portation of troops. So well and so successfully were 
the repairs accomplished that there was not a single in- 
stance of a defective weld, nor has one developed during 
the months of arduous service on which these ships have 
been engaged. 

SAVED YEAR IN TIME AND $20,000,000. 

I have entered upon so full a statement of this case 
because I think it stands out as one of the greatest engi- 
neering achievements of the period. The perpetrators of 
the sabotage were confident that they had damaged the 
machinery of these ships beyond repair, which fact is 



210 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

evidenced by a memorandum found on board one of 
them, in which each case was carefully noted, followed 
by the significant remark, "Can not be repaired" ; and 
the speedy rehabilitation of these vessels in the face of 
such German confidence is a splendid triumph of Amer- 
ican ingenuity and an evidence of American engineering 
accomplishment that is deserving of the highest com- 
mendation. The restoration of these magnificent ships 
to service reflects the greatest credit upon the naval offi- 
cers concerned and upon the officers and employees of 
the welding and engineering companies who carried out 
the work. 

As a side light on this work it has been made the sub- 
ject of careful estimate and determination that the repair 
of these ships resulted in a saving of 12 months in time, 
enabled us to transport at least 500,000 troops to France, 
and effected an economy which is conservatively esti- 
mated at upwards of $20,000,000. 

BUILDING 60 HEAVY GUNS FOR SERVICE IN FRANCE. 

Owing to the changed conditions of warfare, it was 
decided to remove the 7-inch guns from a number of 
our battleships, substituting therefore a quicker firing 
and lighter gun. It was at first believed that the most 
effective use of the 7-inch guns could be made by plac- 
ing them on railroad mountings, but Gen. Pershing said 
he did not wish them in that form. 

It was decided to place them on mobile mountings. 
In the use of high-powered heavy artillery on land guns, 
such as these and the Navy's 14 inch, railway mounts 
had invariably been transported in carriages from which 
on arrival at firing points it was necessary to shift them 
to a firing mount. This destroyed to a great degree 
their mobility. The Navy Ordnance Bureau in its 
mount design sought and found a method of mounting 
that would make heavy guns as mobile as field artillery. 
The weight of this high-powered gun, however, throw- 
ing a projectile weighing some 165 pounds, at a muzzle 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 211 

velocity of 2,800 feet per second, rendered the use of 
any wheeled gun carriage impossible. Accordingly, a 
new type of mount was evolved in which the principle 
of the caterpillar belt was utilized. Instead of wheels, 
two long endless belts were provided, which so increased 
the ground-bearing surface that the entire gun and 
mount, which weigh in the neighborhood of 38 tons, 
may be readily transported over rough and newly made 
ground. Twenty of these mounts are now nearing com- 
pletion. When finished they will be manned by a regi-. 
ment of picked Marines, the equipment for which has 
been furnished by the bureau. 

The first two mounts have been tested and proved 
eminently satisfactory. Following the test of the first 
7-inch mount, the Army requested the Navy to furnish 
it with 36 guns similarly mounted ; construction of these 
mounts is progressing rapidly. 

STAR SHELLS REPLACE SEARCHLIGHTS IN ILLUMINATING 
ENEMY VESSELS AT NIGHT. 

The American Navy has developed a shell which, 
when fired in the vicinity of any enemy fleet, will light 
it up, make it visible, and thus render it an easy target. 
This most recent naval development is in response to the 
demand for some means of searching out the enemy at 
night. For many years the need of lighting the enemy 
for night battle has been supplied by high-powered 
searchlights, but the ever-increasing range of naval artil- 
lery outstripped the development of the searchlight and 
some more effective method was necessary. 

There was an additional objection to the use of 
searchlights which the star shell overcomes. The beam 
i)f the searchlight at night, no matter how well screened 
and how well focused, presents a single pencil only 
and exerts a confusing and dazzling effect upon near-by 
observers. A yet more objectionable feature exists; the 
searchlight indicates the position of the vessel, so that 
the enemy has a clearly defined point of aim, steady 



212 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

and continuous, rather than only the intermittent flash 
of gunfire which, in the absence of the searchlight would 
alone be a means of illuminating his target. 

These shells will be supplied to the vessels of our 
Navy so that they may illuminate the enemy at night 
as a target for their guns, without disclosing the posi- 
tion of our own ships. Not only, however, will we be 
able to use them for actual battle, but they will prove 
serviceable in the examination of suspicious objects, such 
as suspected submarines and vessels of any description 
met with at night. It is believed that this development 
alone represents an increase in the night-fighting effi- 
ciency of our naval vessels by at least 25 per cent. 

The illuminating portion of the shell consists of a 
single light, or star, attached to a parachute. A unique 
expedient has been adopted to prevent the aggregate rush 
of wind resulting from the high speed of the shell while 
in flight from extinguishing the light after the explosion 
of the shell. The velocity of the light and parachute 
has been reduced by expelling the contents of the shell 
through the base, and in this manner the light and para- 
chute acquire a rearward velocity practically compensat- 
ing for the forward velocity of the shell. 

U. S. NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE. 

{Extracts from the Report of Admiral Mayo, Com- 
mander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet.) 

Cooperation with the allied navies in general is effected 
by means of the Allied Naval War Council, which meets 
monthly or as may be deemed advisable. The member- 
ship is composed of the several naval ministers and naval 
chiefs of staff and of officers specifically appointed to 
represent them in their absence. Vice Admiral Sims 
is the United States naval representative. The secre- 
tariat of the council is composed of British officers and 
personnel, with officers of the allied navies designated 
for liaison duties therewith. 

The Allied Naval Council has advisory functions only 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 213 

and has liaison with the Supreme War Council, with a 
view to coordinating and unifying allied naval effort, 
both as regards naval work only and as regards unity 
of action with military or land effort. Proposals made 
by the several allied navies are considered and definite 
steps recommended to be taken in the premises. As well 
the naval aspects of military (land) proposals are ex- 
amined into and passed upon. Conversely military 
(land) aspects of naval activities are referred to the 
Supreme War Council for consideration. 

The Allied Naval Counsel has had, in common with 
the Supreme War Council, until last spring, the handi- 
cap of being only advisory in function. The conclusions 
are recommended to the several Governments for adop- 
tion, but there is no common instrumentality for carry- 
ing into effect measures which require cooperation or 
coordination. This state of affairs in the Supreme War 
Council has been remedied by the appointment of an 
allied commander in chief in the person of Marshal 
Foch. 

There can be no doubt but that the Supreme War 
Council has met and that the Allied Naval Council con- 
tinues to fill a great need as a sort of clearing house for 
the necessarily varied proposals of the several Govern- 
ments, most of which require cooperation on the part of 
some other Government, and certainly it should be con- 
tinued in being until a more forceful control of allied 
naval effort can be agreed upon and brought into effect. 

The United States naval staff representative in Paris 
is the United States naval liaison officer with the Su- 
preme War Council, and a member of the staff of Vice 
Admiral Sims is the liaison officer with the secretariat 
of the Allied Naval Council. The United States naval 
staff representative in Paris is also liaison officer at the 
French Ministry of Marine and is at present naval at- 
tache as well. 

The naval attache to Italy maintains naval liaison 
with the Italian Ministry of Marine and keeps in touch 
with the United States naval activities in Italian waters. 



214 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 



ACTIVITIES IN COOPERATION WITH THE BRITISH. 

Inasmuch as the British are predominant in naval 
activity, it is natural to find that a major part of our 
naval activities are in cooperation with them and con- 
trolled by them. In fact, the British have been in 
position to carry so much of the "naval load" of this 
war that our first and our principal efforts have been 
toward taking up a share of that load. 

Cooperation has in many cases been carried to such 
an extent that the coordination necessary for efficiency 
has developed into practical consolidation. It is pleasing 
to note that while consolidation is all but a fact, our 
own naval forces have in every case preferred to pre- 
serve their individuality of organization and administra- 
tion and, as far as feasible, of operations ; and that a 
healthy and friendly rivalry between them and their 
British associates has resulted in much good to the per- 
sonnel of both services. 



UNITED STATES NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN IRELAND. 

The largest single group of naval activities wherein 
cooperation is effected with the British is that in Ire- 
land, all of them being under the jurisdiction of the 
commander in chief, coast of Ireland, who has been and 
is Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, whose cordial appreciation 
of the work of our forces has gone far to stimulate the 
personnel coming under his direction. The chief of 
staff, destroyer flotillas, and the officer in charge of 
aviation in Ireland are designated by the British Ad- 
miralty as members of the staff of Admiral Bayly. 

Battleship division six is based on Berehaven, Ire- 
land, in readiness for the protection of convoys in gen- 
eral and of troop convoys in particular. 

Submarine detachment is based on Berehaven, Ire- 
land, and maintain a submarine patrol off the west and 
south coasts of Ireland. Their service is hard; they 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 215 

have had a great deal of work at sea and have cheer- 
fully met every demand made on them. 

The destroyers based at Queenstown are the 
original United States naval force in European waters 
— a distinction which is an ever-present spur to cheer- 
ful efficiency under any and all circumstances and pro- 
duces results which must be a satisfaction to their 
superiors. 

Subchaser detachment three at Queenstown had only 
recently arrived, but arrangements for their employment 
were well in hand, and they were expected to begin 
operations as soon as the means of basing them had been 
perfected. 

United States Naval Air Stations in Ireland consists 
of seaplane stations at Whiddy Island, Queenstown (also 
the main supply and repair base), Wexford, and Lough 
Foyle, and a kite-balloon station at Berehaven. None 
of these stations was in operation in mid-September, 
except that Lough Foyle was partially so, but all were 
about ready to begin operations and would do so upon 
the receipt of the necessary planes or pilots or both, all 
of which were en route. A great deal of the construc- 
tion has been done by our own personnel, some of the 
stations having been entirely done by them. 

Battleship Division Nine of the Atlantic Fleet, under 
the command of Rear Admiral Rodman, has constituted 
the Sixth Battle Squadron of the British Grand Fleet 
under Admiral Sir David Beatty for nearly a year. 

When this division was sent abroad it had, in common 
with other units of the Atlantic Fleet, suffered in effi- 
ciency from the expansion of the Navy, which required 
reduction in the number of officers and transfers of num- 
bers of men to furnish trained and experienced nuclei 
for other vessels. Upon reporting in the Grand Fleet, it 
immediately took its place in the battle line on exactly 
the same status as other units of the Grand Fleet. The 
opportunities for gunnery exercises is limited but drill 
and adherence to standardized methods and procedure 
as developed in our own naval service have brought this 



216 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

division to a satisfactory state of efficiency which con- 
tinues to improve. 

It is pleasing to record that the efficiency of this unit 
in gunnery, engineering, and seamanship is deemed by 
the British commander in chief to be in no way inferior 
to that of the best of the British battle squadrons. In 
fact, it is perfectly proper to state the belief that our 
ships are in some respects superior to the British, and 
perhaps chiefly in the arrangements for the health and 
contentment of personnel, which have been very thor- 
oughly examined into by the flag officers, captains, and 
other officers of the Grand Fleet. These ships have also 
been the subject of much favorable comment in regard 
to their capacity for self-maintenance, a matter which 
has been given much attention in our own Navy of 
late years. 

Service in the Grand Fleet is noteworthy by reason 
of the fact that the fleet is at never less than four 
hours' notice for going to sea, so that liberty is 
restricted and whatever is necessary in the way of over- 
haul and upkeep of machinery must always be planned 
with a view to assembly in case of orders to sea. 

The mine force of the Atlantic Fleet under the com- 
mand of Rear Admiral Strauss is an independent 
unit, except that the mine-laying operations are un- 
der the jurisdiction of the commander in chief of 
the Grand Fleet, who has to choose the time when ar- 
rangements can be carried into effect to furnish the 
necessary destroyer escort and heavy covering forces. 
The arrangements made at home prior to the departure 
of the mine force appear to have been well considered 
and thoroughly developed. The mine-laying operations 
themselves give an impression of efficiency which can 
only come from thorough preparation and complete 
understanding of the work. 

The cross-channel transport service was brought 
into being to render indispensable assistance to the 
British in ferrying United States troops across the chan- 
nel from England, in whose ports over half of our 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 217 

troops were landed from British ships. At the time of 
inspection late in September four United States vessels 
were in service, and four more were expected in the 
course of a few weeks. The vessels in service were 
superior in capacity to British vessels engaged in the 
same work and combined with the efficiency of their 
naval personnel made them the subject of favorable 
remark by the British transport authorities. 

Subchaser detachment one, based on Plymouth, 
had been operating for some time. This base is to be 
expanded into a United States naval base. The upkeep 
of chasers is effected entirely with the resources of the 
base ; operations are initiated by the British commander 
in chief at Plymouth. A great deal of development 
work in listening devices is being carried on at and 
from this base. The work of the subchasers from this 
base has proved their usefulness up to the limit of their 
sea-going capacity. 

United States naval aviation in England is carried 
on by cooperation in two British commands. 

The United States seaplane station. Killing holme, is 
under the vice admiral commanding on the east coast 
of England. It has been in operation for some time and 
does escort of coastal convoys, escort of mine layers in 
the southern part of the North Sea, and some reconnais- 
sance work in the direction of the Dutch coast. 

The northern bombing group is under the vice 
admiral commanding at Dover, whose jurisdiction ex- 
tends to naval aviation units in northern France in the 
vicinity of Calais and Dunkerque. The day bombing 
squadrons are manned by marines ; the night bombing 
squadrons by the Navy. There has been some delay 
in the acquisition of suitable night bombing planes, but 
their delivery will find all in readiness to go immediately 
to work. The British prescribe the objectives and 
designate the available free flying time ; the operations 
themselves are carried out by our own personnel. The 
seaplane station at Dunkerque has operated successfully 



218 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

under the handicap of limited and difficult water area in 
which to take off and to land. 

The assembly, repair, and supply station at Eastleigh 
was brought into being primarily for the Northern 
Bombing Group because of the difficulties of transporta- 
tion to and from the general aviation base at Pauillac. 
It also does necessary work for Killingholme and for 
the air stations in Ireland. This base, when visited, was 
in process of completion and gave every evidence of pur- 
pose and capacity to meet all requirements likely to be 
made of it. 

ACTIVITY IN COOPERATION WITH THE FRENCH. 

Aside from the cooperation effected by the force com- 
mander with the French Ministry of Marine through 
the naval staff representative in Paris on matters of 
general policy, actual cooperation is carried on by Vice 
Admiral H. B. Wilson, commander United States naval 
forces in France, whose headquarters are maintained in 
Brest. 

It is deemed worthy of special remark that whereas 
practically all cooperation with the British is effected 
by operating as units under British control, coopera- 
tion with the French is arranged on a basis that 
leaves to the United States naval forces a very large 
measure of initiative. This is particularly true in re- 
gard to troopships destined to French ports, which are 
provided with escort and routed in and out wholly from 
the Brest headquarters which is kept fully informed as 
to routes and positions of British-controlled convoys and 
as to locations of submarine activities and has to so 
adjust routes on and off the coast as to keep clear of 
both. Three out of eight escort units are provided by 
United States vessels for the coastal convoy system, 
which is operated by the French. Unity of purpose and 
sympathy of understanding have combined to make the 
handling of cargo convoys on and off the coast a matter 
of ready adjustment to the general conditions obtaining 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 219 

in regard to destination of cargo ships and availability 
of escort vessels. 

At the end of the fiscal year United States naval 
forces in France are stated to have been, escorting troops 
into France at the rate of 134,000 per month. Since 
May 1, 1918, the number of troopships and cargo-vessel 
convoys east and west bound have averaged more than 
1 a day, and the number of ships over 200 a month. No 
convoy of troopships has failed to be met by destroyer 
escort before entering the area of submarine activity, and 
no passenger intrusted to the care of the United States 
naval forces in France has been lost. 

The destroyers based on Brest are controlled direct- 
ly from headquarters at Brest and are at present main- 
tained in readiness for service with the aid of the 
fleet repair ship Prometheus and lately also by the 
destroyer tender Bridgeport. Additional repair shops on 
shore are in process of completion. 

The United States naval repair facilities here as well 
as elsewhere on the coast of France have to be made 
use of not only for the upkeep of the United States 
naval vessels based on the coast, but also for neces- 
sary repairs to troopships and cargo vessels, whether 
naval. Army, or Shipping Board, the guiding idea being 
to keep the ships moving. 

Costal districts in France. — The north and west 
coasts of France are divided into districts which cor- 
respond with the French prefectures maritimes, and 
the district headquarters are in every case located in the 
same place as those of the several prefects maritimes. 
These headquarters are communication and operating 
centers and provide naturally by arrangement as above 
described for full and ready cooperation with the French 
district activities. 

The principal ports have assigned to them a port 
officer whose function in regard to all United States 
ships is to expedite their "turn around," and in addition, 
where vessels carrying United States naval armed guards 
are concerned, to inspect the armed guards and adjust 



220 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

such matters as are beyond the capacity or authority of 
the armed guard commander. 

United States naval aviation in France includes all 
that the title implies, except the northern bombing group 
mentioned above. 

There are eight sea-plane stations, three dirigible 
stations, and three kite-balloon stations all of which are 
operated by district commanders in cooperation with the 
French naval air services in the several corresponding 
prefectures maritimes. There is also an assembly, re- 
pair, and supply base at Pauillac for the general service 
of all air stations in France and a sea-plane gunnery 
and bombing training school at Moutchie, both of these 
activities being directly under the headquarters in Brest. 

Of the eight sea-plane stations, five have been in 
operation for periods varying from 12 to 3 months, and 
the remaining 3 are now about ready to begin. 

Of the three dirigible stations, only that at Paim- 
boeuf has been in operation for any length of time, and 
is to be used also for training and experimental work. 

Of the three kite-balloon stations, only that at Brest 
is ready for operation. Test and experimental work 
have been carried on here since August, 1918, in con- 
nection with destroyers and yachts. 

The assembly repair and supply station at Pauil- 
lac has progressed rapidly to completion and is deemed 
ready to undertake any and all demands that may be 
made on it. 



V. United States Naval Aviation in Europe. 

The establishment of United States naval aviation in 
Europe has been one of the most difficult and involved 
tasks which have had to be undertaken and brought into 
effect. 

There were arrangements to be made with the French 
and the British as to locations for stations that 
would be best adapted for cooperation. There were fur- 



UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 221 

ther arrangements to be made as to the procurement of 
sites or the taking over of the stations already in opera- 
tion or in process of construction. The Navy Depart- 
ment had also to be communicated with, largely by cable, 
as to design, quantities and shipments of material, which 
upon receipt had to be allocated with a view to com- 
pleting certain stations as soon as possible while not 
delaying the progress of the general scheme any more 
than could be helped. 

Delays and mistakes in the shipment of aviation 
material probably caused more trouble than any other 
one thing, for when material once arrives in a European 
port it has been, and still is, a very difficult matter to 
arrange for coastwise transportation. 



CHAPTER XII 

Naval Lessons of the War 

THE advance of naval science has increased 
the complexities of ships and guns. Conse- 
quently the problems to be solved are much more 
intricate and perplexing, both in preparing mate- 
rial and in the development of skill to operate the 
material. This has emphasised the need of wise 
naval management. One important lesson of the 
war is the necessity of good plans, well understood 
and well carried out. 

Every first class navy has its planning depart- 
ment. The duties of this department are deliber- 
ative; to draw knowledge from past and current 
events, to study strategy and tactics as practised 
now and in the past, at home and abroad; to ad- 
vise respecting navy yards, bases, and stations ; to 
make recommendations as to the size, composition, 
and disposition of fleets; to determine the char- 
acteristics of speed, armour, and armament for 
new ships ; in short, to make plans both for naval 
preparations in time of peace and for employment 
of the fleets in time of war. 



NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR 223 

The present war has taught that an effective 
navy is the logical defence for a country situated 
like the United States. And by an effective navy 
is meant, not an impotent navy like that of Spain 
in 1898, nor a weaker navy like the one sur- 
rendered under such humiliating conditions by 
Germany in 1918, but one adequate to seek and 
defeat enemy ships long before they can approach 
our coasts, thus protecting outlying possessions and 
the sea-borne trade so necessary to our national 
life ; in other words, by an effective navy is meant 
one which stands for world-wide respect for le- 
gitimate American interests; one which is ready, 
if need be, to defend these interests in all parts 
of the world. 

To determine what should be the composition 
of such a fleet is a difficult problem and to under- 
stand the details requires expert technical knowl- 
edge. These technical details are the province 
of naval experts. The principles, however, from 
which these details are deduced are not hard to 
understand, and they are of first importance as 
the foundation on which the entire structure of 
naval defence rests. 

A fairly definite idea of the work which has 
to be done in order to make the sea power of the 
United States an effective guarantor of national 
security may be arrived at through a discussion 



224 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

of the various types of warships, noting briefly 
their characteristics, their uses, and the propor- 
tionate numerical strength of each class required 
in building up a well-balanced United States 
Navy. The estimates which follow have to be 
made in the light of the best obtainable infor- 
mation. They are approximate and subject to 
modification from time to time to meet new condi- 
tions resulting from unforeseen developments. It 
is always to be remembered that the struggle for 
control of the seas is an ever-present spur to in- 
vention and progress in the development of the 
weapons used. Old ships are constantly being re- 
placed by new models. Hence the relative value 
of the respective units may vary somewhat from 
year to year. 

It is a race for the largest stakes that the world 
has to offer. Control of the seas is the objective, 
and the nation which gains this control is the one 
that maintains a fleet able to take and keep the 
seas in all weathers, and powerful enough to over- 
come the strongest enemy fleet that it may en- 
counter. Although the particular kinds of ships 
and guns used in answering the demands of nav al 
strength come and go in continual evolution, still, 
these broad general demands of sea power remain 
the same. It is better, therefore, to study the ab- 
stract requirements of sea power and to note the 



NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR 225 

trend of naval development in meeting these re- 
quirements than to rivet attention on the par- 
ticular types of ships now in use as though they 
were immutable and incapable of being deposed. 

The cornerstone of naval power is the gun ; and 
the measure of a nation's sea power is the strength 
of her battleship fleet. In spite of the develop- 
ment of the mine and torpedo into important fac- 
tors, the high-power naval gun is still supreme; 
so it has been in the past; so it is now; and so it 
probably will continue to be in the future. 

As has previously been pointed out, the only ef- 
fective naval defence is a fleet strong enough to 
keep the enemy at a distance. A navy adequate 
to defend must be sufficiently powerful either to 
defeat the enemy fleet on the high seas or to con- 
tain it in enemy home ports. The main reliance 
of such an effective navy is the long-range gun. 

There is general agreement among experts as 
to this principle, that the gun is the prime consid- 
eration in naval warfare; but the different types 
installed in the newest ships of the various coun- 
tries indicate somewhat divergent views as to what 
is the best design of naval gun. It is obvious that 
the heavier the projectile and the harder it hits 
the more will be the damage done. In a general 
way the principal considerations are: First, ac- 
curacy; second, high velocity; third, weight of 



226 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

projectile; fourth, capacity of the gun to sustain 
continuous fire; and fifth, rapidity, or volume of 
fire. It is thus seen that the size of the projectile 
is limited by the efficiency of the propelling power 
and by the structural capacities of the gun and 
mount. In other words, the heavier the shell, con- 
sistent with high velocity, long range, and ac- 
curacy, the better; but if the structural durability 
of the gun is threatened, or if velocity and ac- 
curacy are sacrificed in order to throw a heavier 
projectile, a point is soon reached where damaging 
power is lost instead of gained. 

The varying conditions of sea and visibility un- 
der which naval actions may be fought also tend 
to modify the effectiveness of the different sizes 
and designs of guns according to the circumstances 
which may exist at the time of any particular en- 
gagement. The gun which would win a fight at 
close range in misty weather might be defeated by 
the same enemy gun on a clear day at long range. 
At the shorter ranges the gun of moderate size 
might dominate a larger and more powerful enemy 
gun by greater rapidity and volume of fire. Al- 
though this is a contingency to be reckoned with, 
still, the present tendency is to increase the size 
of the projectile as fast as improvements in the 
powder and gun structure permit; and this tend- 
ency appears to be one likely to continue in the 



NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR 227 

future. We may expect, therefore, that the size 
of naval guns will increase step by step with sci- 
entific improvements in gun construction and 
powder. 

It is always a good thing to reduce a problem 
to its simplest terms. It is fair to assume that 
overwhelming naval opinion is in favour of the 
fleet of battleships as the one great factor in sea 
power. There is also the same indorsement of 
gun power as the primary requisite of the fleet 
of battleships. Keeping these two things in mind 
we can concentrate on the main terms of naval 
strength without confusing the discussion by intro- 
ducing the complex details of the modern battle- 
ship. The problem of adequate naval defence is 
to provide seaworthy mobile gun platforms capa- 
ble of mounting and maintaining a superior num- 
ber of powerful guns in position against the 
enemy. 

The maintenance of the guns and the mainte- 
nance of their service, which includes all the ma- 
terial and personnel of the ship, must necessarily 
be contained in the gun platform — and conditions 
on the sea arbitrarily divide the guns into groups 
mounted on each battleship platform. Thus the 
problem of the battleship is reduced to finding the 
best possible group of guns, self-maintained upon 
a properly mobile platform, that will act in unison 



228 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

with other similar gun platforms. Protection of 
the gun and its platform increases the efficiency 
of the gun on the sea. Consequently a battleship 
should be the best possible group of guns, ar- 
moured, and mounted upon an armoured gun plat- 
form that is self-maintaining and sufficiently mo- 
bile. Thinking in these terms, the three compo- 
nent factors of armament, armour, and speed re- 
main in their right proportion. 

Since the gun is the prime consideration, the 
other characteristics of a battleship depend upon 
what design of ship is considered most serviceable 
for the purpose of the gun. Some idea of the re- 
quirements of a battleship may be had by keeping 
in mind that it is desirable to mount as many 
guns in one ship as is consistent with having a 
homogeneous fleet possessing tactical mobility, 
adequate speed, long cruising radius, seaworthi- 
ness, habitability, and protection from the blows 
of the enemy whether delivered from above or 
below the water. It requires careful weighing of 
proportionate advantages and disadvantages to 
harmonise these characteristics into the combina- 
tion which will produce the best possible type of 
battleship. 

The advantages of ships of large tonnage over 
smaller vessels are many ; more heavy guns can be 
carried, the platform is steadier, the cruising ra- 



NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR 229 

dius is larger, the habitability and seaworthiness 
are better, and more effective means of protection 
can be installed. On the other hand, there is a 
limit of size beyond which the advantages are out- 
weighed by the disadvantages ; the question of ex- 
pense enters, and any very large increase in the 
size of warships might be argued against on the 
grounds that it would be like putting "too many 
eggs in one basket." Manoeuvring abilities are 
adversely affected by very large displacements, 
and the depths of the various waterways as well as 
the accommodations of canals and dry docks im- 
pose definite limits to the size of ships. 

On the whole it may be expected that the tend- 
ency to increase the tonnage of battleships will 
continue for some time. It would also appear an 
improvident policy for any country to increase the 
size of its battleships by radical changes of large 
increments, because this would entail expense 
and a bad effect upon the homogeneity of the fleet. 
These objections might easily outweigh the ad- 
vantages gained. It may be assumed, therefore, 
that future increase in the size of warships will be 
a gradual growth, with a probably decreasing ac- 
celeration. 

The fleet of battleships alone does not consti- 
tute a navy. Scouts, destroyers, submarines and 
other auxiliaries are needed. In order that the 



230 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

United States may make good defence of her 
great surrounding oceans it is particularly im- 
portant that her battle fleet should have a far 
flung service of scouts to give information of tne 
movements of the enemy. An adequate air serv- 
ice, including airships, aeroplanes, and captive 
balloons, is, for obvious reasons, indispensable to 
the modern fleet. Destroyers are needed to at- 
tack and confuse the enemy ships, and at the 
same time guard their own large ships from simi- 
lar attacks. Submarines are necessa'ry to help de- 
fend the coasts and also to operate as a tactical 
sub-division of the fleet. Mine layers are needed 
to harass and menace enemy ships, while mine 
sweepers and patrols are required to search for 
enemy mines and submarines. In addition to 
these combatant units, auxiliaries, including trans- 
ports, repair ships, hospital ships, and supply 
ships, are essential to the life and vigour of a fight- 
ing navy. 

The floating instruments of sea power, more- 
over, must be backed by suitably situated and 
properly defended permanent bases and navy 
yards in which ships may seek rest and rehabili- 
tation. Strategically situated island possessions 
are also needed for naval bases, by which lines of 
communication may be kept open to such tempo- 



NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR 231 

rary advance bases as the requirements of a par- 
ticular campaign may demand. 

It is thus seen that, while relative naval power 
is primarily measured by the strength of the re- 
spective battleship fleets of the various naval pow- 
ers a navy should also possess these necessary 
auxiliaries in order to attain its maximum ef- 
fectiveness. The first-mentioned auxiliaries, the 
scouts, are a most important adjunct. 

The battle cruiser is the most powerful type of 
scout, and in addition to high speed has great 
offensive powers, together with endurance and a 
moderate protection of armour. While the chief 
function of this type is to get information, it has, 
because of these offensive and defensive charac- 
teristics, additional uses. The battle cruiser may 
fight for information and break through a hostile 
screen; she may support the lighter craft of her 
own fleet, beat back enemy scouts and guard the 
main body from surprise ; she may be used to pro- 
tect national sea routes and attack those of the 
enemy; and in battle she may operate as a fast 
wing and take a position favourable for using both 
guns and torpedoes. 

But the chief utility of the battle cruiser is 
now held to be that of a scout and raider, pos- 
sessed of the power to dominate any such craft of 
other type. Yet the gain of this advantage means 



232 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

that one unit has been built instead of several — 
and, as it would appear that a number of scouts is 
more useful than one individual, except in un- 
usual conditions, the wisdom of building one bat- 
tle cruiser instead of several scouts is questionable. 
The information service of a fleet requires a 
large number of scouts, and in order to produce 
them without undue cost the light cruiser has been 
developed, small in size and lightly armoured, 
but with adequate speed and cruising radius for 
scout duty. As before stated, the unarmoured 
light cruiser, carrying torpedoes and intermediate 
guns, may be regarded as a development of the 
destroyer; it is larger, more habitable, carries 
larger guns, and is more useful as a scout. The 
ultimate development of the light cruiser would 
appear to be a larger unarmoured ship with great 
speed, carrying torpedoes and a few of the most 
powerful naval guns. Such a ship could outrun 
anything it could not fight, and it would take al- 
most an equal number of battle cruisers to deny 
information sought by a group of these big-gun 
fast scouts making determined efforts to break 
through or to go around the opposing battle cruis- 
ers. The thin armour of the battle cruiser would 
afford protection against the small guns of light 
cruisers, but would be of no avail against the 
heavy guns of this new type of scout. In fact. 



NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR 233 

the lessons of the war give good ground for belief 
that such thin armour, particularly in turrets, 
might increase the chances of disaster, if hits were 
made by heavy guns. 

There has been talk of such a ship to be devel- 
oped in this country, its characteristics being ex- 
treme speed and maximum gun power without ar- 
mour protection. Those that favour this type 
hold that, just as the armoured cruiser fell into 
discredit, so will the battle cruiser «fall into dis- 
credit upon the advent of this type of scout. The 
idea is that the battleship is for the main strength 
of the fighting line, having extreme gun power 
and extreme endurance and armour protection; 
that the logical auxiliary of such a battle fleet is 
a class of ships having extreme speed and extreme 
gun power without armour protection; that any 
compromise between these two, such as a battle 
cruiser, is unsound from the essential standpoint 
of getting best results from money expended. 

The destroyer, a familiar and popular fighting 
ship, the usefulness of which the experience of 
the present war has clearly demonstrated, dis- 
places about 1,000 tons, has no armour protection 
carries torpedoes and small-calibre guns, and pos- 
sesses high speed, quick manoeuvring qualities, and 
sufficient radius to permit cruising with the fleet. 
Destroyers have a wide range of employment, in- 



234 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

eluding scouting, patrolling, convoying, and fight- 
ing. They are almost indispensable to the battle- 
ship fleet. While cruising both during the day 
and at night the destroyers help screen the capital 
ships and are ready for any kind of emergency 
duty. 

When the time of battle comes it would be 
hard to overestimate the value of destroyers in 
making attack on the enemy capital ships, in 
breaking up the projected attacks of enemy de- 
stroyers, in delivering the deathblow to crippled 
enemy ships, and making smoke screens for tac- 
tical purposes, either to confuse the enemy or to 
envelop and protect any of their own ships which 
may happen to be hard pressed. 

An excerpt from the report of the Naval Gen- 
eral Board dated Nov. 17, 1914, reads as follows: 
"After mature consideration of all the elements 
involved the General Board concluded that a well- 
balanced fighting fleet for all purposes of offence 
or defence calls for a relative proportion of four 
destroyers to one battleship." 

In addition to this proved value as an auxiliary 
of the fleet, the destroyer is now recognised as the 
best weapon against the U-boat. So evident is 
this that the demand for these craft is most ur- 
gent, and it may be said that seldom has any type 



NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR 235 

of naval construction won so deserved a recog- 
nition in the actual test of warfare. 

Auxiliaries less distinctively combative, but 
still necessary to the maintenance of a fighting 
navy, include colliers, oil-fuel ships, repair ships, 
mother ships for submarines and aircraft, trans- 
ports, and hospital ships. The characteristics and 
uses of these vessels are obvious, and the respec- 
tive number needed may be determined by logis- 
tical calculations. Lesser naval units, including 
mine layers, mine sweepers, patrol ships, and sub- 
marine chasers, also have work to do in modern 
warfare and must be provided for in adequate 
numbers. 

In making a brief survey of the naval activities 
of the war, it is seen that the submarine was of 
no great value to the superior navies controlling 
the seas, but proved practically the most effec- 
tive naval weapon of the inferior fleets. When 
used against the enemy battle squadrons it in- 
fluenced strategy and tactics and scored successes 
in sinking some of the older men-of-war, but gen- 
erally speaking produced no very important re- 
sults. When used against merchant ships the 
submarine was unable to attain effectiveness while 
complying with the rules and usages of interna- 
tional law, but by resorting to unscrupulous meth- 
ods it became a dangerous commerce destroyer 



236 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 

and as such has taken a prominent part in the 
war. 

Experience has shown that the chief tactical 
value of the submarine in actual naval warfare 
is for defence, to hold the enemy at a distance. 
The fleet submarine has also demonstrated an of- 
fensive value which may be useful in attaining 
a tactical advantage. It may be inferred, there- 
fore, that the United States needs submarines both 
to help defend her coasts and to operate as a 
tactical subdivision of the fleet. 

The evolution of the submarine appears to be 
towards the submersible battleship; but the con- 
sensus of naval opinion at present seems to be that 
a super-submersible capable of navigating under 
the water and also strong enough to fight battle- 
ships on the surface involves an almost prohibi- 
tive cost, which would be out of proportion to the 
advantages gained. By increasing the tonnage of 
the submarine its mechanical difficulties are aggra- 
vated. On the other hand, the large tonnage of 
the surface battleship is like a reserve of wealth, 
which may be expended in any desirable way; if 
under-water attack is a serious menace to the bat- 
tleship some of this tonnage can be drawn upon 
to supply suitable protection, such as a series of 
outer and inner bottoms so constructed and subdi- 
vided as to make the ship practically nonsinkable ; 



NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR 237 

or, if attack from the air is dangerous, reserve ton- 
nage may be drawn upon for aero defence — and 
so on. In estimating the value of the submarine 
in wars to come it would appear safe, therefore, 
to assume that in future struggles for control of 
the seas the role of the submarine will always be 
secondary to that of surface ships. 



APPENDIX 

Comparative Strength of Navies 

Excerpts from a compilation by T. G. Frothingham, 
reprinted by courtesy of "Current History." — Table pre- 
pared and arranged by C. H. Foster, U. S. N. A. — Table 
published by the Office of U. S. Naval Intelligence. 

THE four deck plans, Fig. i, Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig. 4, 
show practically all the variations in the construc- 
tion of dreadnoughts, and also of battle cruisers. Keep- 
ing them in mind will help in the following estimate of 
the navies of Great Britain, Germany, United States, 
France, Japan, Russia, Italy, and Austria-Hungary. 
These will be given in their order of tonnage. 

The United States Navy has taken a leading part in 
the development of the modern naval gun. This has re- 
sulted in a gun with an increased length in proportion to 
its calibre, and a high muzzle velocity without undue 
erosion. Our 12-inch naval gun, increased from 45 
calibre to 50 calibre, with a projectile of 870 pounds 
and an initial velocity of 2,950 foot-seconds, is the most 
powerful naval gun of its class. Our next step, the 45- 
calibre 14-inch naval gun, has a projectile of 1,400 
pounds and initial velocity of 2,600 foot-seconds. This 
gun has been increased to 50 calibre for the three new 
dreadnoughts of the Mississippi class. For the later 
classes of dreadnoughts authorised by Congress a 16-inc? 

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242 APPENDIX 

gun has been designed. These guns will be the standard 
of comparison for armaments when considering the for- 
eign navies. 

THE BRITISH NAVY 

The British Navy is much the strongest in the world, 
because, to retain control of the seas, Great Britain has 
made it her policy to maintain a navy powerful enough 
to fight any two naval powers that might combine against 
her. This is the origin of the term "a two-power navy," 
now so frequently used in our country. 

The British strength, in the recognised first essentials 
of sea power, known to be built and building is as fol- 
lows : 

BRITISH NAVY— SHIPS BUILT AND BUILDING 

Dreadnoughts 38' 

Predreadnought battleships 31 

Battle cruisers 7 

' 35 ships, regular programme, 2 Turkish and i Chilean (building in England) 
aken over early in the war. 

Of the 38 dreadnoughts built and building the follow- 
ing is the list of recent construction in the programme, 
with the dates of completion originally planned for each 
ship : 

BRITISH NAVY— NEW CONSTRUCTION— DREADNOUGHT TYPE 

Compl'd Displace- 
in — Name ment Main armament Speed 

1914. .Queen Elizabeth 27,500] ( 250 

1914 .Warspite 27,500 25.0 

i9i5..Barham 27.500 [ 815-inch { 250 

ipis. .Valiant 27,500 25 o 

1915.. Malaya 27.500 J [250 

19 1 5. .Royal Sovereign 25,750] | 220 

1915. .Royal Oak 25,750 22 O 

1916. .Ramillies 25,750 [ 8 15-inch < 22 o 

1916. .Resolution 25,750 220 

19 16. .Revenge 25,750 J I 22 o 

1917- -One Ship 27,500 815-inch 250 

1917. .Renown 25,750 ] 

1917. .Repulse 25,750 ^ 8 is-inch 220 

1917. .Resistance 25,750 J 



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APPENDIX 245 

The dreadnought strength of the British fleet in the 
battle of Jutland (May 31-June 1, 19 16) is authorita- 
tively given as 29. In view of this, it seems improbable 
that at the date of the battle Great Britain had made any 
great additions to the dreadnoughts in her known pro- 
gramme. Great Britain is known to have increased her 
dreadnoughts by the one Chilean and two Turkish war- 
ships taken over early in the war. 

The following is the list of British battle cruisers at 
the time of the battle, with dates of completion: 

BRITISH NAVY— BATTLE CRUISERS BEFORE THE BATTLE OF 
JUTLAND 

Compl'd Displace- 
in — Name merit Main armament Speed 

1908 .. Indomitable 17,230 I [ 26 

1908 .. Inflexible .-.. 17,250 i- 812-inch. | 26 

1908 . . Invincible 17,250 J [ 26 

1911 . .Indefatigable 18,750 8 12-inch 25 

i9ii..Lion 26,3501 o T^ ! inrV, / 28. 5 

1912.. Princess Royal 26,350 J ** i3-5 men < ^S.s 

1912. .New Zealand 18,800 1 o ^o 1" rTi I ^^'^ 

1913. .Australia 19,200/ °i2-incn •^ ^6.0 

1913. .Queen Mary 27,000 8 13.5-inch 28.0 

19 14 .Tiger 28,500 8 I3.s-inch 28.0 

There were nine battle cruisers with the British fleet 
in the battle of Jutland, and it is known that every one 
of these is in the list above given. Of these, three bat- 
tle cruisers were lost in this battle, Indefatigable, Queen 
Mary, and Invincible, leaving the present total seven, 
as given in the table. 

In the months that have followed the battle it is 
probable that there has been an increase of the fleet of 
dreadnoughts, but, realising the other demands on the 
British yards, it is doubtful if the increase has been 
abnormal. 

Great Britain has been obliged to increase greatly her 
fleet of light cruisers, destroyers, patrols, &c,, to meet 



246 APPENDIX 

the submarine danger. It is known that a great deal of 
her building capacity has been used in construction of 
the monitor type. It has recently been given out that 
the British Government is building a large number of 
cargo ships, and the demands on the yards for repairs of 
the fleet, for supply and transport service, &c., must also 
be considered. Add to this the great drain on British 
labour to provide munitions, and the indicated lack of 
great increase to the fleet would be explained. Conse- 
quently, it would be reasonable to conclude that in 1917 
the British fleet of dreadnoughts does not greatly ex- 
ceed the total given in the regular building programme. 
Undoubtedly there has been a continuance of the future 
building programme, and many ships have been laid 
down. 

From the deck plan of the Queen Elizabeth (Fig. 5) 
it will be seen that the placing of the turrets follows 
the design of U. S. S. Michigan (Fig. 4). All of the 
fourteen ships given in the list of new construction have 
this arrangement of turrets. Sixteen of the remaining 
dreadnoughts also have their turrets aligned over the 
keel. The other seven have the less efficient designs of 
the Dreadnought (Fig. 1) and Neptune (Fig. 3). 

Great Britain originated the battle cruiser. The plans 
show the design of the Lion class (Fig. 7) and the ear- 
lier Invincible class (Fig. 6). It will be seen in the list 
of recent construction that Great Britain did not add to 
her programme any battle cruisers for completion after 
1914. The five 25-knot dreadnoughts {Queen Eliza- 
heth class) were for 1914 and 1915. After that for 
1916 and 1917 there is only one 25-knot ship — all the 
rest are 22-knot. 



APPENDIX 247 

For armament eleven dreadnoughts carry 12-inch guns, 
twelve 13.5-inch, and fourteen 15-inch. The Chilean 
warship, now called the Canada, carries 14-inch guns. 
The English 15-inch projectile is very heavy, weighing 
some 500 poutids more than the American 14-inch pro- 
jectile, but the initial velocity of this heavier shell is 
much less than that of our 14-inch. 

It is rumoured, and it is very probable, that still 
larger English naval guns have been designed — even as 
large as 18-inch. But, in view of the British programme 
of construction, it seems most likely that such guns are 
for the monitors. 

Great Britain has built floating batteries of the moni- 
tor type. These are for use against shore guns and in 
places where ships are exposed to torpedoes and mines. 
There is much mystery maintained about them, but it is 
known that some have very heavy guns, and that they 
have a specially devised cushioned protection against 
mines and torpedoes. 

In all the auxiliaries of a great fleet the British Navy 
is well equipped — and when one realises that this means 
cruisers, scouts, supply ships of all kinds, destroyers, sub- 
marines, aircraft, &c., with the additional burden of 
patrols, mine sweepers, and transport service, all of 
which are necessary to maintain British control of the 
seas, the total is astonishing. 

THE GERMAN NAVY 

Germany became the second naval power of the world 
in the years that succeeded the laying down of the 
Dreadnought (1906). This was a time of great activity 



248 APPENDIX 

in the foreign navies. In 1907 Germany had laid down 
four dreadnoughts, in 1908 four, in 1909-10 five, in 1911 
four. In the same years the United States Navy had 
been restricted to the two-battleships-a-year policy — and 
had yielded second place to Germany. 

The known strength of the German Navy is : 

GERMAN NAVY— BUILT AND BUILDING 

Dreadnoughts .- 

Predreadnought battleships to 

Battle cruisers , '..'.'.'..''. -^ 

I Six, regular programme; one battle cruiser building taken over from Greece. 

As in the case of the British Navy, absolutely no 
German naval information has been given out since the 
start of the war. Concerning the German Navy also sen- 
sational stories of increased strength have been circulated. 
It was related that the ships were being rearmed with 
new guns of great power, that there had been secret con- 
struction, and that an unexpected strength had been de- 
veloped, but at the battle of Jutland it was the same 
story. Germany brought out her whole fleet — and there 
was no new element of strength. 

The twenty German dreadnoughts in the known pro- 
gramme consist of thirteen ships, and the following new 
construction is given with proposed dates of completion : 

GERMAN NAVY— NEW CONSTRUCTION— DREADNOUGHT TYPE 

Compl'd Displace- 

m— Name ment Main armament Speed 

1914- Grosser Kurfurst 25,388] f 220 

r9i4--Markgraf 25,388 I ^„ ^ . . 22^0 

i9i4..K6mg 25,388 f 1° l2-mch ^2.0 

1915. .Kronprmz 25,388 I I 22.0 

l9i6.."T" 28,5001 f 23.0 

1916. .Ersatz Worth 28,500 i 8 is-inch \ 23.0 

1917. -Ersatz Fr'd'h III 28,500 J [ 230 




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250 



APPENDIX 251 

The German battle cruisers in the known building pro- 
gramme were as follows at the date of the battle of 
Jutland : 

GERMAN NAVY— BATTLE CRUISERS 

Compl'd Displace- 
in — Name ment Main armament Speed 

1910. .Von der Tann 19,100 8 ii-inch 27.6 

i9ii..Moltke 22.632 \ •, f 28.4 

l9i3..SeydUtz 24,38s / '° "'"''''' \ 29 2 

1914. .Derfflmger 28,000) [ 27.0 

I9iS-.Lutzow 28,000 I a ..^ :„„i, I 27.0 

(916. .Ersatz Hertha 28,000 » I2-mcn ^7,0 

1917. .E'tz Vic'a Louise 28,000 J 1 27.0 

To the above must be added the battle cruiser Salamis, 
building for Greece, which the Germans took over early 
in the war. 

In the battle of Jutland the German High Seas Fleet 
is given as sixteen dreadnoughts, five battle cruisers, and 
six predreadnoughts. The battle cruiser Liitzow was lost 
in the battle. The details of the remaining ships are 
shown in the above list. 

In the months that have followed Jutland it is im- 
probable that any great addition has been made to the 
building programme of the German fleet, but Germany 
has built some new light cruisers, some destroyers and 
numerous air craft. There must have been a strong tax 
on their yards for repairs ; the original ships of the pro- 
gramme were to be completed, and there must have been 
a great effort to turn out submarines for their latest 
offensive. As in the case of the British fleet, it is prob- 
ably safe to conclude that there has been no abnormal 
increase of their fighting fleet. 

The German dreadnoughts are known to be well built 
and able ships, but in many of them the arrangement 
of the turrets hampers the guns. Eight dreadnoughts 
have the design of the Helgoland (Fig. 2), five {Kaiser 



252 APPENDIX 

class, Fig. 8) have the echelon arrangement shown in the 
diagrams, and seven have the turrets aligned over the 
keel. 

The German predreadnought battleships, although 
they are valuable assets to the German Navy, are not as 
good as the corresponding British ships and American 
ships of the same date. 

Of the German dreadnoughts four carry ii-inch guns, 
thirteen carry 12-inch guns, and three 15-inch guns. 
These last are the ships of the Ersatz Worth class (Fig. 
9) in the list given, and, from the evidence of Jutland, 
it is doubtful if all are completed. These twenty Ger- 
man dreadnoughts built and building carry forty-eight 
11 -inch, one hundred and thirty 12-inch, and, when the 
three Ersatz Worths are completed, twenty-four 15-inch 
guns. 

THE UNITED STATES NAVY 

The United States Navy has been the leader in the de- 
velopment of the "all-big-gun" battleship of to-day, 
called the "dreadnought." From the first single-turret 
ship, the Monitor, to the two-turret monitors, then to the 
U. S. S. Roanoke (Fig. 10)— these were the three great 
strides in such ships designed by the United States Navy 
in the epoch-making times of the civil war, which led to 
the plan of big guns in turrets aligned over the keel. 

In the recognised first essentials of sea power the 
strength of the United States Navy is given as follows : 

UNITED STATES NAVY-BUILT AND BUILDING 

Dreadnoughts _ 

Predreadnought battleships '. '. '. '. ] '. [ '. '. . ' ." ." ' .' .' ' .' .' .' ' ai 

, The United States Navy has no battle cruisers. 



fn ....?:{ 



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FIG. 10— U. S. S. ROANOKE, 1863 
(;Sea-going Turret Vessel) 

Armament, two is-inch, two ii-inch, two iso-pdr. rifled guns Armor, 
1 54 in. wrought-iron deck in two layers of ^ in. each, and side armor, 
454 in. at top. 354 in. at bottom; wrought-iron plates 4 ft. below and 6 ft, 
above water-line. 




FIG. II— U. S. S. MICHIGAN, 1909 

Armament, eight 12-in. 45 cal. B. L. R., twenty-two 3-in. 50 cal. R. F., 
four 3-pdr. saluting. Armor belt. 10 in., 11 in., 12 in., at top; 8 in., 9 in., 
10 in., at bottom. Casemate, 8 in. at top; 10 in. at bottom. Side plating 
forward and aft, i54-in. nickel steel. Protective deck forward, i^-in., 
aft. 3-in. nickel steel.i 

' By courtesy of U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. 



253 




254 



APPENDIX 255 

As the object of this article is to give the strength 
of the navies at corresponding stages of their building 
programmes, two of the dreadnoughts should be omitted 
from this list, the Tennessee and California, as their per- 
centage completed is small. The three ships of the class 
of the Mississippi, recently launched, should be included 
on this basis, as these three ships might be hurried to com- 
pletion. Consequently, the dreadnoughts in the corre- 
sponding programme of the United States Navy should 
be fifteen. 

In Fig. 13 is given the plan of U. S. S. Pennsylvania. 
As will be seen, this ship is the developed design of the 
Michigan, with three guns in each turret instead of two. 
The recent building programme of our first-line dread- 
nought battleships is given below : 

Comp'd Displace- Speed 

in — Name ment Armament Knots 

1912. .Arkansas 26,000 1 • ( 21.05 

19 1 2. .Wyoming 26,000/ iz-i" j 21.22 

1913.. Texas 27,000 10 14-in 21.0 

1914. .New York 27,000 10 14-in 21.0 

igiS-Nevada 27,500 1 ■ / 20.5 

1915-. Oklahoma 27,500 / ^° ^4-in ^ 30.05 

1916. .Pennsylvania 31,400 1 ,„ , . _, 

1916.. Arizona 31.400 ( " i4-m 21.05 

Idaho 32,000 I 

Mississippi 32,000 \ 12 14-in 21.0 

New Mexico 32,000 J 

The twelve dreadnoughts completed of the battle fleet 
carry sixty-four 1 2-inch guns and sixty- four 14-inch 
guns. The three ships of the Mississippi class will add 
thirty-six 14-inch guns to this total. 

In addition to these, the two ships of the Michigan 
class carry sixteen 12-inch guns. Of the other pre- 
dreadnought battleships six carry twenty-four 45-calibre 
12-inch guns, and eight carry thirty-two 40-calibre 12- 
inch guns. 




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256 



APPENDIX 257 

UNITED STATES VESSELS BUILDING AND AUTHORISED 

Name Displace- Main Where 

Battleships ment Speed battery building 

Tennessee 32,300 21 12 14-in. New York 

California 32,300 21 12 14-m. Mare Island 

Colorado l f Camden 

KSon::::::::: 32.600 2x s xa-in. Newpo- News 

W. Virginia J I Newport News 



No. 49 

so 

SI 

52 

S3 

54 

Battle Cruisers 
No. 



Characteristics not determined 



.33.000 35 10 14-m. 



3 

4, 

5 > . . . • Characteristics not determined. 
o 

Scout Cruisers 

No. 4 Seattle 



13 



7.100 3S 



, . Characteristics not determined 



From the foregoing table it will be seen that a great in- 
crease of the United States Navy has been authorised. 
As this is for future years it has nothing to do with 
the present comparison. It should be added that many 
destroyers are also being rushed to completion. 

THE FRENCH NAVY 

The French Navy was for many years second only 
to the British Navy, but in the abnormal increase from 
1906 to 1911 there was no effort made to keep pace with 
Great Britain and Germany — and this was probably wise 
from the peculiar situation of France. The strength of 
the French Navy in the main accepted essentials is as 
follows : 




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258 



APPENDIX 259 

FRENCH NAVY— BUILT AND BUILDING 

Dreadnoughts 12 

Predreadnought battleships 17 

The French Navy has no battle cruisers. 

The known recent building programme is as follows : 

Comp'd Displace- Speed 

in — Name ment Armament Knots 

191S . . Bretagne 23,172 1 

1915. .Loraine 23,172 ^10 13. 4-inch 20. 

1915. .Provence 23,172 I 

1916. . Normandie 24,828 | 

1916. .Languedoc 24,828 

1916. .Flandre 24,828 [12 13.4-inch 21. S 

1916. .Gascogne 24,828 

1917 • . Beam 24,828 J 

As will be seen from the plans of the Normandie 
given in Fig. 14, the French have three turrets aligned 
over the keel — but with four guns in each turret. No 
other navy has adopted this arrangement of guns. The 
French have always designed and built good battleships 
— and French ships have been of great use in the Medi- 
terranean and elsewhere. It is now known that equality 
in heavy artillery on the western battle front was only 
established by use of the French naval guns (Fig. 15). 

In auxiliaries of the battle fleet France is well 
equipped. Her submarines in particular are known to be 
very good, although, as has been the case with the British 
Navy, there has not been much chance to use them. 

THE JAPANESE NAVY 

The strength of the Japanese Navy in the first essen- 
tials in the known building programme is as follows : 

JAPANESE NAVY— BUILT AND BUILDING 

Dreadnoughts 6 

Predreadnought battleships 13 

Battle cruiser^ ,..,.,,,........... 4 




FIG. 15— FRENCH NAVAL GUN AT WESTERN FRONT. 
260 



APPENDIX 261 

The recent building programme, so far as known, is 
as follows; 

DREADNOUGHTS 

Comp'd Displace- Speed 

in — Name ment Armament Knots 

1912. .Kawachi 20,800 \ ^^ ,^ • „, „„ _ 

i9i2..Settsu 2o;8oo h^ ^2-mch 20.5 

1915 . . Fu-So 30,600 I 

1916. .Yamashiro 30,6oo ■ , ^ 

I9i6..1se 30,600 " <'ncJi ^2.0 

1917. .Hinga 30,600 J 

BATTLE CRUISERS 

1913-Kongo '. 27,500 \ T^ i-nnTn / 28.0 

i9i4-.Hiyei 27,500 f ^ ^4-mch | ^7.0 

1914-Kmshima 27,500 j „ •, < 28.0 

i9iS..Haruna 27,500 / *^ ^4 men | ^8.0 



The first two dreadnoughts have the arrangement of 
the turrets of the German Helgoland class (Fig. 2). 
The four dreadnoughts of the Fu-So class (Fig. 16) are 
formidable battleships which have followed the design 
of the U. S. S. Arkansas (Fig. 12). As a matter of 
course Japan, like the other nations at war, has given 
out no naval information since she entered the war. Un- 
doubtedly there has been a great increase of the Japanese 
building programme, but it is not probable that any new 
capital ships are ready for service. 

As in the case of the British Navy, it will be noted 
that the Japanese naval programme did not include bat- 
tle cruisers for completion later than 1915. Whether 
or not other ships of this class have been recently laid 
down is not known. The four battle cruisers in the 
Japanese building programme probably make up the most 
powerful squadron of their class afloat to-day. 

In all the auxiliaries of the battle fleet it may be as- 
sumed that the progressive Japanese are well equipped. 






^^ ^ 
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3 



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263 



264 APPENDIX 

In guns It is probable that they are going to larger cali- 
bres, as is the United States Navy. 



THE RUSSIAN NAVY 

In the matter of sea power Russia has been at a dis- 
advantage through being obliged to maintain two sepa- 
rate navies — the Baltic fleet and the Black Sea fleet. 
This unusual condition has come from closing the Darda- 
nelles to Russian warships. Their strength in first es- 
sentials is as follows : 

RUSSIAN NAVY— BUILT AND BUILDING 

Dreadnoughts 7 

Predreadnought battleships 7 

Battle cruisers 4 

The known building programme of dreadnoughts is as 
follows : 



Comp'd Displace- Speed 

in — Name ment Armament Knots 



1914 
1914 
1914 
1914 
1914 
191S 
1915 



.Sevastopol 23,026 

. Petropavlovsk 23,026 I ■ , 

.Poltava 23,026 1^^^^^'^'='^ ^^-O 

. Gangoot 23,026 J 

. Imp'sa Maria , 22,435 1 

.Imp. Alex III 22,435 \ 12 12-inch 21. 

. Ekaterina II 22,435 



Of these the last three are for the Black Sea fleet. It 
will be observed that the Russian dreadnoughts (Fig. 
18) carry four turrets in the centre line with three guns 
in each turret. 

RUSSIAN BATTLE CRUISERS 

Comp'd Displace- Speed 

in — Name ment Armament Eiiots 

1916. . Navarin 32,000 ] 

1916. .Borodino 32,000 I ^- .,. •„!, „,. ^ 

1916.. Ismail 321000 h^ M-"i<=li 2S.O 

1916. .Kinbum 32,000 J 



n 3 
urn 






f:^ 



S'iji 




265 



^66 APPENDIX 

In these Russian battle cruisers we find again the de- 
sign of three guns in each turret instead of two. 

Knowing the pressure that the war has brought upon 
Russia, it seems impossible that this building programme 
of dreadnoughts and battle cruisers has been completed 
in any degree that would make the Russian Navy a fac- 
tor in the balance of sea power at this time. 

Russia, however, is well provided with destroyers, 
having an unusual number of these craft for a navy of 
its size. 

THE ITALIAN NAVY 

The corresponding strength of the Italian Navy is as 
follows : 

ITALIAN NAVY— BUILT AND BUILDING 

Dreadnoughts 9 

Predreadnought battleships 7 

The Italian Navy has no battle cruisers. The latest 
construction in the known building programme is as fol- 
lows: 



Comp'd Displace- Annament Speed 

in — Name ment Knots 

1913. .Giulio Cesare 22,022 13 12-inch 22.5 

1914. 
1915- 
191S 
1917. 
I9I7. 
1917. 
1917. .F'co-Morosini 30,000 



C'ti di Cavour 22,022 13 12-inch 22.5 

Andrea Doria 22,564 

Duilio 22,564 

. Carra;iolG 30,000 



. Mar'o-Collona 30,000 I o ^r- ; u „- «. 

.C'ro-Colombo soiooo ^ ^ 'S-mch 25.0 



The Italian naval constructors have been very skilful 
— and the above is an advanced programme calculated 
to make Italy, if not a great naval power, a valuable ally 
to any naval power. The turret plan shown in Fig. 19 
should be noted, as it provides an ingenious way of 



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267 



268 APPENDIX 

mounting thirteen heavy guns — and it is unique among 
the navies of the world. 

But, again in the case of Italy, it must be realised that 
the country has probably been too much occupied in other 
fields to carry out this ambitious naval programme. 

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NAVY 

Austria-Hungary's known strength in first essentials of 
sea power is given as follows : 

Dreadnoughts 8 

Predreadnought battleships 6 

The Austro-Hungarian Navy has no battle cruisers. 
The recent known building programme is as follows: 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NAVY— BUILT AND BUILDING 

Comp'd Displace- Speed 

in — • Name ment Armament Knots 

1912. .Viribus Unitis 20,010 1 

1913. .Tegetthoff 20,010 > 12 12-Lnch 21. 

1914. .Prinz Eugen 20,010 J 

1914. .Szent Istvan 20,010 12 12-inch 21.0 

(1). . . .One ship 24,500 ] 

(1)... .One ship 24,500 1 ^„ ,, . ■ t, _, „ 

i)....Oneship 24:500 PO i3.S-mch 21. 

C) One ship 24,500 J 

1 Time due to be completed unknown. 

It is improbable that this programme has been carried 
through to any degree. It is much more likely that with 
German assistance Austria-Hungary has been devoting 
her energies to submarines — and has thus become a fac- 
tor in the war of destruction now being waged in the 
Mediterranean. 



For details of naval construction of these Principal 
Powers see the following tables: 




269 



270 



APPENDIX 

NAVAL STRENGTH, JULY. 1914 



n 


Great Britain 


Germany 




Built 


Building 


Built 


Building 




No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 


No. 


■• Tons 


No. 


Tons 


Dreadnoughts .... 

Battleships 

Battle Cruisers. . . 
Armored Cruisers. 


20 

40 
9 
34 
74 
167 
75 


423,350 
589,38s 
187,800 
406,800 
382,815 
125,850 
30,362 


16 

I 

17 
21 
22 


421,750 

28,500 

67,000 
21,770 
17,236 


13 

20 

4 

9 

41 

130 

27 


285,770 
242,800 
88,749 
94,245 
150,747 
67,094 
14,140 


7 

4 

5 
24 
18 


187,164 
112,000 
26,900 


Destroyers 

Submarines 


14,400 
14,400 


Total Tonnage all 
Types 


2,714,106 


1,306,577 






Guns 11" to 15".. . 


564 


320 


Active Personnel . . 


150,609 


79,197 


Appropriation for 
1913-14 


$237,530,459 


$112,091,125 



The above table was prepared and arranged by C. H. Foster, U. S. N. A. 
(References: Navy Year Book 1914: Brassey: Reports published by office of 
U. S. Naval Intelligence, etc., etc.) 



APPENDIX 

NAVAL STRENGTH, JULY, 1914 (.Continued) 



271 



France 


Austria-Hungary 


Russia 


Built 


Building 


Built 


Building 


Built 


Building 


No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 


4 
18 

20 

9 

84 

64 


92,368 
262,67s 

201,724 
46,09s 
3S.8I2 
27,940 


8 

3 
22 


193.656 

2,653 
14,766 


3 

6 

2 

5 

18 

6 


60,030 

74.613 

13.380 

13.81S 

9.450 

1,686 


4 

5 
6 


93,510 

21,216 
5.370 


7 

6 

9 

91 

30 


98,750 

63,500 

52.845 

36.748 

6,506 


7 

4 

8 
44 
i9 


159.409 

128,000 

53.600 
53.664 
13.284 


899.915 


347.S08 


678,818 


204 


90 


160 


63,846 


19.531 


52,463 


$90,164,625 


$29,928,575 ' 


$117,508,657 



1 Estimates given in the Fleet Annual, 1914, page 112. 



WARSHIP TONNAGE OF THE PRINCIPAL NAVAL POWERS 

NUMBER AND DISPLACEMENT OF WARSHIPS. BUILT AND BUILDING. OF 1,500 OR MORE TONS. AND OF TORPEDO CRAFT OF MORE THAN 30 TONS 

[Office of Naval Intelligence. Navy Department Table 25. July I. 1916.*] 



1 


Oreat Britain' 




Ocrmany 




Un 


ited States 
Oct. I 


' corrected to 
. 1916 


France 


Japan 


Riissia 


Ualy 


Aujtritt.Hungary 


Type of vessel 


Built 


Building 


Built 


B 


jilding 




B.nilt 


Building 


Built 


Building 


Built 


Building 


Built 


Building 


Built 


Building 


Built 


UuUdinR 




No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 
(esti- 
mated) 


No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 
(esti- 
mated) 


No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 
(esti- 
mated) 


No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 
(esti- 
mated) 


No, 


Tons 


No, 


Tons 
(esti- 
mated) 


No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 
(esti- 
mated) 


No. 


Tons 


No. 


Tons 
(esti- 
nmtoil) 


No. 


Tom 


No, 


(Mli- 

iimttxU 


,.)' 


40 


4Z3.350 
589.385 




421.000 


13 
2 
4 


4> 
130 


285,770 
242.800 
8,168 
88.749 
94.24s 
150,747 
67,094 


7 


187.052 


4 


307.450 
297.936 
12.900 


S 


160.600 


3 
18 


69,276 

262,675 

8,800 


9 


216.748 


13 

13 
13 
50 
27 
13 


41.600 

191.3S0 

9.086 

55.000 
138,483 

57,915 

20,487 

i?5J 


4 


132,400 






7 


159,409 


i 


62,644 
96.100 


7 


187.150 


3 
J 


fto.ojo 
74.613 
41.700 

13.380 

13,5 IS 
0.450 
ft.8S2 
1,685 


5 

5 





Datuosmps J^J^I] 1 J^ „ ,1 , ,1 


7 


98.750 
10.380 




Dattleslnps IP . , 
































Loast-ucionao esse . . 




M 
74 
167 
■W 
7S 


188,200 
40S.200 
382,81s 
125,850 
1 1, .188 
30,3f'2 




28,500 


4 


110. 17s 










= 


55.000 


4 


128,000 












IjQttic cruisers 


■4 
54 


140.080 
66,410 
45.877 






9 
84 
135 
64 


201,724 
46,09s 
35,812 
13.426 
27.940 






6 
9 
91 
14 
30 


63.SOO 

52.S45 
36.748 
2.132 
6.S06 


9 

6 
36 
68 
to 


74.020 
18.830 
16.807 
u,Sfl4 
5. -175 


15 

2 
8 


' 4,8S8 

14.JO3 

272 

5,842 






21 


67,000 
21,770 


S 
24 


26.900 
14.400 














8 
44 


53.600 
53.664 




Torpralo-imat (icstroyere 


9 


9.9 1 1 


3 


2.653 


= 


1.676 


"•■'"' 


SulMiuiriiicB ■ 




17.236 


27 


14.140 


18 


14,400 


44 




31 




22 


14.766 


2 


1.200 


19 


I3.2S4 






S.3;n 


Total toiw built antl total tons buildind 


2,[.S«,2S0 




SSS,So6 




9SI.7I3 




352,927 




870.653 




170.511 




665.748 




234.167 




519,640 




180.276 




270. S61 




4o;.057 




28.'i,46o 




212,355 




9ai,s>6 




IS0,4Dj 


Total tons built and builtlins 


2,7I3.75(i 


1 .304,640 




1.04 


.164 


899 .9 1 5 


699.916 


6:S..'ii,s 


407.81.'! 


37«.noR 



•■ Due to the Europe; 



[.500 tons a 



current program for which contracts have not been awarded. 
n battery of all big guns (ii inches or more in caliber), except South 
li ari.' not cmsiflcTed as dreadnoughts because of low speed. 

I'-n r :;-,. ,r. t- : : ilisplacement, whose main batteries are of more than 

■* ■': ' ,; ■!;■ ■■ 1 Michigan. 

, : .iHber in main battery and capable of taking their 

ij I 1' 1 1' ii ; rhoy have an increase of speed at the expense of car- 
ttery and a 'lecrcasc in armor protection. 



L* classed 

I have been sacrificed I _ _ . 

all cruisers except the smallest and oldest 



Scouts are considorud as 

oxtremo spuod. The word 

hftvcprntec- 



narmored warships of more th; 
in which battery and protectii 
"protected" has been omitted because 
live decks. 

The following vessels are not included in the tables: 

Ships over 20 years old from date of launch, unlcfss they have been roconstructod and rcomiod 
within S years. 

Torpedo craft over 15 years old. 

Those not actually begun or ordered, although authorized. 

Transports, colliers, repair ships, torpedo ships, or other auxiliaries. 

Vessels of less tha*n 1,500 tons, except torpedo craft. 

Torpedo craft of less than so tons. 

Vessels undergoing trials are considered as completed. 



"EMDEN" EXPLOITS 

Excerpts from articles by Commander L. A. Cotton, 
U.S.N., and Lieutenant H. von Miicke {Executive officer 
of "Emden"), the latter translated by Lieutenant-Com' 
mander J. H. Klein, Jr., U. S. N. — reprinted by courtesy 
of the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. 

IN a war of the size and extent of the Great World 
War, the magnitude and importance of the major 
operations are apt to make one overlook operations of 
lesser military importance in other fields that may be 
very instructive to those interested in the art of war, and 
that may illustrate principles of universal application. 
Of such a nature seem to be the exploits of the Emden 
in the Far East during the first few months of the war. 

The Emden was a small German cruiser of 3600 tons 
displacement, having two masts and three funnels and 
armed with ten 4.1 -inch and eight 5-pounder guns and 
two submerged torpedo tubes. Her speed was about 25 
knots and her maximum coal capacity 900 tons. 

In the early days of August, 1914, the little Emden was 
in the harbour of Tsingtao in the German leased territory 
of Kiaochow in the province of Shantung, China. She did 
not remain there for many days, however, for on August 
6 she inaugurated her war career by capturing a Russian 
volunteer-fleet vessel near Quelpart Island. The Emden 

273 



274. APPENDIX 

accompanied her prize into Tsingtao, filled her bunkers 
and got out at sunrise the next morning. 

Of the Emden's subsequent movements her Executive 
officer writes: "During the evening of August 12, we 
came in the neighbourhood of the island where we ex- 
pected to meet the cruiser squadron and found the out- 
post vessels. In the middle lay the powerful cruisers 
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, with colliers alongside busy 
coaling. Farther to the left the slender Nurnberg, also 
engaged in coaling. Scattered about in the harbour were 
a number of large and small tenders and auxiliaries of 
the squadron. The Emden was ordered to anchor in the 
right half of the harbour, close to the flagship. Rousing 
cheers were exchanged between ships as we passed the 
other vessels and soon thereafter our anchor splashed — 
the last time for a long while. 

"The captain reported aboard the flagship for orders 
from the squadron commander, and made the proposal to 
him to detach the Emden from the squadron and to send 
her to the Indian Ocean to carry on a cruise of 'com- 
merce destruction.' 

"The next day saw the squadron in column, followed 
by the colliers, on an easterly course. The squadron 
commander had not yet made known his decision in re- 
gard to our captain's proposal and we were all eager to 
know what his conclusions were. Along toward midday 
several signals were hoisted high on the flagship : 'Em- 
den detached, wish you much success,' read the signal. 
In an elegant turn our ship sheered out of column, a 
'thank-you' signal for the squadron commander's wishes 
at the mast head, then a semaphore to the Markomannia, 
'Remain with Emden^ and soon, on an opposite course, 



' APPENDIX 275 

we lost sight of the other ships of the squadron. All 
knew that we had seen each other for the last time. 

"We had now reached the point where, in order to 
reach the open ocean, we had to pass through the narrow 
straits. These straits swarmed with fishing craft and 
such other small ships. The nights being bright moon- 
light, the Emden was visible for a considerable distance. 
The captain did not relish the idea of meeting so many 
sailing vessels. He spoke to me about it, saying that he 
wished to avoid meeting any sort of ship for fear our 
presence and course in those waters would become known 
to everybody. All the English men-of-war had either 
two or four smokepipes ; none had three like the Emden. 
Then I conceived the idea of building us a fourth smoke- 
pipe. Immediately I had all the deck-strips brought out. 
These are rolls of heavy sail cloth, about two meters 
wide, laid on the decks as a protection to the linoleum. 
In the upper end we sewed a wooden batten and then 
hoisted this improvised smokepipe forward of our regu- 
lar forward smokepipe. As viewed from the side the 
effect was good. But from forward its appearance was 
exceedingly faulty ; it did not have the necessary thick- 
ness of its step-brothers. It was only a few millimeters 
thick. . But in the hurry of that first night, nothing bet- 
ter could be accomplished. I proposed to the captain to 
build a better fourth smokepipe, to which he agreed. 
And the next day we began the work. Soon we had built, 
by means of wooden laths and sail cloth, an elegant 
smokepipe, and when this was in place we resembled the 
English cruiser Yarmouth. I purposely had the smoke- 
pipe made oval as the Yarmouth had one that shape. 
Our trailer Markomannia was ordered out to a position 



276 APPENDIX 

on our beam, and according to her suggestions (by sig- 
nal) we improved the position of the fourth smokepipe. 
We then painted the marks to simulate overhearing of 
the outer casting of the smokepipe, so that from now on 
we could, at any time, day or night, hoist our fake. 

"And so we arrived in the Bay of Bengal at the end 
of the first week in September. For about five days an 
English warship, probably the Minotaur, steamed 
parallel to and close by us, as we knew by the strength of 
her radio signals. By and by her signals became weaker 
until they ceased entirely. We did not sight her." 

The next time the Emden was heard from she was in 
the Bay of Bengal, a matter of 4000 miles from Tsingtao 
even by direct route and in what may be termed the heart 
of the enemy's sea area. On September 14 the Italian 
S. S. Loredoro arrived off Calcutta and reported that she 
had on the previous day been held up by the Emden, and 
on September 16 the British S. S. Kabinga arrived with 
the crews of five other British steamers that had been 
sunk by the Emden in the Bay of Bengal between Septem- 
ber 10 and 14. 

Since there was no German prize court available, the 
Emden proceeded with her captures as follows : The 
first ship captured was manned with a prize crew and 
forced to accompany the Emden. Then when the sec- 
ond capture was made the more valuable of the two cap- 
tured ships was sunk by a mine or by gun fire, after the 
crew had been removed to the other vessel or to the 
Emden. This procedure was followed with each subse- 
quent capture until the captured personnel became too 



APPENDIX 277 

numerous to be accommodated when they were all placed 
upon the one remaining ship and she was released. 

On September 16 it was learned that the Emden had 
coaled on the previous day in False Bay (British) about 
120 miles from Calcutta. Three British cruisers and 
three French destroyers were sent in pursuit, a pursuit 
that proved to be long if not merry. 

On September 18 the quarry was located — but not by 
a man-of-war — about 20 miles off the mouth of Rangoon 
River, she having sunk the day before the British S. S. 
Clan Matheson. One Japanese cruiser now joined in 
the chase, which proceeded apace. 

Doubling back across the Bay of Bengal the Emden 
appeared next about a mile off the harbour of Madras at 
nine o'clock at night on September 22. The Madras light 
was lighted and working, and the lights of the city were 
all ablaze. The first intimation to those on shore that 
an enemy was near was the turning on of the search- 
lights of the Emden. Quickly picking up the large oil 
tanks of the Burma Oil Company she opened fire upon 
them. A few salvos and they were burning briskly. Fir- 
ing ceased, search-lights were extinguished and the Em- 
den disappeared into the darkness whence she had come. 
She had in these few minutes inflicted a damage of more 
than $100,000. 

From Madras she steamed slowly down the coast, ap- 
pearing off Pondicherry on September 24, having cap- 
tured and sunk five more British steamers in the mean- 
time. At this stage a British cruiser seems to have been 
within 50 miles of the Emden, but the latter appeared 
to be able to determine with fatalistic accuracy alike 



278 APPENDIX 

where enemy merchantmen were and men-of-war were 
not. 

About this time, a Russian cruiser joined in the 
"Emden hunt," but unrestrained the Emden passed out 
of the Bay of Bengal, around Ceylon, and lay athwart 
the Aden-Colombo trade route. To the westward of 
Ceylon up to September 27 she sank five more British 
steamers and captured a collier with 7000 tons of Welsh 
coal. 

During the first two weeks of October the Emden was 
rumoured to be in the Makassar Strait, each of Borneo, at 
Padang on the Straits of Malakka and southeast of 
Sumatra, but in reality she seems to have been far away 
at Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago. There she 
cleaned her boilers, was heeled over and had her bottom 
scraped and painted as far as practicable. Then she 
steamed north again to near the Laccadive Islands. 
Here from October 15 to 19 she sank five more steamers 
and a large Tasmanian dredger and captured another 
large collier. Meanwhile two more Japanese cruisers and 
one more Russian cruiser joined the searching force. 

All trace of the Emden was lost for ten days, and she 
made her next appearance 1700 miles from where she had 
been last reported. 

At early dawn on October 29 the quiet of a sultry sum- 
mer night still hung over the harbour of Penang (Brit- 
ish). The puffing little tugs and launches and the many 
sampans that give to eastern harbours their appearance 
of unusual animation, lay moored to the wharves or an- 
chored near by, and sleep still held alike the people 
ashore and afloat. It was the hour so well known to all 
sailors at which a lamp is worse than useless, yet without 



APPENDIX 279 

which objects can be seen but dimly. The mist of the 
tropical morning began to lift from the harbour, slowly 
rolling up as though it were a curtain being lifted from 
a mammoth stage whereon some terrible tragedy was 
soon to be enacted. 

Slowly from around the point to the eastward a steamer 
appeared, indistinct as to details and vague as to char- 
acteristics, but to the trained eye clearly a man-of-war. 
Any naval officer can picture to himself what followed on 
board the Russian cruiser Jemtchug peacefully lying at 
anchor in the harbour. Suddenly the quartermaster on 
watch sings out "Man-of-war standing in from the east- 
ward, sir!" "Make her out," replies the officer of the 
watch, started from the boredom of the first part of the 
morning watch. For a moment the quartermaster gazes 
through his spy glass, and answers "Two-masted cruiser, 
with four funnels, sir !" "Very well," comes from the 
officer of the watch, with an admonition to keep a bright 
lookout on the incoming cruiser, and report her actions. 
Doubtless the officer of the watch was momentarily 
alarmed when the ship was first sighted, but he was 
quickly reassured, for the only cruisers with four funnels 
in the waters of the Far East were British and Japanese, 
both friends. Of course, the ship slowly standing in 
around the point must be the British cruiser Yarmouth, 
thought he, or one of the Chikuma class of Japanese 
cruisers, all known to be in near-by waters. Slowly and 
with outward calm the stranger stood in for the usual 
anchorage of the Yarmouth, next the berth of the 
Jemtchug. Now she has reached a point on the 
J emtchug' s beam and only about 300 yards away. On 
the stranger all are tense and alert, while on the Jemtchug 



280 APPENDIX 

sleep still holds the crew and officers — the last sleep for 
many, the next few moments proved. Suddenly the Ger- 
man ensign fluttered from the stranger's truck, a flash of 
light rippled along her broadside and a salvo hurled death 
and destruction into the inert Jemtchug. The tragedy 
had begun. As those on the Jemtchug sprang from their 
bunks to the sound of steel crashing through steel, of 
bursting shell and shrieks of pain, a torpedo sent a quiver 
throughout the ship as it let loose its energy beneath her. 
Torn by shell and sundered by torpedo and listing badly, 
the Jemtchug began to sink at once, but a few more salvos 
in rapid succession and a second torpedo made assur- 
ance doubly sure as the curtain of smoke rolled down 
where the curtain of mist had so recently lifted. When 
in turn the curtain of smoke began to lift, only the masts 
of the Jemtchug were visible above the blood-stained 
water, as the struggling survivors cried for help, which 
the now wide-awake harbour promptly gave. Disappear- 
ing out the western entrance of the harbour was the in- 
strument of destruction, the Emden, for the stranger 
was none other than she. With the aid of a dummy 
funnel and the artistic use of paint and canvas she had 
succeeded in her disguise as the Yarmouth in the early 
morning light, and now was rapidly disappearing from 
view unscathed and undaunted. 

The engagement, if engagement it may be called, lasted 
scarcely a quarter of an hour, but the destruction of the 
Jemtchug was complete. Her casualties reached the total 
of one officer and 84 men killed and two officers and 
112 men wounded, being approximately 60 per cent of 
her complement. 

As the Emden steamed out of the harbour she fired on 



APPENDIX 281 

a patrol boat, but only damaged her slightly. Outside 
she came upon the outer-patrol, the French destroyer 
Mousquet, and quickly sank her by gun fire. She stopped 
long enough to pick up the survivors of the Mousquet, 36 
men and officers, and further out stopped a British 
steamer to which she transferred them. Then she again 
disappeared into her habitat, the high sea. Two French 
destroyers at anchor in Penang harbour quickly raised 
steam and gave chase, but in vain, for the Emden was 
not seen again for more than 10 days. 

After the Penang raid, two more cruisers, two gun- 
boats, three destroyers and an armed merchant cruiser 
were added to those exclusively engaged in searching 
for the Emden. This brought the number so engaged 
up to 19 all told, and in addition a large force was being 
used in convoy duty in the Far East, almost entirely 
on account of the Emden s activities. 

The next exploit of the Emden brought to an end her 
eventful career. At daylight on November 9 she ran in 
for the harbour on South Keeling Island in the Cocos or 
Keeling group. She still had her dummy funnel rigged, 
but its effectiveness as a disguise had vanished with the 
Penang exploit. The harbour on South Keeling is an 
important British submarine cable and radio station. As 
soon as the Emden was sighted, the word was cabled to 
London, Adelaide, Perth and Singapore, but what was 
more important, it was flashed into the air by radio that 
all who could might hear. 

Passing near the Cocos Islands was an army exf)edi- 
tion from Australia, bound for the Suez Canal and with 
it, thanks largely to the Emden menace, was a strong 
naval convoy. The Emden used her radio outfit to the 



282 APPENDIX 

best of her ability to interfere with the message being 
sent, but the keen ear of the radio operator on the Brit- 
ish cruiser Minotaur caught it just the same. One of the 
units of the convoy was the Australian cruiser Sydney. 
Faster, larger and more powerful than the Emden, she 
was just the ship for the job at hand, and away she 
steamed full speed for South Keeling and the Emden. 

Meanwhile the Emden had entered the harbour and 
immediately landed a party of five officers, seven petty 
officers and 35 men, who proceeded to destroy the radio 
and cable-stations. The Emden stood back to the har- 
bour entrance to keep watch. Apparently her captain 
was somewhat worried about the radio message that had 
been sent, for at 8.45 he steamed in again and recalled 
his landing force by flag signals and by siren. The party 
did not respond promptly enough, and at 9.30 the Em- 
den, leaving her landing party behind, headed out at 
full speed as the Sydney came charging up.^ 

The action began at the harbour entrance at a range 
of only about 4000 yards. Before she turned to head 
away, the Emden fired a broadside salvo that injured 
both fire control stations on the Sydney and destroyed 
one of her range finders. The Sydney had 2 knots su- 
periority in speed, and she also had 6-inch guns 
against the Emden s 4.1 -inch guns. Slowly the Sydney 

The Emden landing force consisting of five officers, seven 
petty officers and thirty-seven men, seized the schooner Ayesha, 
and sailed for Arabia. On the i6th of December the Ayesha, 
was wrecked in Seaflower Channel and the crew transferred 
to the Lloyd liner Choising. Finally they were landed on the 
Arabian coast of the Red Sea, made their way overland to 
Turkey, and thence back to Germany, 



APPENDIX 283 

hauled out and up, and brought her broadside to bear, 
almost out of range of the Emdens battery. Soon the 
Emden lost a funnel, and almost immediately thereafter 
a mast. Then another funnel went by the board, and 
fire broke out aft. Handicapped by her landing party left 
ashore, outranged and outstripped by her larger adver- 
sary, the Emden ran on the reef at North Keeling. With 
flag still flying, and burning fiercely, she still continued 
firing her one available gun, and not until the Sydney 
had reluctantly fired three more salvos into her, was the 
flag hauled down on the mass of blackened and twisted 
steel that had been the Emden. She made a game fight 
against heavy odds, as is freely admitted by her van- 
quishers. 

The casualties on the Emden, as is usual with the van- 
quished in a naval action, were enormous, only four 
officers and about 75 men being saved, and a number of 
these were wounded. The Sydney was but little dam- 
aged, and her casualties amounted only to three killed 
and 15 wounded. 

ITINERARY OF EMDEN 
Location 1914 Remarks 

Yellow Sea August 2 Outbreak of war 

Tsingtao (arrived) August s » 

Tsingtao (left) August 7 

Met fleet, probably at Lamo- August 12 

trek Island (Caroline group) 
Entered Bay of Bengal September 4 1 Route uncertain, Aug. 12- 

Sept. 4 

Off Calcutta, India September 10-14 

Off Rangoon September 18 i 

Madras September 22 Bombardment 

Off Colombo September 30 

Diego Garcia October 5-10 i 

Off Minokoi Island October 15-20 

Penang October 28 Sank Zemtchug and Mous- 

quet 

Straits of Sunda November 1-6 > 

Keeling, Cocos Island November 9 Destroyed by Australian 

cruiser Sydney 

1 Indicates approximate dates. 

The Emden caused in all a direct monetary loss of more than $25, 000, 000. 



AMERICA'S PART IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
NAVAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS 

By T. G. Frothingham, reprinted by courtesy of the 
United States Naval Institute Proceedings. 

ALTHOUGH most of us know that American tac- 
tics are being used in this great war, few realise 
the important part taken by weapons and tactics which 
had their origin in America. On land the European for- 
mal battles and formal fortresses have been superseded 
by armies manoeuvring and intrenching, as developed in 
our American wars. On the sea American ideas have 
been even more universally adopted. In their effect on 
methods and weapons of warfare, our three great wars, 
the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and the 
Civil War, are beyond comparison. 

Our war for independence, the American Revolution, 
was destined to differ in tactics from any previous war, 
and for these new tactics on land and sea the Colonists 
were well prepared. This is very little understood, even 
by those who have some historical knowledge ; but a care- 
ful study of the history of the Revolution shows that, al- 
though the Colonists were poor in resources, the Ameri- 
can soldiers and sailors had acquired the qualities that 
gave them victory. 

On land, the idea that "embattled farmers' sprang 
forth fully armed is wrong from every historical point of 
view. The "French wars" had given our people the 

284 



7 . J\ 



N""^-^^^^^^ 



-=Vi 




U. S. S. "CONSTITUTION" ("OLD IRONSIDES") 

From the Print by Bowen in the Collection of the Marine 
Museum, Boston, Mass. By Courtesy of the Society. 

The Symbol of the Spirit of the United States Navy. 
The Ancestor of the Modern Dreadnought. 



U. S. S. "Constitution" 

U. S. S. "Niagara" 

U. S. S. "Monitor" 

U. S. S. "Roanoke" 

U. S. S, "Michigan" 

U. S. S. "Pennsylvania 



1797 
1856 
1862 
1863 
1909 
1916 



285 



286 APPENDIX 

right preparation for the Revolution. Scattered through 
all the Colonies were officers and men who had served in 
the French and Indian War. Consequently, from Wash- 
ington down, through the personnel of our Continental 
Army, were men who had learned the lesson of tactics 
adapted to this continent. They had also learned, many 
of them from bitter experience, that such tactics were 
very effective against the British Army. On the sea the 
Colonists had another element of preparedness which is 
not generally appreciated. Nowhere in the world were 
there hardier and more intelligent seamen. Their ships 
had been on every sea, and American designers were al- 
ready noted for the speed of their ships. American sail- 
ors all over the world had gained the experience that 
was destined to make them so resourceful against their 
enemies. Many of them had been fighting in every kind 
of naval warfare. They were thus especially well 
equipped for war against a superior naval power, in 
which ingenuity and daring were necessary qualities. 

On land, the first action of the Revolutionary War was 
prophetic of great changes of tactics. The Lexington and 
Concord fight showed the helplessness of the old formal 
school against a line of battle in extended order, taking 
advantage of every natural shelter, never giving a set 
battle but attacking, here, there, and everywhere. 

On the sea, it was the same story. Harassing tactics 
were adopted by the Americans in naval warfare. With 
the poor resources at their command, the Colonists could 
not hope for a strong navy, and the number of ships 
commissioned in the United States Navy was small. 
But American naval vessels boldly sailed into the well 
guarded British seas, and actually harried the British 



APPENDIX 287 

coasts. These raids, culminating in the exploits of Paul 
Jones and the fight off Flamborough Head, had a serious 
effect on the British public. 

Our Navy also did damage to British commerce, and 
here another class of American ships was of great tacti- 
cal value. There being so few naval ships to give service 
to our seamen, private enterprise began to fit out ships. 
Soon a swarm of privateers was scattered over the seas, 
preying on the British merchant marine. English insur- 
ance rates were raised, and merchants were even deterred 
from shipping goods at any rate of insurance. The 
American privateers captured or destroyed about six hun- 
dred British ships of the value of $i 8,000,000 — very 
great losses for those days. 

"In all the memorials presented to Parliament the 
argument used to bring about peace was the unprece- 
dented destruction of English commerce," ^ and many au- 
thorities believe this argument of commerce destroying by 
the United States Navy and American privateers did 
more to gain independence than any other factor in the 
war. 

Probably, however, the most extraordinary event in 
the Revolution, in relation to the present war, was the 
first use of the torpedo and the submarine. Various 
forms of mines had been tried before with indifferent suc- 
cess, but nothing approaching the torpedo as used in the 
present war. 

In 1775 David Bushnell of Connecticut, who gradu- 
ated from Yale that year, built the "diving boat" known 
as the "American Turtle." Its design was astonishingly 
modern in many ways. It was made of iron plates, 

^ Maclay. 



288 APPENDIX 

propelled by a screw, and guided by a compass made 
visible by phosphorus. The torpedo was carried outside, 
to be attached to the enemy ship, and then cast loose. 
The action of casting off started a clockwork, which gave 
the submarine time to get away to a safe distance. 

This submarine and torpedo were first tried against 
the Eagle, a 64-gun ship, lying off New York. The oper- 
ator in the submarine found difficulty in attaching the 
torpedo, which contained 100 lbs. of powder, and the 
explosion was not near enough to the Eagle to cause any 
damage. It was again tried against the Cerberus at New 
London. The submarine missed the large ship, but blew 
up a schooner that lay near her, with several of her 
people killed. It was Bushnell who in 1778 set afloat 
torpedoes against the British shipping in the Delaware 
River near Philadelphia. They were in kegs and did lit- 
tle damage, but inspired the amusing poem "The Battle 
of the Kegs," written at the time. 

These attempts with the submarine and the torpedo, al- 
though they did very little actual harm, caused so much 
alarm and kept the enemy ships away from narrow waters 
to such an extent, that it is perfectly fair to say that the 
submarine and torpedo had a tactical value in the Revo- 
lutionary War. 

Thus it will be seen that in American warfare on the 
seas, in the Revolution, are found the germs of many of 
the most important naval tactics of the present war — 
tactical use of the torpedo, tactical use of the submarine, 
commerce destroying as a factor in war, raids upon the 
enemy's coasts by a weaker navy. 

Our second war with England, the War of 1812, 




AMERICAN LETTER OF MARQUE BRIG "GRAND TURK" (14 

GUNS) OF SALEM SALUTING MARSEILLES, 18 15 

From the Painting by Roux in the Collection of the East India 
Marine Society oi Salem. By Courtesy of the Society. 



found the Americans totally unprepared on land. The 
generation of the Revolution had passed away. There 
was no element in the population with any experience in 
war, except a few Indian fighters in the western part of 
the United Stiates. On the sea, things were very different. 
Our seamen had become even more expert in the interval 
between the two wars, our ships had maintained their 
superiority in speed, and our privateers repeated the dam- 
age of the Revolution, but on a larger scale. The Ameri- 
can privateers captured or destroyed in this war no less 
than thirteen hundred British vessels of the value of 

289 



290 APPENDIX 

$39,000,000. Such losses were unprecedented, and this 
destruction of commerce won us an advantageous peace. 

The following from the London Times is enough to 
show the effect of these losses on the public mind: 

"Lloyd's list contains notices of upward of five hun- 
dred British vessels captured in seven months by the 
Americans. Five hundred merchantmen and three frig- 
ates ! Can these statements be true *? And can the 
English people hear them unmoved?" The reference to 
the loss of "three frigates" is comment on another offen- 
sive developed by the Americans on the sea, which was 
the beginning of great changes in naval tactics. 

The United States Navy had only twenty-three ves- 
sels in commission in the War of 1812, including the 
squadrons of Perry and McDonough on the lakes, but 
in this small navy were concentrated skilled officers and 
men. Our Navy had gained experience of warfare in 
the Tripolitan War, etc., and it was far ahead of its time 
in construction and armament. 

Our naval constructors, with an intuition almost pro- 
phetic, had built a class of frigates, of which the Consti- 
tution is best known, and placed 24 pounders on them. 
Such an armament was ridiculed abroad, and it was pre- 
dicted that such ships would be useless — but, in the War 
of 1812, these frigates became the wonder of the world. 
Another extract from the London Times shows again the 
state of the public mind — "The fact seems to be estab- 
lished that the Americans have some superior mode of 
firing." The "fact" that the Times could not under- 
stand was the great advance in naval construction shown 
by these frigates of the United States Navy. This ad- 





AMERICAN ARMED BRIG "TENEDOS," OF BOSTON, AT 
SMYRNA, JULY 4, 1834. 



vanced design by American naval constructors was the 
birth of the "All big-gun ship" idea, which was destined 
to dominate naval construction ; and the Constitution 
may fairly be called the ancestor of the modern dread- 
nought. 

In the War of 1812 the American inventions of the 
torpedo and the submarine were of tactical value, al- 
though not in actual use. Robert Fulton had attempted 
to develop the Bushnell inventions, at first for the French 
and then for the English; but he had returned to Amer- 
ica discouraged. There was some aid voted for his ma- 
chines, but nothing was ever done with them in actual 
warfare. However, as in the Revolution, the idea that 
the Americans possessed such dangerous weapons proved 
a good defence for portions of our coast. 

In the Mexican War, as there was no navy to oppose 
291 




U. S. S. "NIAGARA" 

From the lithograph by Currier and Ives in the collection of the 
Marine Museum, Boston, Mass. By Courtesy of the Society. 

Carries 12 Dahlgren Guns, weighing 14 tons, each 11 inches in 
diameter in the bore, throwing a solid shot of 270 lbs. or a shell of 
180 lbs. a distance of four miles. This was a very powerful arma- 
ment for the times. 



our operations, the use of our navy, although important, 
did not develop tactical changes. Yet it is a curious fact 
that steamers were then first used in naval warfare.^ In 
the same spirit of progress that had placed the heavy 
guns on the Constitution, the United States Navy built 
steam frigates, the Niagara, Wabash, etc., which 
had the most powerful armament of their class, holding 
' Soley. 

292 





A 






.y 


I'i-^ 








r«r" 




AMERICAN ARMED BARQUE "STAMBOUL," OF BOSTON, AT 
MARSEILLES, 1844. 



fast to our Navy's consistent policy of making the gun 
all-important. 

The Civil War brought about still greater advances 
in American heavily armed warships, which revolution- 
ised naval ships and naval tactics throughout the world. 
The attack in Hampton Roads on the Union fleet by the 
Merrimac, converted into the casemate ironclad Virginia 
by the Confederates, showed decisively the helplessness 
of wooden ships against armoured ships. The fight that 
followed between the Virginia and the first turret ship, 
the Monitor, was the first challenge to guns in casemates 
by guns in turrets. The construction of the epoch-mak- 
ing Monitor had been hurried, and she was defective in 
many ways. Consequently, although the Monitor saved 
the Union fleet, the question of superiority between the 
two types remained undecided in many minds. 

293 




U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA" (ist) 1837, Ship-of-the-Hne 
(three decker) 

From the Lithograph by N. Currier in the Collection of the Marine 
Museum, Boston, Mass. By Courtesy of the Society. 

Rate, 120 guns. 16, 8 in. 104, 32 pr. Total, 120. Complements 
1,100. Tonnage, 3,241. Laid down, 1822. Completed, 1837, Phila- 
delphia. Cost, $694,500. Annual cost in commission, $382,432. 
Note : Originally this Pennsylvania carried 140 guns. The above 
data are quoted from the Navy Register of July 1, 1850. 

The less known fight in Wassaw Sound in 1863 estab- 
lished the superiority of a few big guns in turrets over 
a greater number in casemates. The Atlanta, a Con- 
federate casemate ironclad of the type of the Virginia, 
came out to destroy two monitors, with two excursion 
steamers to watch the destruction. The monitor Wee- 
haw ken fired just five shots — and the contest was ended 

294 




Copyright, E. Muller 

U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," 1916 

Guns — 12, 14 in. 22, 5 in. Total, 34. Complement, 1,100. Ton- 
nage, 32,567. Laid down, 1913. Completed, 1916. Built at New- 
port News. Cost, $14,000,000. 

295 



296 APPENDIX 

for all time in favour of big guns in turrets. The all-big- 
gun ship commands the sea in this war — and the big guns 
in turrets have never been supplanted. 

In the Monitor type, from one to two turrets was but a 
step, and many such monitors were built. Then came 
the Roanoke (1863), another stage in the development 
of the Monitor. The Roanoke was a "sea-going turret 
vessel" with three turrets, all aligned over the keel. 
Here were the essentials of the dreadnought of to-day,^ 
and this American design of big guns in turrets, aligned 
over the keel, has prevailed over all other types of ar- 
moured warships. 

Foreign navies have been reluctant to accept this de- 
sign. They have built all kinds of armoured ships, and on 
their turret vessels used various arrangements of the 
turrets. English and German dreadnoughts, designed 
less than ten years ago, have other dispositions of the 
turrets ; but, in the latest classes of dreadnoughts, all 
foreign naval constructors have conformed to the Ameri- 
can design of turrets aligned over the keel, from which 
we have never swerved in mounting our heavy guns. 

From the Constitution to the first Pennsylvania, to the 
Niagara, to the Monitor, to the Roanoke, to the Michigan, 
to the present fleet flagship Pennsylvania, are but steps in 
the American idea of the all-big-gun-ship. 



In the Civil War there was also a great development 
of the torpedo, and of the submarine. The use of tor- 

*"For one nowadays to see a drawing of the battery plan of 
the U. S. S. Roanoke is to be reminded that there is nothing 
new under the sun." Lieut. Corn. W. P. Cronan, U. S. N., ia 
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. 



APPENDIX 297 

pedoes by the Confederates was of real tactical value to 
them. Their torpedoes were placed, as are mines in the 
present war, to protect narrow waters and harbours. 
Covered by artillery fire, these mine fields undoubtedly 
proved a good defence in many cases against the superior 
naval power of the North. Many Federal warships were 
destroyed by them, among these the monitors Tecumseh 
and Petapsco. In fact they were a long step toward the 
great mine fields, which now defend the German bases 
against the stronger British fleet. 

There was also tactical use of the torpedo as a weapon 
of offence, the Confederate ram Albemarle being the 
most important warship so destroyed. The Albemarle 
was torpedoed in Cushing's daring night attack. As is 
well known, with a volunteer crew, he attacked in a 
launch with the torpedo rigged on a spar. This torpedo 
was exploded by pulling a lanyard. 

The Confederates also made great strides in the de- 
velopment of the submarine. Under-sea boats approach- 
ing the modern type were built, especially at Charleston. 
The torpedo was thrust out forward on a spar instead 
of being ejected from a tube. One type had an engine, 
but the best known submarine, used at Charleston, was 
propelled by the crew who sat along the shaft and re- 
volved it by hand. These submarines were fearfully 
dangerous to their crews, and many crews were drowned 
in this type of boat. But the Confederates, by the use of 
the submarine, destroyed one good Federal cruiser, the 
U. S. sloop of war Housatonic, off Charleston in 1864. 

This Confederate development of the original Ameri- 
can idea of the submarine undoubtedly paved the way 
for Holland, Lake and others, and led to the recent high 



298 APPENDIX 

efficiency of the U-boat, which has become so important 
a factor in the grand tactics of the present war. As a 
dangerous commerce destroyer, nothing approaching the 
U-boats has ever been seen. 

The other commerce destroyers, the light German crui- 
sers, which made such destructive raids on British ship- 
ping, closely followed the tactics of the Confederate Navy 
in the Civil War, which was the first navy to make com- 
merce destroying a factor in war after the passing of the 
privateer.-*^ 

At the outbreak of the Civil War the Confederate 
Government hoped to create a fleet of privateers. This 
proved impossible. The South did not have the ships, 
and privateering was not of much importance in the war. 
The South then tried new tactics, and the Confederate 
Navy commissioned warships whose mission was com- 
merce-destroying. 

These cruisers, Sumter, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 
etc., almost drove the United States flag from the seas. 
With the command of the sea hopelessly against them, 
their raids were carried on with the greatest ingenuity and 
daring, and it was very difficult to catch them. 

In the present war the German cruisers imitated the 
tactics of these Confederate commerce-destroyers, and did 
a great amount of damage, with the same control of the 
sea against them. The Alabama and the Emden will 
always be associated in their kin?hip of successful au- 
dacity. 

For the Federals on the sea the hardest task was the 
blockade of the Confederate coast. Blockades had been 

^"Privateering is and remains abolished." Declaration of 
Paris, 1856. 



APPENDIX 299 

used before in warfare, and the status of a blockade was 
well defined/ What the United States Navy accom- 
plished was no "cabinet blockade," but an effective block- 
ade such as had never been seen. 

Here was one of the longest coast-lines in the world, 
where harbours and inlets gave every advantage to the 
blockade-runner. The United States Navy had not ships 
enough to carry out the task, but, with characteristic 
energy all kinds of craft were utilised. The steamer 
Circassian, one of the most valuable prizes of the war, 
was actually captured by a Fulton ferry-boat. At first 
the blockade was de facto, as different portions of the 
coast were policed and notified of the blockade, but in 
an astonishingly short time the long coast-line was ef- 
fectively hemmed in. "As to the legal efficiency of the 
blockade after the first six months there can be no ques- 
tion." ^ 

This was only the beginning of the undertaking. 
Great profits offered inducements to blockade-runners. 
After the blockade became stringent and ships were be- 
ing constantly seized on the high seas, attempts were 
made to evade capture by clearing for one of the avail- 
able neutral ports, touching there, and then trying to run 
into a Confederate port. Bermuda, Nassau, Havana, and 
Matamoras were these ports, of which Nassau was much 
the most active. The idea was that the claim of neutral 
destination would protect the ship for most of its voyage, 
and it would only be in danger in the short run between 
the neutral port and the Southern port. 

^"A blockade to be legal must be effective." Declaration of 
Paris. 
2 Prof. J. R. Soley, U. S. N. 



300 APPENDIX 

This practice proved easy to stop, as the character of 
cargo and evidence of final destination brought condem- 
nation in the courts. This evidence was most difficult 
in the case of Matamoras, the only town of importance 
on the Confederate southern border, but so general be- 
came the forfeiture of ships and cargoes that some other 
evasion was necessary. 

The next scheme tried was clearance for the neutral 
ports, and then trans-shipment at the neutral port. The 
return cargoes were to be handled in the same way. 
"But here again the courts stepped in, and held that 
though a trans-shipment was made, even after landing 
the cargo and going through a form of sale, the two 
voyages were parts of one and the same transaction, and 
the cargo from the outset was liable to condemnation, if 
the original intention had been to forward the goods to 
a blockaded port. Nor did the decision stop here. As 
all property, both ship and cargo, is confiscated upon 
proof of breach of blockade, it was held that ships carry- 
ing on this traffic to neutral ports were confiscable, pro- 
vided the ultimate destination of the cargo to a block- 
aded port was known to the owner. In the words of the 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 'The ships are 
planks of the same bridge.' " ^ 

The last resort of the blockade-runners was most in- 
genious, to break the voyage by shipping to a Federal 
port, then to a neutral port, then to the Confederate port. 
Goods were shipped to New York by regular steamship 
lines, thence to Nassau, to be sent to the South. This 
was ended, when it was observed that trade with Nassau 
and Bermuda was abnormal, by orders issued to the col- 

' Soley. 



APPENDIX 301 

lectors of customs to refuse clearance to vessels whose 
cargoes were in danger of falling into the hands of the 
enemy, and to require owners to give ample security 
where there was ground for apprehension that cargoes 
were destined for the enemy's use. 

These orders were general and named no particular 
ports. Yet the "Merchants of Nassau" complained of 
this "unjust discrimination" and persuaded Earl Russell 
to take up the subject diplomatically. The correspond- 
ence that followed showed so plainly that "the trade of 
the Baham.as" was blockade-running, that the British 
Government "derived little satisfaction," and the traffic 
was ended. 

Thus were overcome difficulties, physical and legal, 
that seemed insuperable. The amount of harm done to 
the South by these perfected blockading tactics cannot be 
estimated. 

This well established case of successful legal blockad- 
ing tactics was at the command of the British Govern- 
ment at the outbreak of this war. Enforcement of a legal 
blockade against the Teutonic alliance would have been 
very difficult. Instead of trying this. Great Britain at- 
tempted in the beginning of the war to keep goods from 
the Teutonic allies by using her command of the sea, 
and an increasing list of contraband. Great Britain is 
now avowedly trying to imitate the blockade of our Civil 
War. 

The American invention and development of the aero- 
plane is so recent that there is no need to describe it. 

It is impressive to sum up these American contribu- 
tions to the naval weapons and tactics of to-day. 

The development of the all-big-gun ship. 



302 APPENDIX 

The tactical superiority of the armoured ship. 
The tactical superiority of guns in turrets— and of 
turrets aligned over the keel. 
The tactical use of the torpedo. 
The tactical use of the submarine. 
Commerce destroying as a factor in warfare. 
Raids of an enemy's coasts by an inferior navy. 
Establishment of a legal blockade of a long coast line. 
The invention and development of the airplane. 



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